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Preface
Ongoing international economic integration has without any doubt been one of the most
formative societal trends in the last few decades, and it is expected that it will continue
and even accelerate. If any more evidence of this was needed, the financial crisis, culmi-
nating in the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and the
ensuing recession hitting economies - both developed and developing - around the globe
simultaneously, is a tragic and living proof of this statement. Governments, supranational
institutions and central banks around the world saw the need to take unprecedented action,
both in scope and nature of the measures. In the United States and the United Kingdom,
e.g., record new government debt to finance economic stimulus packages give the state a
role it has not had in decades. The crisis, contradicting the hope many economists have
had that globalization served as an insurance as a crisis in one region would typically be
next to prosperity in other economic areas, has called to mind how interrelated economies
are today. What it also has made immediately clear is the big role the state as an economic
actor plays. Now that the burden of governments’ reaction to the crisis has to be carried
in a time when labor markets are strained, the whole issue of governments’ tax-raising
possibilities is high on the agenda of both academic discussions and the public debate.
This happens in a time in which jurisdictions are, at the regional and often global levels,
competing: For mobile capital and high-skilled labor, for instance, competition is found
in taxes, but also in regulatory policies, environmental standards, and public input goods,
inter alia. The facts that openness of goods and factors makes national policies strongly
interrelated, and that competition for the particularly mobile factor capital guides and
constrains governments in their choice of instruments are the fundamental lines of thought
underlying this thesis. It is now widely agreed upon that intergovernmental competition
may be harmful, which dates back to Oates (1972). He expressed the thought that jurisdic-
tions may keep taxes suboptimally low in order to be an attractive location for businesses,
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which is in contrast to the so-called Tiebout hypothesis (Tiebout (1956)).1 There is by
now a plethora of papers on different issues of tax competition, including examples where
it may be beneficial (for instance, Edwards and Keen (1996)). For a nice survey, refer to
Wilson (1999).
My thesis has the aim of shedding some light on a few questions arising in the context of
governmental action in the face of inter-jurisdictional competition. A focus will be on the
implications of distortions in goods and labor markets, whereby labor market asymmetries
take center stage as they are empirically relevant and allow for interesting new insights
from a theoretical and a practical policy point of view. But there is more to this: It is not
exaggerated if one claims that labor market phenomena like unionization, minimum wages,
unemployment, and the like, are among the most (and most controversially) debated topics
in economics, both at the academic level and when it comes to discussions with the more
general interested public. This is true in particular for debates on globalization and its
consequences. Former independent US presidential candidate and billionaire Ross Perot
once famously opposed NAFTA, North America’s free trade agreement, claiming that jobs
would be lost for America in a ‘giant sucking sound’. Will globalization, while generally
proven to be beneficial due to a better international division of labor, economies of scale
and a larger variety of goods, put an end to traditional Western European strong trade
unions? What will happen given immediate competition from locations in Eastern Europe
and especially South East Asia, where a huge workforce, increasingly trained, is able and
willing to work at labor costs that are often a tiny fraction of those in Europe and the
USA?2 Against this background, it is a natural question to ask what tax policy can do in
reaction. Will taxes fall to partly compensate for wages which cannot fall due to institu-
tional constraints? Will governments try to influence unions? Under which conditions may
international competition even give governments the opportunity to curtail labor market
distortions? These are many and very big questions. It is the ambition of this thesis to
contribute a few steps on the long way to the answers.
Although modular in nature, in this book, there is the common theme of policy compe-
tition in ever more integrating economies. Finding answers to questions that arise from
the complex nexus of interrelated policies’ effects and the increasingly important role of
1It states that jurisdictions’ competition for mobile households is desirable from a welfare point of view
since the provision of local public goods will be in accord with the tastes of residents. The tax competition
literature, which has grown exuberantly since the 1980s, then states that similar arguments cannot be
applied to mobile companies.
2There is, of course, a large body of work on questions related to this, e.g., in form of the literature on
unionized oligopolies which examines the role of distortions in goods and labor markets. However, little
work has been done relating this to tax policies.
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openness on various fields requires rigorous theoretical reasoning as well as the application
of modern econometric methods. In this dissertation, I concentrate more on the theory
side, although empirical parts are to be found in Chapters 4 and 6.
To give a short outline of the structure and storyline, Chapter 1 has the purpose of putting
into place earlier results that the outcome of competition for foreign direct investment
depends on the industry structure: I argue that FDI’s location depends on ownership
structures of existing industry. The chapter also has the motivation of laying out a basic
model which will then be used to examine further issues: Chapter 2 will display a framework
in which there are two governments competing for investment by an outside firm, and
the two countries are asymmetric in that the one has a unionized and the other has a
competitive labor market. It will examine if and how tax policy is related to wage-setting
in the sense that the union may be influenced in its behavior. Chapter 4’s theoretical part
uses a similar model, with one crucial modelling difference due to a very different question
in mind: Endogeneity of the labor market distortion is ruled out by assumption, and the
chapter examines to which degree tax policy is used to overcome a country’s disadvantage
that arises from a higher labor cost. Chapter 3 employs a very different model type,
namely a monopolistic competition, New Trade style approach with agglomeration forces,
to address the question under which conditions a unionized country finds it optimal to use
tax policy to defend its existing, unionized sector industry. In this literature, it is typically
found that industrialized countries will be able to defend their cores in tax competition.
The chapter argues that taxes may be used to overcome an otherwise persistent inefficient
lock-in.
Chapter 5 then makes a big step in a different direction and explores specific commodity
taxation in view of the fact that in markets like the European car market, significant price
differences (before and after taxes) can be observed. Existing literature has shown that
price discrimination exploiting real trade costs should be banned; I take a look at similar
regulation in the presence of goods taxes. The chapter is related to the others in that it
also considers how market integration and tax policies are interrelated; this time, however,
I do not consider non-cooperative policy’s goals and consequences given existing structures
and asymmetries, but I rather examine the optimality of the establishment of a set of
rules which will then have its bearing on tax policy. In all the chapters up to this point,
governments have only one instrument. Chapter 6, finally, looks at what it means when
governments have two instruments. The theory part analyzes how tax and public input
competition are interrelated. In the empirical section, we find that local governments adjust
their business tax rate towards levels chosen in neighboring jurisdictions. Also, if neighbors
increase their spending on local infrastructure, governments follow suit by increasing their
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own spending, which suggests the interactions are more complex than displayed by existing
literature.
Before delving into the heart of the matters, let me briefly introduce the most basic features
and contributions of each of the chapters.
Chapter 1: The role of firm ownership in tax competition
Chapter 1 analyzes the role that the ownership structure of companies plays for govern-
ments in asymmetric countries’ competition for a multinational’s subsidiary. I argue that
equilibrium tax policies as well as a foreign investor’s location decision in policy compe-
tition between these countries critically depend on ownership of incumbent industry. It
turns out that otherwise disadvantageous locations with high shares of their incumbent
production facilities owned by foreigners may be successful in attracting multinationals.
As is usual in those games, due to the auction-like character, the outcome will be efficient
in that aggregate welfare will be maximized, i.e. the mobile capital will be induced to go
to a country precisely if this maximizes the sum of both countries’ welfare and the multi-
national’s profits. However, regional welfare is lowered by tax competition below a certain
level of trade costs. In a nutshell, I argue that the outcome of tax competition may be less
determined by the industry structure than by that industry’s ownership structure. The
chapter is based on Mittermaier (2009).
Chapter 2: Unionization triggers tax incentives to attract foreign direct invest-
ment
Chapter 2 looks into tax competition between a unionized and a non-unionized country
for the location of a mobile firm owned by third-country foreigners. Unionization offers
an extra incentive for the government to attract a foreign investor, in order to affect the
behavior of the domestic union. This results in the unionized country’s government offering
a tax discount (or a subsidy premium) to the outside firm in excess of what is needed to
compensate the investor for the higher union wage. Therefore, in equilibrium, the union-
ized country attracts the foreign investment, even if it has no other location advantages.
Still, the country with the union ends up with a lower per-capita welfare compared to the
location with the competitive labor market. The model analyzes how tax policy can have
an influence on other actors’ behavior, who will then influence a location’s attractiveness
for mobile capital. So tax policy is shown to have an indirect effect via affecting the be-
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havior of another player like a union, which can lead to surprising results: In our case,
a country that can attract mobile capital although it has an inefficient labor market, an
existing competitor (which the other one doesn’t display) and even a smaller market. The
chapter is based on joint work with Prof. Dr. Andreas Haufler, LMU Munich (Haufler and
Mittermaier (2009.))
Chapter 3: The winner gives it all: Unions, tax competition and offshoring
Chapter 3 analyzes competition for capital between welfare-maximizing governments in
a framework with agglomeration tendencies and asymmetric unionization. We find that
a unionized country’s government finds it optimal to use tax policy to induce industry to
relocate towards a location with a competitive labor market instead of realizing the benefits
from higher wage income while exporting part of the wage burden to foreign consumers.
Via a tax regime effect, which favors the factor capital, and an efficiency effect, consumers
and producers alike benefit from off-shoring industry towards a low-cost country. Our
result qualifies first intuition that defending high wage industries is beneficial to a country
as part of the associated cost is shifted to foreign consumers. The result is obtained in
a model where capital is mobile, but its owners keep on residing in their respective home
countries and repatriate income, which we consider more apt to our application than what
is assumed in many other agglomeration models. Things change if governments disregard
capitalists’ income and focus instead on laborers: Then, the industrialized country will hold
on to its industry as long as the labor market distortion is not too strong. The chapter is
based on joint work with Hyun-Ju Koh, LMU Munich (Koh and Mittermaier (2009)).
Chapter 4: Do countries compensate firms for international wage differentials?
Chapter 4 shows, in a short theoretical section, that in a bidding race for FDI, it is optimal
for governments to compensate firms for labor cost differentials. The model is similar in
its basic structure to the one employed in Chapter 2, but a lot less complex. It illustrates
that without an influence on a labor market distortion, a country will not find it optimal
to attract a mobile outside firm if it doesn’t have a location advantage like a larger market.
However, we show there are cases where a government of a country with a labor cost
disadvantage will be able and willing to attract capital, using a subsidy, where it would not
be able to attract it in the absence of such a policy instrument. This finding is supported by
panel data estimations for Western Europe, suggesting that corporate income tax rates are
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significantly lower in countries with relatively high labor costs. We exploit the exogenous
integration of the former communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the ensuing surprising
and immediate location competition from countries in Western Europe to show that there
was a reaction in taxes on factors like wages. A direct tax competition effect is not plausible,
at least not as the main driving force, as taxes in Western Europe began to fall before those
in Eastern European economies. The chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Johannes
Rincke, LMU Munich (Mittermaier and Rincke (2009)).
Chapter 5: Should market integration be enforced?
Chapter 5 takes up a very different issue and brings together two strands of literature,
namely on specific taxation and on antidumping with imperfect competition. Taking Eu-
rope’s car market as a starting point, it examines the role of market integration in the
presence of non-cooperative specific taxation among welfare-maximizing governments. I
show that integrated markets in the sense of a strict ban on price discrimination across
markets is welfare optimal in the sense of bringing taxes closer to the cooperative solu-
tion as well as in the sense of sparing the economies wasteful reciprocal dumping. I also
show that with foreign-owned firms or asymmetric countries, market integration may no
longer be optimal or consensual, respectively, qualifying the earlier (and existing theory’s)
results. Also, integrated markets may benefit producers in contrast to what existing litera-
ture showed. The results are derived under consumption-based taxation, i.e.the destination
principle, but I show that they also hold under production taxation (the so-called origin
principle).
Chapter 6: Fiscal competition over taxes and public inputs: Theory and evi-
dence
Chapter 6 characterizes the reaction functions of governments competing for capital by
choosing both the business tax rate as well as a productive public input. For this purpose,
we construct a simple model that enables us to analyze the strategic effects involved in
competition with two instruments chosen simultaneously. We then test the model predic-
tions regarding the nature of strategic interaction among governments. The estimations
of a system of spatially interrelated equations suggest that local governments use both
the business tax rate and public inputs to compete for capital. We find that if neighbors
cut their tax rates, governments try to restore competitiveness by lowering their own tax
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and increasing public inputs. If neighbors provide more infrastructure, governments react
by increasing their own spending. The chapter is based on joint work with Dr. Johannes
Rincke, LMU Munich, and Dr. Sebastian Hauptmeier, ECB Frankfurt (Hauptmeier et al.
(2009)).
All chapters are based on stand-alone papers and can be read separately. Hence, to facili-
tate reading within chapters, footnotes and equations are numbered independently in each
chapter. Figures are embedded within the text, whereas appendices and tables containing
empirical results can be found at the end of each chapter. A last note on pronouns: I
generally prefer ‘I’ over the somewhat aristocrat ‘we’ in single-authored pieces. The parts
of this thesis that are based on joint work will, of course, be written in the first person
plural.
Chapter 1
The role of firm ownership in tax
competition
1.1 Introduction
With increasing mobility of real capital and falling trade costs, making closeness of pro-
duction to final consumers ever less important, competition for mobile capital has become
one of the most widely studied and debated forms of interjurisdictional competition in the
last few decades. There is a large theoretical literature on jurisdictions competing for for-
eign direct investment (FDI). Many examples in the European Union show that states are
willing to offer considerable subsidies in order to attract potential investors’ new sites. A
prominent one is the aid to AMD (microelectronics) for a production site in Eastern Ger-
many, which was approved by the EU Commission in 2004 and amounted to EUR 545m,
23% of the total investment costs. Another example is the case of a subsidy to Kia Motors
for a project necessary for the production of a new model in Slovakia, where direct aid
of EUR 32m, 15% of the eligible investment costs, was granted in 2007.1 Increased local
competition, reducing distortions arising from concentrated markets, and thus increased
consumer surplus is one obvious advantage of the attraction of mobile firms. Creation of
jobs in internationally operating industries or technological spill-overs are other widespread
motives.
The present paper aims to contribute to the literature on competition for mobile firms
1Source: European Commission, Directorate General for Competition (Official Journal of the European
Communities, C and L)). Those are examples for cases where state aid is allowed according to Articles
87(3)(a) and 87(3)(c) of the EU Treaty, cf. European Commission (2007b).
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by focusing on the role of ownership structure in the domestic industry. Even though
internationalization of large companies’ ownership structures is a feature of globalization
and economic integration in general, this topic has received little attention so far in the
theoretical literature, but it is clearly of empirical relevance. International portfolio invest-
ment is at a high level in Europe (cf. Adjaoute´ et al. (2000)). Huizinga and Nicode`me
(2006), using the ‘Amadeus’ database (containing balance sheets and income statements
for European firms), compute that the asset-weighted foreign ownership share in Europe
as a whole was at about 21.5 % in 2000, and even at 32.9% in Eastern Europe, based on
a sample of about 15,000 firms without an exchange listing in various sectors. Focussing
on manufacturing and looking at the share of foreign-controlled affiliates in manufacturing
turnover from OECD (2005) as an indicator of internationality in firm ownership, those
fractions are strikingly high for some countries like Ireland (79.5%), Hungary (71.6%) or
Luxembourg (52.9%); but also in larger countries like France (35.9%), Germany (24.4%) or
the United States (20.3%), the numbers are significant.2 This affects economies not only
because profits will often be repatriated, but also since the dependency on strategic and
employment decisions by foreign investors is high.3 Another statistic to look at, which,
inter alia, sparked the idea for this paper, is the comparison of gross domestic and gross
national products. Looking at 2007 World Bank (World Development Indicators) data on
GDP and GNI, the former exceeds the latter by 19% in Ireland. In contrast, the corre-
sponding figure for the UK is only 3.3%. Although a crude measure, this can be interpreted
as an indication that a comparatively larger fraction of Ireland’s production facilities is not
owned by nationals. The notion that countries should care about the degree to which they
own ‘their’ industries suggests itself in policy competition among ever more integrating
economies.
In this paper, I argue that differences in the national ownership share of local production
facilities can be crucial in determining countries’ incentives to attract international firms.
In a model where a foreign multinational is choosing between two possible locations sep-
arated by real transport costs, the question is addressed whether the presence of mainly
domestically owned (as opposed to more foreign-owned) industry makes a difference in
2When interpreting those figures, on should take into account that in order to qualify as foreign-
controlled, a single foreign investor (or group of associated investors) has to hold more than 50% of the
shares with voting rights.
3A more indirect indicator of economic globalization is employment in firms under foreign control
as a percentage of total manufacturing employment. As long as foreign-controlled firms do not employ
significantly more people for the same production activities, this figure also gives a hint at the lower bound
of the degree of internationality in firm control. For 2006, in the Czech Republic, the figure was 39.6%.
The corresponding numbers were, for example, 33.1% in Belgium, 28.4% in the United Kingdom, 26.3%
in France, 15.6% in Germany, and a mere 11.2% in the United States, see OECD (2009).
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bidding competition. I show that not having a national company can give an otherwise
losing country the edge over a bigger rival in bidding competition.
The model is related to two different strands in the literature: One focuses on the compe-
tition for mobile firms, like the monopolist model in Haufler and Wooton (1999) and the
duopoly case considered in Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). Haufler and Wooton find that in
equilibrium, the monopolist will decide to go to the bigger of the two countries which may
even be able to tax it. Bjorvatn and Eckel demonstrate that the market structure plays a
significant role as absence of an incumbent firm can make up for a location’s disadvantage
of having a smaller market.4 A complementary piece of analysis to this paper is Ferrett
and Wooton (2009) who consider the effects of ownership of the new investment (as op-
posed to the existing industry) and show that it does not matter for the outcome of tax
competition. In terms of the basic modelling strategy, I follow this part of the literature,
which, however, has not explicitly addressed the role of incumbents’ ownership so far. A
second strand has considered this, but in different policy settings. Fuest (2005), in a model
with an endogenous export vs. FDI decision, shows that in the country considered, in the
absence of tariffs, falling trade costs induce profit taxes to fall as well. The existence of
foreign ownership can prevent profit taxes from falling in line with trade costs. Huizinga
and Nielsen (1997) argue, inter alia, that source-based investment taxes can be used to
shift income away from domestic firms that are in part owned by foreigners to domestic
citizens.
For empirical evidence on the impact of taxes and market size on the FDI location decision,
refer to Devereux and Griffith (1998).5
The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model. Section
1.3, the main part of the analysis, introduces policy influence and the role of both symmetric
and differing ownership structures. Section 1.4 provides a brief welfare analysis. Section
5.5 concludes.6
4The case of two countries bidding for two mobile firms is examined in Ferrett and Wooton (2009); an
extension to the generalized oligopoly case for both symmetric and asymmetric countries is discussed in
Haufler and Wooton (2007). For an analysis of tax competition with full agglomeration in a New Economic
Geography framework, see Baldwin and Krugman (2004); for a partial agglomeration case, refer to Borck
and Pflu¨ger (2006).
5Theory and evidence on tax competition among asymmetric jurisdictions with public consumption
and public input goods can be found in Bu¨ttner (1999).
6A slightly abridged version of this chapter will appear as Mittermaier (2009).
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1.2 FDI in an oligopolistic industry: A simple model
Consider a region with two countries, A and B, each of which already hosting one not
necessarily locally owned firm of a specific industry, and a potential entrant. Let a and b
denote the existing firms in countries A andB, respectively.7 The two markets are separated
by unit transport costs τ . The firms in this oligopolistic industry produce a homogeneous
good, x. A is the larger economy in that there is a single household in country B and
n ≥ 1 identical households in country A. There is demand for a second, nume´raire good,
z, produced by perfectly competitive firms where labor is the only input so that free trade
in this good equalizes wages to w. Preferences in the countries are:
uI = αxI − 1
2
βx2I + z, I ∈ {A,B}. (1)
This quadratic, quasi-linear utility function parallels that used in Horstmann and Markusen
(1992) and gives rise to linear demand. A household inelastically supplies one unit of labor,
earning it an income of w. Maximizing the representative utility function subject to the
implied budget constraint w = pIxI + zI , one obtains (inverse) demand for x. This yields
XA =
n(α− pA)
β
; XB =
α− pB
β
, (2)
(with pI denoting the price of x in market I) as country A’s and country B’s aggregate
demand for x, respectively. As in the z sector, wages are the only variable costs in the
oligopolistic industry. In order to set up a plant, however, a fixed amount has to be spent,
assumed to be sufficiently large to prevent a firm from producing in both locations.8 Let-
ting firms compete a` la Cournot, each firm is partially protected in its domestic market by
transport costs, and reciprocal dumping will occur in equilibrium, cf. Brander and Krug-
man (1983). The intuition for this at first glance pointless trade in homogeneous products
is that eating into foreign firms’ oligopoly rents makes it worthwhile to incur the real trade
cost.
Now, a firm in the same industry from a third country wants to serve the regional market.
I assume that trade costs between its home country and the region under consideration are
too high to make exporting from there worthwhile.
7I assume the existing industry, but not necessarily its ownership, to be symmetrically dispersed across
countries as the impact of different market concentrations across locations is not at the center of this
analysis. For a discussion of the role of different industry structures within countries, refer to Bjorvatn
and Eckel (2006).
8I do not go deeper into this point of ‘exports vs. FDI’ as it is has been examined extensively in the
literature; see, e.g., Horstmann and Markusen (1992).
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In what follows, subscripts denote the countries or firms in question and superscripts indi-
cate the foreign investor’s location decision (A or B). If f goes to A, profits will amount
to
piAa (= pi
A
f ) =
n(α− w + τ)2
16β
+
(α− w − 2τ)2
16β
; (3)
piAb =
n(α− w − 3τ)2
16β
+
(α− w + 2τ)2
16β
(4)
for firms a, f and b, respectively. The first terms in (1) and (4) represent a firm’s market
A profits, the second ones market B profits. Consumer surplus will be
CSAA =
n(3α− 3w − τ)2
32β
; CSAB =
(3α− 3w − 2τ)2
32β
(5)
in countries A and B, respectively. These equations show how the two markets are ‘made’
by the transport costs.
Similarly, if f decides to locate in the smaller market B,
piBb (= pi
B
f ) =
n(α− w − 2τ)2
16β
+
(α− w + τ)2
16β
; (6)
piBa =
n(α− w + 2τ)2
16β
+
(α− w − 3τ)2
16β
, (7)
will be the firms’ equilibrium profits and
CSBA =
n(3α− 3w − 2τ)2
32β
; CSBB =
(3α− 3w − τ)2
32β
(8)
will be the respective countries’ equilibrium consumer surpluses. Again, CSBA , e.g., reads
‘consumer surplus in A if f goes to B’. One further assumption will be made: Transport
costs are below the prohibitive level τ proh = (α − w)/3 so that all Cournot equilibria will
be interior. This ensures that ‘cross-hauling’, i.e., two-way trade, will occur. If any, profits
of firms a and b will be of interest to the two countries’ governments, as f ’s profits are
assumed to be fully repatriated. Without government intervention and symmetric market
structures, it is immediately obvious that the foreign investor will always choose to locate
in the bigger country (and will be indifferent if n = 1) for any positive level of trade costs.
This is intuitive as when producing in the larger part, one has to bear transport costs only
for a smaller fraction of the total market.9
9This phenomenon is called the ‘home market effect’ in the New Trade literature. The ‘geographic
advantage’ Λ that A offers to f is simply the difference in profits (not taking into account taxes and fixed
costs): Λ ≡ piAf − piBf = (3/16)[τ(n− 1)(2α− 2w − τ)]. This advantage is increasing and concave in τ .
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1.3 Tax Policy
Throughout this paper, it is assumed that the two regions’ governments do not cooperate.
Due to increased local goods market competition, attracting the multinational has the
advantage of increased consumer surplus because of lower prices.10 Welfare in each country
is determined by consumer surplus, tax receipts and, if the incumbent local industry is
at least partly domestically owned, a share λ of this industry’s profit.11 Tax receipts are
redistributed to the respective country’s residents, or, in case a subsidy has to be paid, it
is financed via a lump-sum tax. In spite of trade between countries, due to real transport
costs, competition among firms within one certain location is fiercer: The marginal cost of
domestic sales is lower than that of exports. However, there is the second effect that to
the extent that the incumbent firm is domestically owned, that country’s government will
have to take into account that f as a new competitor will lower the incumbent’s profits by
more than if it went to the other jurisdiction.
If governments are free to tax or subsidize the foreign firm, it is not clear ex ante which
country will win the ‘bidding race’ and whether f will have to pay taxes in equilibrium.
In order to determine the outcome of tax competition, observe that the game between the
two governments resembles a bidding race in which the governments charge the foreign
firm the highest possible ‘entry fee’ (or give it the lowest possible ‘welcome gift’ in the
case of a subsidy). The firm simply decides to locate in the region where its after-tax
profits are highest. To find the equilibrium, then, one has to work out the best offer a
country is willing to make to f and compare it to the minimum offer it has to make so
as to outbid its competitor. The gain GI a country I can make by attracting the firm
is simply its welfare WF II in that event minus its welfare if f went to the other country,
WF JI , whereby those levels are before any tax or subsidy (i.e., gains are ‘gross gains’) and
amount to: WF II = CS
I
I + λApi
A
i ,where i = (a, b) and λA ² [0, 1] denotes the share of
firm a that is owned by A’s residents (and λB is the corresponding expression for country
B residents’ share of firm b), whereby the respective rests of the firms’ shares are owned
by third-country foreigners, leading to an outflow of profits out of the considered region.
10As mentioned above, there are many other motives that make the attraction of mobile capital beneficial
to a country, like the sparking of agglomerative forces or the creation of jobs. I follow the bulk of the
literature in this field (e.g., Haufler and Wooton (1999) or Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006)) in abstracting from
such motives as they are much harder to model and do not yield additional insights to the research question
at hand, at least not if they benefit both countries alike.
11This is easily observed by (using the assumption in the case of country A that profits, inasmuch
as they accrue to the country’s inhabitants, and taxes are equally shared among residents) plugging the
expenditures for the nume´raire good z, determined residually from the budget constraint, in equ. (1).
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Taking the example of country A, the gain is then
GA = WF
A
A −WFBA = (CSAA − CSBA ) + λA(piAa − piBa ). (9)
A lower λA will make GA larger as the second part of the sum in (3) is negative due to
what one could call the ‘local competition effect’. Hence, the country will, ceteris paribus,
be willing to bid for f more aggressively with a lower λA.
12 Two baseline scenarios will be
considered: On the one hand, cases with symmetric ownership structures (i.e., where A’s
share of a, λA, equals λB (call this scenario ‘(sy)’ for ‘symmetric’), and on the other hand,
cases where ownership is asymmetric in the sense that A owns more or less than B of ‘its’
local incumbent (call this scenario ‘(as)’ for ‘asymmetric’).
It is straightforward to determine country I’s equilibrium policy choice BI (‘bid’):
13 Each
country anticipates the maximum bid of the other potential host which it must outbid, i.e.
it has to offer f the other country’s entire gain. In order to win the bidding race, however,
a government has to offer f on top the profit it would be making had it located in the
other country minus what it can earn after having decided for this country - i.e., the profit
differential. Sticking with the example of country A, the minimum bid is:14
BA = pi
B
f − piAf + CSBB − CSAB + λB(piBb − piAb ). (10)
From here on, the analysis can be carried out in two steps: By setting BI ≥ 0, one can
see if a country will have to pay a subsidy or be able to raise a tax so as to attract the
firm.15 By comparing BI , the minimum bid needed to win, and GI , one can see if country
I actually wants to attract the investment at that cost or if it is better off letting f go to
jurisdiction J . It can be easily shown that one region wanting to attract f implies that the
other region does not, and vice versa: The difference in f ’s profits (piIf −piJf ), by definition,
exactly equals GJ −BI = BJ −GI . The results in the aforementioned cases are as follows,
taking as a natural starting point the case where both countries equally own ‘their’ firms:
Symmetric ownership structures
If both countries equally take into account their respective incumbents’ profits (λA = λB =
λsy), it will always be the case that GA > BA. To see this, insert the values from eqns. (1),
(4), (2), (6), (7), and (8) into BA ((10)) and GA ((3)), and the condition BA < GA reduces
12Note that the analysis focuses on taxes or subsidies for the initial location decision.
13For a similar auction-like approach to policy competition, refer to Kessing, Konrad, and Kotsogiannis
(2009).
14Observe in (10) that the bid consists of f ’s profit differential and the other country’s gain.
15The simple lump-sum taxes are not restrictive in this game as they can be easily transformed into ad
valorem profit taxes by dividing them by company profits.
The role of firm ownership in tax competition 15
to τ < 2(α− w), which is always fulfilled for τ < τ proh.
The equilibrium tax/subsidy threshold is determined as follows: Setting BA > 0, one
obtains the critical level below which16 country A has to pay a subsidy:
τ
(sy)
A =
2(α− w) (6n− 2(n− 1)λsy − 9)
6n− 2(5n+ 3)λsy − 9 . (11)
The analogous value for country B is τ
(sy)
B = (2(α− w) (9n− 2(n− 1)λsy − 6))/
(9n+2(3n+5)λsy−6), but it remains without significance since country A always attracts
f .
As intuition would suggest, τ
(sy)
A falls in n as the market size advantage increases the taxing
power.
Taking the first derivative with respect to λsy,
∂τ
(sy)
A
∂λsy
=
48(n+ 1)(2n− 3)(α− w)
(2(5n+ 3)λsy − 6n+ 9)2
, (12)
we see that the taxing power is increased (by lowering the critical τ boundary) for n < 1.5
and curbed for n > 1.5, reflecting a counterclockwise rotation of the τ
(sy)
A schedule around
a point on n = 1.5. Intuition on this will be given below.
Note that the symmetric case encompasses both the scenario in which both countries fully
own their firms as well as the one in which both countries do not hold any shares of
a, b. I analyze those polar cases in turn for illustrative purposes. If both incumbents
are fully owned by their respective countries’ residents (call this regime ‘national’ ), then
λA = λB = λsy = 1 and equation (11) reduces to
τ
(sy,national)
A =
(14− 8n)(α− w)
15 + 4n
. (13)
Since the first derivative of this term with respect to n is negative, this critical τ level falls
in A’s size advantage. If both incumbent firms are owned by foreigners (call this regime
‘foreign’ ), profits completely drop out of the welfare terms (λA = λB = λsy = 0).
17 BB
will always be positive, i.e., country B will in any event have to pay a subsidy (the precise
condition is that τ be smaller than 2(α − w)). BA (country A’s minimum winning bid)
16To see this, observe that at τ = τ (sy)A , ∂BA/∂τ < 0.
17This case mirrors the monopoly case (Haufler and Wooton (1999)): Countries are ex ante alike in all
respects but size. The difference is that consumer surplus will be higher and profits will be lower here due
to intensified competition.
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Figure 1.1: Equilibrium outcomes with ‘symmetric ownership structures – regimes (na-
tional) and (foreign)
TA (sy, national)
SA( sy, national)
τ
τ
(sy, national)
A
τ
(sy, foreign)
A0.35
0.15
0
1 1.5
n
τproh
τ
(sy, national)
B
will be greater than 0 if n < 1.5, implying a subsidy in those cases and taxes for other
values (in case n = 1.5, zero taxes will prevail). Recall that the border between A paying
a subsidy and receiving a tax, τ
(sy,national)
A , falls in n with national ownership. This means
that there will be a point at which A’s relative taxing power changes. The findings are
summarized in
Proposition 1 With symmetric ownership structures, in a bidding equilibrium for a multi-
national’s affiliate f , the bigger country will always attract the investment. Its ability to
tax is higher under the ‘national’ regime than under the ‘foreign’ regime for high trade costs
and lower for low trade costs.
Proof. The first result follows immediately from setting GA > BA (or, equivalently, setting
GB < BB), which yields n > 1. ¤
To understand the second part of the proposition, the changed taxing power, observe that
there are parameter constellations in n-τ -space where A has to pay a subsidy under regime
‘foreign’ and can already tax under ‘national’. This is above the τ
(sy,national)
A -threshold and
to the left of n = 1.5: Refer to Figure 1, where the case with equal full national ownership
is depicted.
In this figure, as in Figure 2, the τ (.)-lines denote, for each country, the regime borders
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between the minimum winning bids being subsidies or taxes. To facilitate the comparison,
the frontier between A paying a subsidy and raising a tax in the equal full foreign ownership
case, τ
(sy,foreign)
A at n = 1.5, is also shown
18. The capital letters S, T indicate whether a
subsidy is paid or a tax can be raised, and the superscript denotes the winning country and
the regime.19 Intuitively, above the τ
(sy,national)
A -threshold and to the left of the τ
(sy,foreign)
A -
threshold, (always in equilibrium winning) country A will find it harder to outbid B under
‘foreign’ where the latter does not take b’s profits into account. On the other hand, there
is a small area to the right of n = 1.5 and at low trade costs where A has to pay subsidies
under ‘national’ where it could already raise taxes under ‘foreign’. There, the intuition
is that it is harder for A to outbid B under ‘national’ as firm b’s profit will be higher if
f decides to colocate with it. This at first sight counterintuitive effect appears as at low
levels of trade costs, market B is hardly shielded from competition and it is better for b
if its rival does not settle in the larger A market (and, thus, has to incur the same cost
disadvantage vis-a`-vis firm a when serving it). The formal condition for piBb being greater
than piAb , which drives this effect, reads
τ < τ˜ =
2(α− w)(n− 1)
5n+ 3
. (14)
Notice that τ˜ = τ
(sy,national)
A if n = 1.5, so this is precisely the point around which the
τ
(sy,national)
A schedule rotates if λsy goes up.
20
It will be argued below that tax games like the one considered here will always maximize
aggregate welfare. However, an interesting implication of the results obtained so far (cf.
Proposition 1) is that in terms of regional welfare, countries A and B combined lose from
competition (a compared to a case where they do not have policy instruments at their
disposal) in the figure’s S realm, and gain from it in the T realm. For instance, in the
(sy, national) regime, our baseline case21, they lose for low trade costs (and a limited size
difference, see Figure 1), and they gain for high trade costs. To see this, observe that firm
f would have gone to the larger country A anyway in the absence of taxes/subsidies, which
then merely constitute a direct transfer from/to firm f without changing the allocation.
18For the comparisons of cases, as in the figures, I set the marginal cost w = 0 and α = 1 in order to
concentrate on trade cost and country size effects. Then, the factor (α−w) disappears in the numerators
of the critical levels. As those parameters are identical across countries anyway, no effects are lost by this.
19E.g., S (sy, national)A denotes a situation where, under equal full national ownership of firms, country A
attracts the firm by paying a subsidy.
20The corresponding expression for firm a can never be positive as being joined in the larger market is
always a disadvantage.
21Cases in which 0 < λsy < 1 imply a τA-line in between the τ
(sy, foreign)
A - and τ
(sy, national)
A -lines,
making the same reasoning applicable.
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Aymmetric ownership structures
For the asymmetric case, it is assumed that λB = 1 − λA. To ease comparability, I call
λA ‘λas’ (and λB ‘1 − λas’) in this section. From Proposition 1, we already know that
λas = 1 − λas = 1/2 leads to A’s winning of f no matter the n-τ -combination. I assume
from here on that λas > 1/2, i.e. that in the bigger country A, the incumbent is owned by
local residents at a larger share than in B. One could think of a traditional industry in a
big country, whereas in another, smaller country, one finds a firm of the same industry, but
owned by people from the rest of the world at a higher fraction. This is done for the simple
reason that the case where a more home-owned firm resides in the small country yields no
additional insight – that the big region, having to worry less about producer surplus, will
win, is confirmed in the affirmative.22 That is, A will now consider a’s profits relatively
more than B will take into account b’s. Proceeding as above, I set BA = 0 to obtain
τ
(as)
A =
2(α− w)(2n(λas + 2)− 2λas − 7)
6λas + 2n(5λas − 2)− 15 , (15)
below which, again, A will have to pay a subsidy to f . More importantly, B can now win
the investment, namely if
τ ≥ τd = 14(n− 1)(α− w)
16(n+ 1)λas − n− 15 . (16)
Proposition 2 If the large region’s incumbent industry is more home-owned than the small
one’s, it is possible for the small region to win the bidding race as the large one’s offer is
moderated by concern for its industry’s profits relatively more. This occurs above a level of
trade costs τd, whereby this critical level is increasing in n and decreasing in λas.
Proof. By setting GA > BA ⇔ CSAA − CSBA + λas(piAa − piBa ) > piBf − piAf + CSBB − CSAB +
λas(pi
B
b − piAb ), one obtains that A will win the investment if τ < τd. The first derivative
thereof with respect to n equals (224(α− w) (2λas − 1)) /(n − 16(n + 1)λas + 15)2, which
is strictly positive for λas > 1/2. It is seen immediately from (16) that the derivative with
respect to λas is negative for n > 1. ¤
This suggests that close to the ‘τd-line’, competition for f will be most intense – i.e.,
subsidies will be paid in equilibrium, cf. Figure 2 (which is drawn for λas = 0.8
23).
The τ
(as)
A -line denotes the regime border between A’s minimum winning bid being a subsidy
22Formally, there is no n > 1 for which GA > BA, 0 < λas < 1/2 and α > w, β > 0, 0 < τ < τproh.
23A higher λas will bend the τd-line to the right, which can be seen from differentiating (16) with respect
to λas, which yields −224(n− 1)(n+ 1)(α− w)/ (n− 16(n+ 1)λas + 15)2 < 0 for n > 1.
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Figure 1.2: Equilibrium outcomes with asymmetric ownership
τ
0.35
0.15
0
1 1.5
TA(as)
SA(as)
SB(as)
τd
τWF
τ
(as)
A
τproh
n
or a tax. The figure shows τ d, separating the parameter constellations under which A and
B win, respectively.24 The intuition for A having an easier game the larger is n, for any
given τ , is the market size effect, as above. The dependency on τ is less clear, but it
is understood by taking a closer look at the condition that GA > BA ⇔ GB < BB ⇔
CSBB − CSAB + (1 − λas)(piBb − piAb ) < piAf − piBf + CSAA − CSBA + λas(piAa − piBa ): When
considering whether to attract f , B weighs increasing own welfare against the costs of
outbidding A, which consist of three elements: Firstly, the direct costs of attracting f ,
earning the latter the profit differential; secondly, A’s change in consumer surplus; and
thirdly, firm a’s profit differential (to the extent it is taken into account by A). This
last effect drives the result, as with high trade costs, a acts as a quasi-monopolist in the
large market, making it unattractive for A to reduce its home firm’s profits by getting f
into the country – and hence, making it easy for B (caring less about b) to outbid A’s
low offer. For n close to 1, f ’s profit differential (piAf − piBf ) and the difference in change
of consumer surplus across countries are minor, whereas it makes a big difference for a
(namely, piAa − piBa ≤ 0) whether it acts as a quasi-duopolist or a quasi-monopolist in the A
market. With n increasing, the first two differences become significant, making it harder
for B to profitably win the investment.
To summarize those findings: If the ownership structure gets more international in the
24The regime border for B being able to raise a tax does not show up for this parameter value. For
λas = 1, for instance, there is a tiny realm in the northwest of the considered n-τ -space where B is even
able to raise a tax.
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sense that the incumbent in the small country is ‘less domestic’, the large country is at risk
of losing FDI to the small one which is less reluctant to subsidize multinationals as it lacks
a ‘national champion’ it could harm through local competition. Stated differently, the mere
fact that B does not fully own ‘its’ company may induce it to attract a multinational. This
result obviously hinges on the assumption that governments care about local profits. Note,
however, that this is very plausible precisely in cases where industries are very concentrated:
There, single firms generate high profits and are highly ‘visible’ at the same time.
1.4 Welfare
I now briefly turn to welfare issues. Note first that due to the auction-like character of the
bidding game, the outcome will be efficient in that aggregate welfare will be maximized,
i.e. the firm will be induced to go to country B precisely if this decision maximizes the sum
of both countries’ welfare and the firm’s profits. This point has been made in the literature
before (e.g., Barros and Cabral (2000), Fumagalli (2003), and Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006))
and therefore will not be repeated here.
More insightful, though, is the evaluation of regional welfare, i.e. the sum of the two regions’
welfare levels without f ’s profits. Since positive taxes (subsidies) that do not change f ’s
location (relative to the case without government policy) have no effect on efficiency, they
trivially amount to an increase in regional welfare in case of a tax (and a reduction in case of
a subsidy). This was already stressed in the discussion of the symmetric ownership case in
Section 1.3. In the asymmetric case, and in cases where competition actually does change
the allocation, it is not so obvious where competition helps or harms the region. If country
B now wins the competition, this will of course be beneficial for it. As far as region-wide
welfare is concerned, one simply has to work out if the difference in gains between countries
outweighs the payment by B, i.e., if GB − GA − BB > 0. Setting the difference equal to
zero and solving for τ leads to:
τWF =
2(α− w) (2(n− 1)λas + 7− 10n)
15− 2n− (22n+ 26)λas . (17)
Proposition 3 With asymmetric ownership structures, and in the case where the smaller
country attracts the outside firm, regional welfare is lowered by tax competition below a level
of trade costs τWF . The realm where tax competition is harmful becomes smaller as λas,
the asymmetry in ownership structure, grows larger.
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Proof. Taking the first derivative of (GB −GA −BB) with respect to τ and evaluating at
τ = τWF , one obtains (α − w) (−2n (λas − 5) + 2λas − 7) /(16β), which is positive for any
λas ² [1/2, 1], n > 1. To see the second part of the proposition, the derivative of τ
WF with
respect to λas is 16(19− 28n)(n+1)(α−w)/ (2n+ (22n+ 26)λas − 15)2 < 0, which shows
that a higher λas lowers the critical τ level. ¤
The intuition is straightforward: The area where tax competition is beneficial is where it is
not too intense and where trade costs are high, rendering the attraction of a new competitor
especially beneficial. A higher λas makes B
′s minimum winning bid smaller, enlarging the
realm where competition is beneficial for the region as a whole. The corresponding line
below which regional welfare is harmed by tax competition is also represented in Figure 2.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper has shown that in competition for FDI, the location pattern and equilibrium
taxes are highly sensitive to ownership structures. Under the assumption that national
governments as tax-setting authorities care about firm-level profits only to the extent that
they will not be repatriated to some other jurisdiction, their willingness to bid for multina-
tionals’ new plants or subsidiaries will be very high if incumbents are hardly domestically
owned, even though those subsidies do not apply to existing firms. This can help explain
recently observed high amounts paid to companies in the European Union for settling in
a particular region. As with otherwise symmetric countries, the bigger one will always
have the edge over smaller jurisdictions in bidding races, evidence about FDI in the Euro-
pean periphery suggests that a force like the one modelled may be at work. The analysis
illustrates the impact of national champions as a force that renders the attraction of for-
eign direct investment less desirable. What do we take from all this? From a theoretical
perspective, this means that, in intergovernmental competition, it does not suffice to take
into account industry structure and its influence on companies’ profits, but that one rather
has to take due account of the extent to which industry’s interests are considered by the
government. International ownership is one very intuitive reason for disregarding producer
surplus, but political economic or ideological motives may as well be important (and differ
across countries). For empirical research, this implies firstly that the degree to which in-
dustry is locally owned should be incorporated in estimations of policy reaction functions
whenever competition in goods markets is imperfect. Secondly, and more importantly, the
model developed in this paper yields the directly testable implication that a country that
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both hosts and – to a large extent – owns existing industry should be relatively less inclined
and hence less likely to attract foreign direct investment, all other things being equal. Even
though this model was built around competition for a single firm, the analyzed effects will
still be present in a more general framework with a broad-based capital tax.
Chapter 2
Unionization triggers tax incentives
to attract foreign direct investment
2.1 Introduction
In most OECD countries, and in many developing countries, the potential benefits from
foreign direct investment (FDI) in the form of higher employment, intensified competition
in product markets, and positive productivity spill-overs on other sectors of the economy
are increasingly perceived by policy makers. The employment argument, in particular, has
become a highly important one. In many OECD countries employment in multinational
firms now accounts for more than 25% of total employment in the manufacturing sector.1
At the same time, multinational firms are able to choose among an increasing number of
potential investment locations, particularly in Eastern Europe and Southeast Asia, which
offer low wages, an educated workforce, and rapidly expanding domestic markets. This has
led to a number of highly publicized cases of plant relocations from rich OECD countries
to lower-cost regions.
As a result of these developments the competition among potential host countries to attract
internationally mobile firms has tightened visibly during the last decades. This can be
seen in the corporate tax changes, in particular the reduction of statutory tax rates, that
many countries have undertaken since the 1980s (see Devereux et al., 2002). A second
and even more direct indicator is the increasing use of direct location subsidies that are
1In 2005, employment in multinational firms as a percentage of total manufacturing employment was,
for example, 33.1% in Belgium, 26.4% in France, 15.2% in Germany, 48.0% in Ireland, 33.8% in Sweden,
27.6% in the United Kingdom and 11.2% in the United States. See OECD (2008).
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Table 2.1: Approved investment subsidies in EU member states (2000-2007)
Investing company headquarter Date of Host country Subsidy Aid in-
(sector) country approval (city/region) (mill.e) tensitya
Investor from Rest of World
AGC/Glaverbel (glass) Japan 06/2000 Greece (Kavala) 41 48%
Motorola (semiconduct.) U.S.A. 07/2000 Scotland (Edinburgh) 172 6%
Nissan Japan 01/2001 U.K. (Sunderland) 60b 19%
Ford U.S.A. 07/2003 Belgium (Genk) 45 4%
AMD (microelectronics) U.S.A. 02/2004 Germany (Saxony) 545c 23%
DOW PET (synthetics) U.S.A. 04/2004 Germany (Saxony) 28 23%
e-glass (glass) Hong Kong 04/2004 Germany (Saxony-A.) 42 35%
AMD (microelectronics) U.S.A. 07/2007 Germany (Saxony) 262 12%
Kia Motors Korea 12/2007 Slovakia (Stredne´ Sl.) 32 15%
Investor from Europe
ST Microelectronics Switzerland 04/2002 Italy (Sicily) 542 26%
European Optic Media Austria 06/2003 Germany (Thuringia) 35 35%
Volkswagen Germany 06/2003 Spain (Navarra) 20 6%
Infineon (semiconduct.) Germany 03/2004 Portugal (Porto) 42 29%
Peugeot Citroen France 09/2004 U.K. (Ryton) 30b 10%
National investor
Volkswagen Germany 07/2001 Germany (Dresden) 75 12%
Infineon (semiconduct.) Germany 04/2002 Germany (Saxony) 219 20%
Iveco (utility vehicles) Italy 10/2002 Italy (Puglia) 109 44%
BMW Germany 12/2002 Germany (Leipzig) 363 30%
Wacker (silicon wafers) Germany 02/2004 Germany (Saxony) 120 28%
DHL Airways (logistics) Germany 04/2004 Germany (Leipzig) 70 28%
De Tomaso (vehicles) Italy 01/2005 Italy (Calabria) 81 60%
a present value of state aid divided by present value of investment
b 1 British Pound is converted to 1.5 e c upper limit
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities, C and L (http://eur-lex.europa.eu)
paid to foreign firms. Some examples were already given at the beginning of the last
chapter. Table 2.1 provides a selective list of 21 cases for the period from 2000 to 2007
where substantial investment subsidies (above 20 million Euro) have been offered by host
countries and approved by the European Commission. These subsidies often account for
25 to 30 percent of the present value of the investment, and in some cases for even more.2
A striking fact in Table 2.1 is that, in absolute terms, the highest subsidies are paid for firms
that engage in regions characterized by weak economic activity and high unemployment,
but simultaneously are part of countries with strong trade unions that succeed in keeping up
wages even in low-productivity regions. This is true, in particular, for Eastern Germany
and Southern Italy, where the collective bargaining coverage rate is above 80% of the
2Note that the subsidy payments collected in Table 2.1 cover only direct monetary transfers and thus
represent merely a lower bound for the overall value of the incentive package. The latter often includes
additional measures, such as the free provision of public infrastructure.
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workforce.3 To give an overview of how strongly even the most developed countries differ
with respect to labor market rigidities, Figure 2.1 illustrates the degrees of unionization
across OECD countries.
Figure 2.1: Union density and coverage rate in OECD member countries
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Source: OECD Employment Outlook, 2004.
Whereas the density rates4 in the year 2000 are rather low across countries (27% in the
Czech Republic and 25% in Germany), the coverage rate is 68% in Germany and above 80%
in France and Italy, whereas it is only around 25% in the Czech Republic and 14% in the US.
This suggests that fiscal policies are used to compensate investors for the location disadvan-
tages of facing high wages without benefitting from positive spill-overs in an industrial core
region. To some extent this reflects the European Union’s regulations on state aid, which
specify that location subsidies are only permitted to compensate investors for a demon-
3In contrast, this coverage rate (the percentage of employees for whom the wage negotiated by the
union is binding) is only about 50% in the UK and 20% in the United States and Japan (Cahuc and
Zylberberg, 2004, p. 372). In Eastern Europe, coverage rates have fallen dramatically in several countries
and were about 35% in Hungary and 50% in Slovakia in 2001 (EIRO, 2002, Table 1).
4The percentage of the workforce actually being a member of a union.
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strated cost disadvantage in comparison to a feasible alternative location. The question
remains, however, why unionized countries are also willing to provide high subsidies, the
cost of which have to be fully borne by them.5
A further motivation for our analysis comes from several empirical studies that find a
surprising positive correlation between the degree of unionization and the likelihood of a
given location to attract foreign multinationals (Coughlin et al., 1991; Friedman et al.,
1992). As stressed by Friedman et al. (1992, p. 416), in their analysis “[t]he most puzzling
result is on unionization.” While these empirical studies control for regular business tax
rates, they do not incorporate discriminatory tax concessions or investment subsidies that
host government grant to individual international investors. In line with the examples in
Table 2.1, one potential explanation for the positive effect of unionization on inward FDI
could thus be that unionized countries (or states) have more incentives to subsidize foreign
investment, as compared to their less unionized neighbors.
Against this background the present paper analyzes how the presence of a domestic union
affects the incentives of governments to grant specific tax concessions, or even direct in-
vestment subsidies, in order to attract a foreign multinational enterprise (MNE). Our main
result is that if a unionized and a non-unionized country compete for FDI, the unionized
country will attract the investment in equilibrium, even if it has no other location advan-
tages. This occurs because the government of the unionized country will offer a location
subsidy to the outside firm which more than compensates the investor for the higher wages
caused by union power. The fundamental argument behind this result is simple. In con-
centrated markets where firms set prices above marginal (wage) costs, unions exerting their
market power to raise wages above their competitive levels aggravate the distortions in the
economy. This gives the unionized country’s government a strong incentive to reduce the
existing inefficiencies, but it cannot curtail the union’s wage setting power directly. Hence
attracting FDI serves as a second-best instrument, giving the union an incentive to lower
its wage demand, in exchange for higher employment in the multinational firm.
We develop our main result in a model where a unionized and a non-unionized country
form an integrated market and compete for the location of a single, multinational firm. We
5A further important question is why more than 80% of the subsidies to industry in the OECD take
the form of investment subsidies, rather than direct subsidies to employment, even if their purpose is to
counteract labor market rigidities (see Fuest and Huber, 2000, Table 1). One answer to this question is
that employment subsidies may strengthen the position of trade unions, whereas investment subsidies can
induce more competition in both product and labor markets. Fuest and Huber (2000) show, in a model
where firms with different productivities bargain with unions over both wages and employment, that an
investment subsidy financed by a labor tax increases the number of active firms and generates welfare gains
by reducing the rents of workers.
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model a five-stage game where governments compete through location taxes or subsidies
in the first stage, the union sets the wage in the second stage and the MNE chooses its
location in the third stage. In the fourth stage the union may re-optimize its wage policy
and in the fifth stage all firms choose output levels. We also show that our main result
carries over to an extended setting with trade costs. In this case, the unionized country
may be able to attract the outside firm, even if it has other location disadvantages, such
as a smaller home market.
Our analysis relates to two different strands in the literature. The first set of papers
analyzes the effects of unionized labor markets on foreign direct investment.6 Mezzetti
and Dinopoulos (1991) investigate the role of unionization in a firm’s exporting versus
FDI decision. As recently shown by Mukherjee (2008), these two modes of serving a
foreign market may also be simultaneously chosen by a cost-minimizing firm when labor
markets are unionized. Leahy and Montagna (2000) analyze how FDI is affected by different
degrees of wage setting centralization. Most of the papers focusing directly on the link
between unionization and inward FDI find a negative effect; see e.g. Naylor and Santoni
(2003), or Munch (2003).7 Our model incorporates this effect in that, other things being
equal, unionization reduces the likelihood of a country to attract FDI. However, by also
endogenizing tax policies we show that the negative effect of unionization on FDI can be
more than compensated by a rationally chosen location subsidy offered by the unionized
country’s government.
A second and parallel strand in the literature has analyzed tax competition for FDI in
models of imperfectly competitive product markets and with various country asymmetries.
This ‘bidding-for-firms’ literature was initiated by Black and Hoyt (1989), and it has since
been applied to tax/subsidy competition between countries that exogenously differ in size
(Haufler and Wooton, 1999), the valuation of employment gains (Barros and Cabral, 2000),
factor endowments (Davies, 2005), or the number of domestic competitors (Bjorvatn and
Eckel, 2006). A general finding of this literature is that countries can tax the profits of a
single internationally mobile firm to the extent that they possess a location advantage, rel-
ative to their closest competitor.8 Related results have been derived in the ‘new economic
6These contributions are part of a more general literature that analyzes the interaction between union-
ization, imperfect competition in goods markets, and economic integration. See e.g. Brander and Spencer
(1988), Huizinga (1993), Driffill and van der Ploeg (1995), and Naylor (1998).
7An exception is Lommerud et al. (2003), who show that unionization can simultaneously induce FDI
and cause job losses in the unionized country.
8Ferrett and Wooton (2005) show that when there are two internationally mobile firms, rather than
only one, the taxing power of the competing countries is increased. Under some conditions they will even
be able to extract all profits from the duopolistic firms.
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geography’ literature where agglomeration effects and a larger market size allow the core
country to tax positive location rents (Kind et al., 2000; Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Ot-
taviano and van Ypersele, 2005; Borck and Pflu¨ger, 2006). None of these models, however,
incorporates trade unions as an additional player in the competition for FDI.
We are aware of only one other paper which combines unionization and tax competition
in a model with endogenous location decisions of mobile firms. This is the fair wage
model of Egger and Seidel (2007).9 In their model, however, the labor market distortion is
exogenously given by the fair wage preferences of workers and can therefore not be affected
by tax policies. Hence Egger and Seidel (2007) obtain the ‘conventional’ result that the
country with stronger fair wage preferences will be at a disadvantage in attracting FDI. We
show in this paper that results change fundamentally when the extent of the labor market
distortion can be affected by government tax policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general set-
up of the model. Section 3 analyzes the interaction of union and firm behavior in the
last four stages of our game. Section 4 turns to the tax and subsidy decisions of the two
governments in the first stage. Section 5 discusses the robustness of our results with respect
to alternative model assumptions. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 The model
We consider a region of two countries10 i ∈ {A,B} which compete for FDI from a multina-
tional firm that has its home base in a third country C. The multinational firm, labelled
c, produces a homogeneous output good x and competes with one incumbent firm in the
region, which is located in country A and labelled a.11 The market for good x is thus
characterized by duopoly competition and the two possible scenarios are either that firms
a and c both produce in country A, or that they produce in different countries. The two
9Skaksen (2005) analyzes the incentives for a single country to attract a foreign firm to a unionized
market with a domestic incumbent. This model focuses on complementarities between the outputs produced
by the incumbent and the mobile firm, however, and does not incorporate location competition between
two potential host countries. There is also a small literature on tax and social policy competition when
labor markets are unionized and capital is internationally mobile (see Lejour and Verbon, 1996 or Fuest and
Huber, 1999). In this literature product markets are perfectly competitive and thus there are no distinct
output and location decisions of individual firms.
10The ‘countries’ can also be thought of as sub-national units (such as U.S. states), as long as their
labor market institutions and taxing powers are completely independent.
11For reasons of symmetry, one could also assume an immobile, incumbent firm in country B. This,
however, would substantially complicate the algebra without adding to the substance of our analysis.
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firms compete over quantities. The regional market for good x is completely integrated,
with no trade costs arising between A and B in our benchmark model.12 Hence we con-
sider ‘export-platform FDI’ (e.g. Ekholm et al., 2007) where the firm from the outside
country C locates in one of the countries in the region (in A or in B) and serves the entire
regional market from there. Regional trade is balanced through a nume´raire good z, which
is produced under conditions of perfect competition.13
The core difference between the two countries in the region is that sector x is unionized
in country A, but not in country B. To give an example in a European context, we could
think of country A as being Germany (more specifically, a state in Eastern Germany),
whereas country B is a less unionized country, for example Hungary.14 The existence of an
immobile, incumbent firm a in country A is central to our model because it ensures that the
union has the ‘outside’ option to raise the wage rate in this firm, should the multinational
firm decide to locate in country B.
In production, wages are the only variable costs in both sectors. In the nume´raire sector,
1/w¯ units of labor are needed in both countries to produce one unit of good z. Free trade
equalizes the price for good z in A and B at unity and the competitive wage rate at w¯.
In sector x one unit of capital is needed for each firm to produce any output. We assume
that the multinational firm disposes of only one unit of capital and hence can set up at
most one plant, either in A or in B.15 These fixed costs are assumed to be equal for FDI
in countries A and B and are ignored in the following.16 Once the fixed factor is installed,
one unit of labor produces one unit of good x. In the non-unionized country B, the wage
rate is wB = w¯, whereas in country A the sector-specific union endogenously chooses the
wage rate wA. We assume a monopoly union model where the union sets the nominal wage
so as to maximize the wage surplus in sector x, with firms consequently adjusting their
output optimally.
On the demand side, the total population of countries A and B is normalized to unity.
12In section 5 we extend the model to allow for positive trade costs. In this section we also briefly
discuss the case of price competition between firms.
13In a strict sense, this setting applies only to the first set of examples given in Table 2.1. However, the
remaining entries in Table 2.1 are also consistent with our model because the subsidies were typically paid
to prevent a European or national investor from setting up a plant for a new product line in a different
EU country, and serve the European market from there.
14See footnote 3. Note that our analysis implicitly assumes that wage differences are caused only by
unionization, whereas the competitive wage per unit of output is equal in the two countries.
15One example is where the fixed factor in sector x are entrepreneurial services and firm c has only one
suitable manager.
16As we will show, the after-tax profits of firm c in the host country are always positive and we assume
that they exceed the fixed costs (cf. footnote 27).
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Each household in A and B exogenously supplies one unit of labor, which is mobile across
sectors but immobile across countries. A share n of the total population lives in country A,
whereas 1 − n residents live in country B. While market size is thus allowed to differ
between countries, we need to restrict the magnitude of these differences. In particular
we assume that country B is at most 50 percent larger than country A.17 Moreover, we
must ensure that both countries have enough workers to host firm c and produce its desired
output. Hence we set 0.4 ≤ n ≤ 0.9 (see footnote 18 below).
The preferences of households are identical for all consumers and across countries. Per-
capita utility in each country is of the quasi-linear and quadratic form18
ui = αxi − 1
2
βx2i + zi ∀ i ∈ {A,B}, . (1)
As only sector x in country A is unionized, an endogenous fraction sA of country A’s
workforce will find employment in this sector at wage wA. The remainder of country A’s
workforce is employed in the z sector and earns the competitive wage w¯. Workers in A
are homogeneous and their allocation to the two sectors is not explicitly modelled. There
are simply some ‘lucky’ workers who earn more than the competitive wage. Since the
preferences of all workers are identical, we can focus on the average income in country A
for most of the analysis. In country B, all workers earn the same wage w¯.
To derive the country-specific budget constraints, we assume that both governments use
lump-sum instruments in order to finance subsidies or, in case they are able to tax the
outside firm c, redistribute tax proceeds. Moreover we assume that the profit income earned
by the local firm in country A is redistributed to the domestic worker-consumers in equal
per-capita shares. With these assumptions, the (average) per-capita budget constraints in
the two countries are:
wAsA + w¯(1− sA) + (pia + tA)
n
= zA + pxA,
w¯ +
tB
1− n = zB + pxB.
(2)
Here pia denotes the profits of the incumbent firm a, ti are the tax revenues in country i
obtained from the outside firm c (negative, if subsidies are paid) and p is the common
consumer price of good x in the integrated region.
17The reason for this restriction will become clear in section 4 (see footnote 24).
18For the above restrictions on n, the condition that the desired output of good x can be produced in
both countries requires that β ≥ 4(α− w¯). At the same time α > βxi ∀ i is required for positive marginal
utility from good x.
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Maximizing the representative consumer’s utility function in each country, subject to the
budget constraint, and aggregating over individuals gives the market demand functions for
good x:
XA =
n(α− p)
β
; XB =
(1− n)(α− p)
β
; XA +XB =
(α− p)
β
. (3)
These market demand functions are independent of the exogenous income components
in (2), due to the quasi-linearity of utility.
National welfare is obtained from the individual utility functions (1). We use the per-
capita budget constraints (2) to substitute out for zi, employ the first-order condition of
the consumers’ optimization problem and aggregate over households using (3). Moreover,
we allow for an exogenous, positive externality σ that the location of the outside firm c
exerts on the host country. This externality is the same for both countries and it is meant
to capture, in a highly simplified way, the empirical finding that multinational enterprises
(MNEs) often generate positive productivity spill-overs on the host country’s economy.19
In our model we assume that this technological spill-over increases the production of the
nume´raire good in the host country of the FDI by σ > 0 units. This gives the following
national welfare measures:
UA = n uA = (α− p)XA
2
+ pia + sA(wA − w¯) + nw¯ + tA + σ; (4)
UB = (1− n)uB = (α− p)XB
2
+ (1− n)w¯ + tB + σ; (5)
where ti and σ are zero for the country that does not attract the outside firm. Hence
the location of firm c matters for country B through its effects on the price for good x,
tax revenue collections and the productivity spill-over σ. For country A, it is furthermore
relevant how domestic wage and profit income in the x sector are affected by the location
choice of the multinational firm.
In order to examine the impact of union power on tax competition for the outside firm,
we model a five-stage game. In the first stage, the two competing governments simultane-
ously and non-cooperatively choose a lump-sum tax or subsidy on the entry of the outside
19As is established in an extensive literature, such spill-overs originate from a superior knowledge of
multinational firms, which may be transferred to the host country by means of movements of highly skilled
staff, or by demonstration effects. See Go¨rg and Strobl (2001) for an empirical meta-analysis of studies
that estimate productivity spill-overs of MNEs on host countries.
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firm.20 The objective of governments is to maximize the overall utility of their respective
population, as given in (4)–(5). In the second stage, the union in country A chooses the
wage rate that maximizes the wage surplus in sector x. The trade-off for the union is that
attracting the outside firm increases local output in the unionized sector, but at the same
time the union may have to moderate its wage in order to induce firm c to come. In the
third stage, the foreign firm decides to enter either market A or market B. In the fourth
stage, country A’s union may renegotiate the wage set in stage 2, but this is possible only
when the MNE does not locate in country A. In the fifth stage, output levels are chosen
by the firms, in response to the wage rates faced in the respective host countries.
The above sequence of moves implies that the location choice of the MNE is made only
after the union in country A has committed to the wage rate that it would set if the MNE
located in country A. Put differently, if country A attracts the mobile firm, then its union
cannot renegotiate the wage after firm c has settled there. This assumption is motivated
by the increasing international mobility of MNEs, which can easily relocate production, if
changing cost conditions in the host country make it unattractive to stay. The location
decisions of MNEs are not permanent and a firm may close a plant in one country and
re-open in another, if (relative) production costs change after an initial location decision
has been made. More generally, the inherently ‘footloose’ nature of multinationals has
been stressed in the recent theoretical international trade literature21 and this hypothesis
has been supported by several empirical studies.22 If this argument, and the evidence in
favor of it, is incorporated into our static model, then it calls for a sequence of play where
the outside firm chooses its location only after the wage rate has been set by country A’s
union. The same argument does not apply, however, when the union is confronted only
with the incumbent firm a, which is internationally immobile. In this case the union can
indeed re-optimize the wage, once the MNE has decided to settle in country B.
Another assumption regarding the timing of events is that the government sets its tax
policy before the union in country A decides on the wage. To motivate this assumption,
20Assuming lump-sum instruments is analytically convenient, but it also captures the character of many
existing subsidy schemes. See Table 2.1 in the introduction.
21Caves (1996) argues forcefully that MNEs can react promptly to adverse cost changes in the host
country and shift production elsewhere. Markusen (2002, pp. 6-7) lists a high share of intangible assets,
or ‘knowledge capital’, as a general characteristic of MNEs. The importance of intangibles like patents or
brand names implies that relocation costs are low, relative to the transferred values.
22Go¨rg and Strobl (2003) compare the exit probabilities of national and multinational firms in Ireland
and find that multinational firms are significantly more likely to exit, other things being equal, when
sectoral conditions change adversely. For the United States, Bernard and Jensen (2007) show that plants
owned by either U.S. or foreign multinationals are significantly more likely to close than single-plant firms,
if other relevant firm characteristics are controlled for.
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we interpret the government’s policy variable in a wide sense, as a general policy stance
towards attracting FDI. Such a policy is arguably of a more long-term nature than the
wage setting decision of trade unions and it implies that the government of country A can
strategically adjust its tax policy in order to affect the wage claims of the local union. In
section 5 we show that our main results are qualitatively unchanged if this sequence is
reversed and the union in country A chooses the wage before governments set tax policies.
2.3 Stages 2-5: The interaction of union and firms
2.3.1 Stage 5: Output
The model is solved by backward induction, ensuring subgame perfectness. In the last stage
the two firms a and c simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose their output quantities,
given the marginal costs in their country of production. The (variable) cost function for
firm j ∈ {a, c} is κj = wixj where wi is the unit labor cost in the host country i and xj is
firm j’s output. Both firms observe market conditions according to (3) and maximize their
profits.
In what follows we distinguish between two regimes, depending on whether firm c locates
in country A (Regime A, or RA for short) or in country B (Regime B, or RB). Let
superscripts denote the country in which the outside firm settles (i.e., the regime), whereas
subscripts denote the countries, or firms, for which a given value is calculated. With this
notation, the output of firm j ∈ {a, c} in country i ∈ {A,B} is
(RA) : xAa = x
A
c =
(
α− wAA
)
3 β
; (6)
(RB) : xBa =
(
α + w¯ − 2wBA
)
3 β
, xBc =
(
α− 2w¯ + wBA
)
3 β
. (7)
In Regime A duopoly competition is symmetric, as the regime-specific wage rate in the
host country, wAA, is the same for both competitors. In Regime B, the outside firm c faces
the competitive wage rate w¯ in country B, whereas the incumbent a faces the wage rate
wBA that country A’s union sets when it cannot attract the MNE.
In conjunction with (3) this determines the equilibrium price of good x in the two regimes
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as a function of regime-specific wages
(RA) : pA = (α + 2wAA)/3;
(RB) : pB = (α + wBA + w¯)/3.
(8)
These prices lead to regime-specific expressions for the consumer surplus CSi
(RA) : CSAA =
2n(α− wAA)2
9β
, CSAB =
2(1− n)(α− wAA)2
9β
;
(RB) : CSBA =
n(2α− wBA − w¯)2
18β
, CSBB =
(1− n)(2α− wBA − w¯)2
18β
;
(9)
and to regime-specific gross profit levels piij (ignoring fixed costs of production)
(RA) : piAa = pi
A
c =
(
α− wAA
)2
/(9 β);
(RB) : piBa =
(
α− 2wBA + w¯
)2
/(9 β), piBc =
(
α− 2w¯ + wBA
)2
/(9 β).
(10)
2.3.2 Stage 4: The union’s wage renegotiation in Regime B
There are two widely used models of trade union behavior in labor economics, the monopoly
union model (as a special case of the more general right-to-manage model) and the efficient
bargaining model. Both of these models are able to explain some, but not all, of the stylized
facts in labor markets (Oswald, 1993). In the more narrowly related literature on the
interaction between unionization and FDI, however, virtually all contributions employ the
monopoly union model. This approach provides a benchmark where wages are determined
unilaterally by the union, whereas firms adjust their labor demand optimally in a later
stage of the game. Stated differently, the union chooses its preferred point on the firms’
labor demand curve. We also adopt the monopoly union approach in this paper.
A further modelling choice is at which level the wage setting in country A takes place. In
the following we assume that wages are set at the sectoral level, and hence that the same
wage rate wA applies for all firms in sector x of country A. One reason for this specification
is that, at least in continental Europe, collective wage bargaining occurs predominantly at
the industry level (see Cahuc and Zylberberg, p. 375, Table 1). Moreover, even if wage
bargaining occurs at the firm level, these wage negotiations will typically be interdepen-
dent due to the competition for, and the intra-sectoral mobility of, workers with similar
qualifications. As a result, wage differentials within the same sector are unlikely to be
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sustainable in equilibrium. As emphasized by Calmfors (1993, p. 170) the correlation of
wage outcomes negotiated at the firm level is particularly high in tradeable sectors, such
as the unionized x sector in our analysis.
Finally, we assume that the sector-specific union in country A is interested only in the
nominal wage, and it neglects the effects of its wage setting behavior on the output price in
sector x. This is a simplification, but one that can be motivated rather straightforwardly.
Since the union cares only about the workers in the x industry, it ignores the share of the
output price increase that falls on workers in country A’s nume´raire industry z. Moreover,
since the market for good x is completely integrated within the region, the union also
ignores the effects of the price increase of good x that falls on the residents of country B.
In Regime B, the sector-specific union faces only one local firm in the x sector, the in-
ternationally immobile incumbent a. Given the above assumptions, the union maximizes
the sector-specific wage surplus, subject to the optimal output adjustment of firm a in (7).
Denoting the sectoral wage surplus by ΩA, the regime-specific maximization problem is
(RB) : max
wBA
ΩBA = nsA(w
B
A − w¯) = xBa (wBA − w¯). (11)
The wage rate that maximizes the objective function of the union is
wBA =
(α + 3w¯)
4
, (12)
resulting in a wage surplus for country A’s union in Regime B of
ΩBA =
(α− w¯)2
24 β
. (13)
2.3.3 Stage 3: The location decision of the MNE
We assume that the MNE sets up a subsidiary in either country A or country B. Firm c
will be indifferent as to where to settle down when its net-of-tax profits are the same in
the two countries. From (10) and the lump-sum taxes ti this condition reads
piAc − tA = piBc − tB ⇐⇒
(
α− wAA
)2 − (α− 2w¯ + wBA)2
9 β
= tA − tB. (14)
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In what follows we assume that the MNE will locate in country A when it is indifferent
between the two locations. At the time where it takes its location decision, firm c correctly
anticipates that, in Regime B, the union will renegotiate the wage with the remaining
incumbent firm in its jurisdiction and set wBA from (12). Substituting this wage into (14)
we can then solve the condition that keeps the firm indifferent between the two locations
for wAA. The relevant solution is
wAA = α−
δ
4
, δ ≡
√
25(α− w¯)2 + 144 β (tA − tB). (15)
Equation (15) gives the maximum wage that the outside firm c is willing to pay in country A,
as a function of the tax differential (tA− tB). The critical wage rate wAA falls when the tax
rate in country A is high or that in country B is low, and it rises when the competitive
wage w¯ (which is to be paid in country B) is high.
2.3.4 Stage 2: The union’s wage setting decision
We now analyze the union’s wage setting decision. This wage is announced to the outside
firm before the latter takes its location decision, but it will remain effective only if the
union in country A wants to attract the FDI and thus induces Regime A in equilibrium.
(In Regime B the union will instead renegotiate the wage in stage 4.) Hence our discussion
in the following will focus on Regime A. Note also that in this regime the union must
choose a sectoral wage that applies for both firms a and c (cf. the discussion in section 3.2).
The union maximizes the regime-specific wage surplus
(RA) : max
wAA
ΩAA = nsA(w
A
A − w¯) = (xAa + xAc )(wAA − w¯), (16)
subject to the condition that the wage rate must be sufficiently low to attract the outside
firm. Let us assume for the moment that the upper bound on wAA in eq. (15) is indeed
binding so that the union chooses this wage rate. Substituting (15) and the firms’ output
choices (6) into (16), the union’s wage surplus in Regime A is then
ΩAA =
[4(α− w¯)− δ ] δ
24β
, (17)
where δ is given in (15).
The union in country A compares the wage surplus in the case where it is able to attract
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the outside firm, and in the case where it chooses instead the ‘outside option’ of letting the
firm go to country B and extracting a high wage from the domestic incumbent. Hence the
union compares ΩAA in (17) with Ω
B
A in (13). Since the term δ includes the tax differential
(tA − tB), the union’s decision of whether to attract the outside firm will be affected by
the tax rates that governments choose in the first stage. We assume that the union wants
to attract the outside firm in the case where its wage surplus in Regimes A and B is just
equal. Then setting ΩAA = Ω
B
A yields the highest possible tax differential (superscript H)
that will still induce the union to set the wage wAA. This is
23
(tA − tB)H = −(9− 2
√
3)(α− w¯)2
72β
< 0 . (18)
We can directly infer from (18) that country A’s tax rate has to remain below tB, in order
for a Regime A equilibrium to be feasible. Once (tA − tB) surpasses the critical threshold
in (18), the union will not find it profitable to attract the outside firm, and the location
equilibrium will thus be in Regime B.
At this stage we cannot exclude the possibility that the union finds it optimal to charge
a wage below the maximum wage that is compatible with a location equilibrium in
Regime A. In this case condition (14) is not binding and the union’s unconstrained wage
rate in Regime A, labelled w˜AA, is obtained by differentiating (16), using the firms’ output
choices (6). The resulting wage rate is
∂ΩAA
∂w˜AA
=
2(α+ w¯ − 2w˜AA)
3β
= 0 ⇔ w˜AA =
α + w¯
2
. (19)
We can then derive a lower threshold (superscript L) for the tax differential (tA − tB),
which is defined by the equality of wAA in (15) and w˜
A
A in (19). This is
(tA − tB)L = −7(α− w¯)
2
48β
< 0, (20)
which is unambiguously smaller than (tA − tB)H in (18). Since wAA is falling in (tA − tB)
whereas w˜AA is independent of taxes, any tax differential below this critical value implies
that w˜AA < w
A
A. In this case the tax rate in country A is so low, relative to that of country B,
23Equation (17) is quadratic in the tax differential so that there are two solutions for (tA − tB) that
solve ΩAA = Ω
B
A . In between these two solutions the union prefers Regime A to Regime B. Of the two
solutions only the higher one, (tA − tB)H , is of interest for our analysis. The second solution is irrelevant
because, at that low level of tA, the constraint to make the outside firm indifferent between Regimes A
and B is not binding for the union. Hence its optimal wage will be determined from an unconstrained
problem, as shown below in eq. (19).
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that the union is not constrained by the condition to attract the outside firm. It optimally
chooses w˜AA according to (19) and since this wage is below w
A
A, the outside firm will surely
locate in country A. We label this case Regime A2. In contrast, we denote by Regime A1
the case where the condition to attract the outside firm is binding and the union’s optimal
wage is given by (15). We can then characterize the wage policies of country A’s union that
induce a location equilibrium in each of the three regimes B, A1 and A2, as a function of
the taxes decided by governments in the first stage. Starting with high values of (tA − tB)
gives:
(RB) : wA = w
B
A = (α + 3w¯)/4 if (tA − tB) > (tA − tB)H ;
(RA1) : wA = w
A
A = α− δ/4 if (tA − tB)L ≤ (tA − tB) ≤ (tA − tB)H ;
(RA2) : wA = w˜
A
A = (α+ w¯)/2 if (tA − tB) < (tA − tB)L;
(21)
where δ is given in (15) and (tA − tB)H and (tA − tB)L are given in (18) and (20).
2.4 Stage 1: The governments
In the first stage, the two governments play a tax competition game with the strategic
choices being lump-sum taxes or subsidies on the entry of the outside firm. The payoffs
are given by the sum of utilities of the worker-consumers in (4)–(5). In a first step we
substitute regime-specific output choices (6)–(7) in the union’s objectives (16) and (11)
and use this along with prices, consumer surplus and profits from (8)–(10) in (4)–(5). This
yields regime-specific utilities in Regime A:
UAA =
2n(α− wAA)2
9β
+
(α− wAA)2
9β
+
2(wAA − w¯)(α− wAA)
3β
+ nw¯ + tA + σ;
UAB =
2(1− n)(α− wAA)2
9β
+ (1− n)w¯,
(22)
and analogously in Regime B:
UBA =
n(2α− w¯ − wBA)2
18β
+
(α− 2wBA + w¯)2
9β
+
(α− w¯)2
24β
+ nw¯;
UBB =
(1− n)(2α− w¯ − wBA)2
18β
+ (1− n)w¯ + tB + σ.
(23)
In the expressions for UA, the first term equals the consumer surplus, the second term is
profit income from firm a and the third term denotes the wage surplus ΩA. For country B,
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the consumer surplus in market x is given by the first terms in UAB and U
B
B .
To solve the tax competition game we proceed in two steps. We first derive the properties
that a candidate tax equilibrium in Regime A must have and then show that there is indeed
a unique equilibrium of the first-stage game in Regime A.
In the first step we show that in any candidate tax equilibrium in Regime A, the government
of country A wants to raise the tax rate up to the point where neither the outside firm nor
the trade union receive a rent over their next best alternatives.
Lemma 1 In any candidate tax equilibrium in Regime A, the tax differential is given by
(tA − tB)H in (18) and the union sets the wage according to wAA in (15).
Proof: See Appendix.
The technical proof for the lemma is relegated to the appendix, but the reasoning behind
this result is easily explained. First it is straightforward to see that, for any level of tB,
country A will never set a tax that leads to an equilibrium in Regime A2. In this case the
wage rate would be w˜AA in (19), which is below w
A
A in (15). Setting the wage below w
A
A
implies, however, that the union leaves a location rent to the outside firm, in excess of what
is needed to attract it to country A. This is anticipated by country A’s government, which
raises tA and thus brings down w
A
A until w˜
A
A = w
A
A. This tax increase will not raise the
equilibrium wage and its only effect is to increase country A’s tax revenue at the expense
of firm c’s profits. This clearly must be beneficial for country A.
The second part of the proof shows that, for any level of tB, optimal tax policy in country A
always implies that the union is not left with a wage surplus that exceeds its surplus in
Regime B [eq. (13)]. In other words, country A’s optimal tax policy implies that any
candidate equilibrium is at the boundary of Regimes A1 and B, rather than in the interior
of Regime A1. Intuitively, wAA is the union’s optimal wage policy in Regime A1, which is
a decreasing function of (tA − tB). Therefore a tax increase in country A replaces wage
surplus accruing to the workers in sector x by an equal amount of tax revenue. Lowering
the wage rate, however, also creates an efficiency gain because it reduces the wage-induced
output distortion in sector x, whereas the lump-sum entry tax for the outside firm does
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not distort output decisions at the margin.24
Lemma 1 has two implications that greatly simplify the tax competition game below. First,
since country A’s optimal tax policy implies a tax differential equal to (18) for each value
of tB, we can derive the wage rate that must necessarily hold in any candidate Regime A
equilibrium. Substituting (18) in (15) gives
(wAA)
∗ = α− (2 +
√
3)
4
(α− w¯) = w¯ + (2−
√
3)
4
(α− w¯). (24)
Note that this wage rate is above the competitive wage rate w¯, but it is below the wage
rate that the union charges from the domestic incumbent in Regime B [see eq. (12)].
Second, Lemma 1 also implies that the union’s wage surplus is identical in the two regimes.
Substituting (24) in (6) and in the union’s objective function in Regime A [eq. (16)] gives
country A’s wage surplus in any (potential) Regime A equilibrium, which equals that in
Regime B:
(ΩAA)
∗ =
(α− w¯)2
24β
= ΩBA. (25)
These results allow us to express regime-specific national welfare in each country as a
function of exogenous parameters and tax rates only. We substitute (wAA)
∗ from (24) and
wBA from (12) into (22) and (23), respectively. This gives for Regime A:
UAA =
[13 + 4
√
3 + n(14 + 8
√
3)](α− w¯)2
144β
+ nw¯ + tA + σ
UAB =
(7 + 4
√
3)(1− n)(α− w¯)2
72β
+ (1− n)w¯ ; (26)
and analogously for Regime B:
UBA =
20 + 49n(α− w¯)2
288β
+ nw¯ , UBB =
49(1− n)(α− w¯)2
288β
+ (1− n)w¯ + tB + σ . (27)
To derive the tax equilibrium, we set up the best response functions of the two governments.
24Lemma 1 does not hold for n < 0.4 and this is why we have constrained n from the outset (see
footnote 17). The reason is that if country A becomes too small, it internalizes few of the efficiency gains
from attracting firm c, which accrue to all consumers in the region through a lower price for good x. Instead
country A then wants to raise the wage rate in order to increase the union’s wage surplus at the expense of
foreign consumers. This leads to country A choosing a tax rate below the one compatible with (tA− tB)H ,
in order to accommodate a higher wage demand of its union. The analysis of this case is complex and
unrewarding, however, and generally a tax equilibrium in pure strategies cannot be shown to exist.
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Starting with country A, its government will never make a tax offer that leaves the country
worse off in Regime A, as compared to the allocation that results in Regime B. Hence,
setting UAA = U
B
A in (26) and (27) gives the best offer (denoted by a superscript o) that
country A’s government is willing to make to the outside firm c. This is the minimum tax
that country A is willing to accept, or the maximum subsidy that it is willing to pay, in
order to host the firm:
toA =
−[6 + 8√3 + n(16√3− 21)](α− w¯)2
288β
− σ . (28)
Note that country A’s best offer is negative, even if no technological externality arises from
FDI (i.e, σ = 0). Hence country A is willing to subsidize the outside firm, if it is forced
to do so by a sufficiently low tax rate of country B. The willingness to subsidize the firm
results from the additional employment in the x sector generated by the foreign investment.
Moreover, any positive spillover effect σ > 0 is fully reflected in a still higher subsidy offer
of country A.
Moreover, we know from Lemma 1 that in any candidate equilibrium in Regime A, coun-
try A’s best response to the tax rate of country B is implied by the critical tax differential
(tA − tB)H in (18).25 Hence country A’s best response function is26
tA =

tB − (9− 2
√
3)(α− w¯)2
72β
if tB ≥ t˜B (RA),
−[6 + 8√3 + n(16√3− 21)](α− w¯)2
288β
− σ if tB < t˜B (RB).
(29)
The threshold value t˜B, below which country A stops matching successively lower taxes
offered by country B is given from substituting toA in (18)
t˜B =
[30− 16√3 + n(21− 16√3)](α− w¯)2
288β
− σ . (30)
In a similar way, we can set up the best response function of country B. The best offer
that this country will make to the outside firm, toB, is obtained from equating U
A
B = U
B
B
25Recall our assumptions that the union in country A wants to attract the firm when its wage surplus in
Regime A is at least as high as in Regime B, and the outside firm settles in country A when its net-of-tax
profits are equal in A and in B.
26Strictly speaking, the lower branch of country A’s best response function is a correspondence, as any
value of tA that does not attract the outside firm yields the same welfare level for country A.
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in (26) and (27):
toB =
(16
√
3− 21)(1− n)(α− w¯)2
288β
− σ. (31)
In the absence of spill-overs (σ = 0), country B’s best offer is positive. The reason is that
in Regime B the union in country A will push through the high wage wBA in (12), harming
consumers in B. Country B wants to be compensated for this loss in consumer surplus by
positive tax revenues, in order to be willing to attract the FDI.
In Regime B, country B’s best response to any given level of tA is to offer a tax rate
that is marginally below the one implied by (18). If instead tA is so low that country B
no longer wants to attract the firm, then it will still want to ensure by its tax offer that
the union in country A does not receive a wage above (wAA)
∗ in (24). The reason is that
country B’s consumers are unambiguously hurt by high wages in country A. Hence in this
case country B will just bid the tax implied by (18), as this ensures that country A receives
the firm (see footnote 25). Hence the best response function of country B is
tB =

tA +
(9− 2√3)(α− w¯)2
72β
− ε if tA ≥ t˜A (RB),
tA +
(9− 2√3)(α− w¯)2
72β
if tA < t˜A (RA);
(32)
where ε is a small positive number and t˜A is the tax offer of country A below which
country B no longer wants to attract the outside firm. Substituting toB in (18) gives
t˜A =
[24
√
3− 57− n(16√3− 21)](α− w¯)2
288β
− σ < 0 . (33)
Note that the structural difference between the best response functions lies in the lower
branches of (29) and (32), respectively. Country A is indifferent between all allocations
in Regime B, due to the fixed wage rate in country B. In contrast, country B prefers
the allocation in Regime A that minimizes the endogenous wage rate wAA, and uses its tax
policy accordingly.
To find the equilibria of the tax game we must look for mutually consistent pairs of tax
offers. From (29) and (32) the equilibrium will be in Regime A if t˜A > t
o
A holds. Intuitively,
this implies that starting from high tax rates which are successively lowered, country B
drops out of the bidding game before country A does. Conversely, a Regime B equilibrium
is characterized by t˜A < t
o
A (or, alternatively, by t˜B > t
o
B). It is easily checked from (28)
and (33) that t˜A > t
o
A is indeed fulfilled for all levels of n in our specified range. Hence the
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tax pair
{t˜A, toB} =
{
[24
√
3− 57− n(16√3− 21)](α− w¯)2
288β
− σ, (16
√
3− 21)(1− n)(α− w¯)2
288β
− σ
}
(34)
is an equilibrium of the tax competition game in the first stage, where the outside firm
locates in country A.27
Eq. (34) also shows that the positive spill-over effect σ > 0, which is identical for the two
countries, is fully reflected in a lower tax rate of the country attracting the outside firm in
equilibrium (country A). Hence all benefits from the spill-over accrue to the outside firm,
as a result of tax competition between the two potential hosts.
Figure 2.2: The tax competition game
The tax competition equilibrium is shown graphically in Figure 2.2. The figure shows that
the equilibrium tax pair (34) is not the only one in our first-stage game. In fact, all tax
rates t˜A ≥ tA ≥ toA are matched by mutually consistent tax rates of country B [see the
27Since the outside firm receives a subsidy in this equilibrium, its after-tax profits exceed before-tax
profits. Hence, a sufficient condition for firm c to locate in country A is that the fixed costs F of setting
up a subsidiary do not exceed firm c’s before-tax profits. From (10) and (24) the latter are (7 + 4
√
3)(α−
w¯)2/(144β).
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lower branch of (32)]. Hence all these tax combinations lead to equilibria in Regime A and
have the property that the tax differential equals (tA − tB)H in (18). The reason for this
multiplicity of equilibria is that, whenever country A lowers its tax below t˜A, country B will
fully match this tax reduction in order to minimize the unionized wage in country A, while
at the same time ensuring that it does not attract the outside firm. Hence it is possible in
our setting that country B offers a tax rate below its best offer in (31).28
The particular Nash equilibrium given in (34) may, however, be regarded as the dominant
equilibrium in our analysis (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, pp. 20-21). This is because
it is the Pareto optimal equilibrium from the perspective of the two governments taken
together. Any other of the Nash equilibria involves lower tax revenues for country A (to
the benefit of the outside firm c) and no welfare change in country B. For this reason we
will focus on the tax vector (34) in the following. At the same time, it is worth emphasizing
again that all possible Nash equilibria lie in Regime A. We can thus summarize:
Proposition 1 In the tax/subsidy game between two countries that differ with respect to
union power, the unionized country (country A) offers a location subsidy and attracts the
outside firm in equilibrium.
The result in Proposition 1 is surprising at first glance, as the unionized country seems
to be at a disadvantage in the location competition for the outside firm. What is crucial,
however, is that this country has an incentive to subsidize the firm, which exceeds the cost
disadvantage that the MNE faces when it locates in country A. By subsidizing the MNE,
the government of country A can induce the union to moderate its wage in exchange for
higher employment in sector x [recall from (12) and (24) that wBA > (w
A
A)
∗], thus reducing
the inefficiencies in country A’s labor and product markets.
Note, moreover, that it is also globally efficient in the present setting that the outside firm
locates in country A. Substituting (24) and (12) in (8) shows that the price for good x in
the integrated market is lower when both firms produce in country A at unit labor costs
wAA in (24) than in Regime B, where the outside firm produces in country B at costs w¯,
but the incumbent firm in country A has unit labor costs wBA . This is an intuitive result in
the present setting, where tax policy can reduce the wage surplus to its reservation value
28In the existing literature on tax competition for FDI, the country that loses the competition for FDI
is typically indifferent between all bids that do not attract the outside firm(s). Hence a refinement of Nash
equilibrium can be invoked to exclude multiple equilibria by arguing that countries will never play weakly
dominated strategies. See, for example Barros and Cabral (2000, Figure 1), or Ferrett and Wooton (2005,
p. 17). The same argument cannot be used in the present analysis, however, because country B is not
indifferent between its bids in Regime A.
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ΩBA. The union in country A will then accept a wage below the average of w¯ and w
B
A in
Regime A, because it will benefit not only from the location of the outside firm but also
from the output expansion of both firms following a wage decrease. This output expansion
constitutes the efficiency gain that can be reaped when the FDI takes place in country A.
The result that the unionized country attracts the outside firm in equilibrium does not
imply, however, that workers in country A are also ‘better off’, on average, than those
in country B. For a meaningful comparison of per capita welfare in the two countries
we need to disregard the additional profit income from firm a. We thus assume that all
profit income in country A accrues to a group of capitalists with mass zero, whereas the
n workers do not receive any profit income. From (22) workers’ income in country A is
then (UAA )
w = UAA − (α − wAA)2/(9β). Dividing (UAA )w and UAB in (22) by n and (1 − n),
respectively, and forming the difference yields
(UAA )
w
n
− U
A
B
(1− n) =
1
n
[
(ΩAA)
∗ + t˜A + σ
]
=
[24
√
3− 45 + n(21− 16√3)](α− w¯)2
288βn
< 0,
(35)
where (25) and (33) have been used in the second step. Hence, for any (permitted) level of
n, non-profit income per capita is lower in country A than in country B. In other words,
the equilibrium subsidy paid by country A exceeds the sum of the wage surplus for workers
in sector x and the technological externality σ. Moreover, this result must hold for all
Nash equilibria of the tax game, because welfare in country A is never higher than in the
equilibrium given by (34), whereas welfare in country B is the same in all Nash equilibria.
Hence we get:
Proposition 2 In all Nash equilibria, per-capita non-profit income in the unionized coun-
try (country A) is less than per-capita income in the non-unionized country.
A simple way to explain this result is to compare the different ways in which countries A and
B can (partly) extract the profits from the outside firm, if it locates in their jurisdiction.
In country B only the tax instrument is available for this purpose, but this instrument
causes no allocative distortions. In country A, in contrast, profit extraction occurs through
a mix of higher wages and lump-sum taxes. Since the wage instrument is distortive but
must nevertheless be used in order to ensure the compliance of the union, country A’s
set of instruments to capture the outside firm’s profits is less efficient, on average. Since
the overall level of profit extraction is fixed for both countries by the arbitrage condition
that governs firm c’s location choice, these efficiency losses translate into a lower average
non-profit income in country A.
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Proposition 2 immediately leads to the question of why a union exists in country A, given
that its presence is welfare-reducing, on average. One answer to this question is the presence
of redistributive effects. It is easily shown that even though unionization reduces the
average non-profit income in country A, the unionized workers in A are better off than
they would be in the absence of the union. This result holds under the condition that the
share of workers in the x sector does not exceed a critical threshold. Put differently, there
must be a sufficiently large z sector whose workers bear both the efficiency losses and the
redistributive gains of their unionized counterparts:
Proposition 3 If the share of workers in the unionized sector is below a critical value
scA ≈ 0.41, the per-capita welfare of unionized workers in country A is higher than in the
absence of the union.
Proof: See Appendix.
2.5 Extensions and discussion
In this section we examine the robustness of our results when some of the model’s assump-
tions are changed. One relevant extension is when positive trade costs are incurred for
shipping goods between countries A and B. In this setting with imperfect market inte-
gration, the relative size of national markets becomes directly relevant for the question of
who attracts the firm in equilibrium. This case is analyzed in the appendix. While the
calculations are considerably more tedious, the basic mechanisms at work in this extended
model are completely analogous to those in our benchmark case.
The results of the extended model are presented graphically in Figure 2.3. On the horizontal
axis is country A’s market share in the region (n), whereas the vertical axis graphs per-
unit transport costs τ between countries A and B. The upward sloping curve gives the
locus of all (n, τ) combinations where optimized welfare in the two regimes is just equal for
country A. As shown in the appendix, all equilibria in Regime A are then to the right of
this curve, whereas equilibria in Regime B are to the left.
The graph combines two asymmetries that have been analyzed in the previous literature.
In the presence of transport costs, the larger country wins the competition for an outside
firm, other things being equal (Haufler and Wooton, 1999). If instead two countries of
equal size compete for an outside firm and trade costs partially separate markets, then
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Figure 2.3: Location of firm c as a function of trade costs and market size
- n
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Note: The figure is drawn for α = 10, w¯ = 8, β = 9.
the MNE will choose the less competitive environment and locate in the country without
an incumbent firm (Bjorvatn and Eckel, 2006). These findings are also incorporated in
Figure 2.3, as a larger domestic market size n makes it more likely for country A to attract
the outside firm, whereas high transport costs strengthen the competitive advantage of
country B, which does not have an incumbent firm.
If a sector-specific union in country A is added to this picture, first intuition would suggest
that the unionized country A needs to have other, compensating advantages in order to
attract the FDI. Figure 2.3 shows, however, that exactly the opposite is true and country A
can win the competition for the outside firm, even though it has the smaller home market
and it already hosts an incumbent firm. This occurs in the area underneath the regime
frontier, but to the left of n = 0.5. Hence, the fact that country A has a domestic union
is able to simultaneously offset two other (albeit limited) location disadvantages. In this
sense Proposition 1 carries over to the more general setting analyzed here.
When the trade costs in Figure 2.3 exceed a critical threshold τ¯ , trade will cease in at least
one of the two regimes (see Appendix for details). When trade costs become so high as
to make exports from A to B unprofitable in Regime A, it is obvious that a Regime B
equilibrium must result in order for B’s residents to be able to consume good x. Hence the
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case of prohibitively high trade costs requires a symmetric set-up with one internationally
immobile, incumbent firm in each of countries A and B. In this case it is again true that
the unionized country will attract the outside firm, even if it has a (limited) market size
disadvantage vis-a`-vis country B. Thus Proposition 1 also generalizes to a setting with
prohibitively high trade costs, if the model is adjusted to incorporate symmetric market
conditions in the two countries.29
In the following we revert again to the case of zero trade costs. A second issue is whether,
and how, the results of our model are affected when the sequence of play is altered.30
One alternative scenario is that the union’s decisions are of a longer-term nature than tax
policies and hence the union in country A chooses the wage rate before the two governments
set taxes. This setting changes the distribution of rents, in comparison to our benchmark
case. If the union in country A has a first-mover advantage it will choose the sector-specific
wage wA so as to just make country A’s government willing to set a sufficiently low tax rate
in order to attract the outside firm. In other words, the government of country A will then
always have to bid its best offer. In comparison to our benchmark case, this scenario leads
to higher wages and a lower average per-capita utility in country A. However, it will still
be true that the unionized country attracts the FDI in equilibrium and hence Proposition
1 carries over to this alternative sequence of moves.
In contrast, the assumption that the outside firm makes its location choice only after the
wage is set by country A’s union is crucial for the results of our model. To see this let
us consider a scenario where governments set taxes in the first stage, firm c makes its
location in the second stage, the union in country A sets the wage in the third stage and
both firms choose output levels in the fourth stage.31 In this case the union in country A
will set the monopoly wage also in Regime A, as the investment is locked in at the time
of the union’s wage decision. Hence tax policy is unable to induce wage moderation and,
as a result, country A’s government is unwilling to make a sufficiently generous tax offer
to attract the FDI. Such a scenario would imply, however, that the international mobility
of the multinational firm is permanently lost, once this firm has settled in one country.
Instead, as we have discussed in section 2, it is a characteristic feature of MNEs that they
retain their ‘footloose’ nature even after a (temporary) location decision has been made
and hence can relocate easily, should the union in country A increase the sector-specific
wage rate.
29See our working paper version, Haufler and Mittermaier (2008), for a full analysis of this case.
30The complete set of results for these cases is available from the authors upon request.
31This setting is equivalent to allowing the union in the fourth stage of our analysis (section 3.2) to
renegotiate the wage also in Regime A.
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Another possible sequence of events is that the union can commit to the wage rate set in
stage 2, even if the MNE locates in country B (i.e., it does not renegotiate the wage in
stage 4). In this setting Proposition 1 is maintained and a Regime A equilibrium becomes
even more likely than in our benchmark case. The reason is that the incumbent firm a
faces a lower wage rate and hence produces more output in Regime B when the wage is
not renegotiated. This in turn makes it less attractive for the MNE to locate in country B.
However, this scenario would imply that the union can commit to a wage rate in Regime B
that is below the ex-post optimal wage wBA in eq. (12). Given the immobility of the
incumbent firm a, this announcement will not be credible.
Thirdly, we briefly consider the case of price competition between the two active firms. In
the benchmark setting with homogeneous goods and no trade costs, Bertrand competition
effectively eliminates all union power. The reason is that if the MNE locates in country B
and faces the marginal wage cost w¯, the incumbent firm in country A will not have positive
sales in the integrated market, unless the wage in this country also drops to w¯. But this
implies that the union loses its outside option and hence its wage surplus in equilibrium
can be driven to zero by an optimizing strategy of country A’s government.
Finally, we have chosen the most straightforward way to model asymmetric union power
by assuming that a union is present in country A, whereas the labor market in country B
is competitive. We expect our results to carry over qualitatively to the case where a union
is also present in country B, but it is less powerful than that of country A. If union power
is fully symmetric in countries A and B, then the equilibrium location of the outside firm
will be indeterminate, unless other relevant asymmetries are introduced into the model.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed a model of tax competition between two countries of different
size, of which one has a sector-specific union in an imperfectly competitive market, whereas
the other country’s labor market is perfectly competitive. This model leads to the seemingly
counterintuitive result that it is the unionized country which attracts an internationally
mobile firm in equilibrium. In a model extension with positive trade costs, the unionized
country can win the FDI even if it has two simultaneous location disadvantages, such as
a smaller home market and an incumbent firm in the relevant market. The core reason
underlying our results is that the government of the unionized country will provide a
generous tax environment to the firm as a means to induce wage moderation from its
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domestic union. Foreign direct investment plays a crucial role in this process because
it offers a discrete increase in employment opportunities when the union ‘cooperates’ in
attracting the mobile firm.
Our analysis may help to explain why high investment subsidies are commonplace in loca-
tions with high wages and union power. At the same time it may also provide a possible
explanation for the puzzling result in several empirical studies that a high degree of union-
ization is positively correlated with the likelihood of a given location to attract multination-
als (Coughlin et al., 1991; Friedman et al., 1992). While these studies typically incorporate
the regular rates of business taxes, they do not include specific location subsidies, on which
the present analysis has focused. Incorporating such (direct or indirect) subsidies as an
explanatory variable would thus allow a direct test of our theoretical hypotheses.
Our model can be extended in several directions. One possible route is to widen the
set of policy instruments in the hands of governments and to include distortionary taxes.
We would expect that the overall policy package in the (more) unionized country is still
more generous towards international investors, and hence that the unionized country will
attract more FDI, other things being equal. A second possible extension is to relax the
assumption of a monopoly union and replace it by a bargaining game between the union
and the firm(s). Finally, and perhaps most ambitiously, an extended model could allow
for repeated interactions between the union and the multinational firm, when the latter
can relocate in response to changing wage demands by the union, but incurs some costs of
doing so. We leave the analysis of these extensions to future research.
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2.7 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
We start from country A’s welfare in Regime A, UAA , as given in (22). In Regime A2,
where the union’s wage is not constrained by the condition to attract the outside firm, we
substitute w˜A from (19) into (22). This gives
UA2A =
(2n+ 7)(α− w¯)2
36β
+ nw¯ + tA + σ.
Hence ∂UA2A /∂tA = 1 holds throughout Regime A2, implying that it is optimal for coun-
try A’s government to raise taxes until Regime A1 is reached.
In Regime A1, we substitute wAA from (21) into (22). This gives
UA1A =
δ2(2n− 5) + 24δ(α− w¯)
144β
+ nw¯ + tA + σ,
where δ(tA, tB) is given in (15). Maximizing with respect to tA, for any given level of tB,
yields32
tmA =
(16− 5n)(5n− 4)(α− w¯)2
144(2− n)2β + tB. (A.1)
Hence country A either sets tmA in (A.1), or it raises its tax until it reaches the border to
Regime B, where (tA− tB)H holds as given in (18). For any given tB, country A thus wants
to raise its tax throughout Regime A1 iff tmA > t
H
A . This condition is fulfilled if
(16− 5n)(5n− 4)(α− w¯)2
144(n− 2)2β −
(
2
√
3− 9) (α− w¯)2
72β
> 0 ⇔ n > 2
(
3
√
3− 5
)
≈ 0.39.
(A.2)
Hence, for any n ≥ 0.4 the tax differential in any candidate equilibrium in Regime A is
given by (tA − tB)H in (18). ¤
32The second order condition for a maximum is fulfilled.
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Proof of Proposition 3
From (22) country A’s aggregate welfare, but excluding profit income, in Regime A is
(UAA )
w =
2n
(
α− wAA
)2
9β
+
2(wAA − w¯)(α− wAA)
3β
+ nw¯ + tA + σ. (A.3)
We substitute (wAA)
∗ from (24) and t˜A from (34). To obtain the per capita welfare of a
unionized worker, we divide tax revenues and consumer surplus by n but the wage surplus
by sAn, since only the share of workers in sector x enjoys the wage surplus. This gives
uunionA =
[
7 + 4
√
3
72
+
1
24nsA
+
(21− 16√3)n+ 24√3− 57
288n
]
(α− w¯)2
β
+ w¯. (A.4)
In the absence of a trade union, both countries are indifferent about attracting the firm,
except for the technological externality σ. This leads to ti = −σ in equilibrium and both
countries are indifferent about being in Regime A or B. Hence (non-profit) per capita
welfare of all workers in country A amounts to
unounionA =
2(α− w¯)2
9β
+ w¯. (A.5)
Equating per capita welfare in (A.4) and (A.5) and solving for sA yields the critical share
scA where unionized workers are indifferent between having the union or not:
scA =
4
19− 8√3 + 5n. (A.6)
This share is falling in n and thus reaches its minimum at the maximum value of n in the
permitted range, which is n = 0.9. In this case scA(n = 0.9) ≈ 0.415. Hence sA < 0.41 is a
sufficient condition for each unionized worker to gain from having the union, for all values
of n permitted in our analysis. ¤
The model with positive trade costs
We now assume that there is a per unit trade cost of τ on each unit of good x shipped
between countries A and B, whereas trade in the z industry remains free. Firms’ profits
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in the final stage of the game are then
piAa = pi
A
c =
n
(
α− wAA
)2
9β
+
(1− n) (α− τ − wAA)2
9β
(A.7)
if the outside firm c goes to A. If it goes to B then
piBa =
n
(
α + w¯ + τ − 2wBA
)2
9β
+
(1− n) (α + w¯ − 2τ − 2wBA)2
9β
,
piBc =
n
(
α− 2w¯ − 2τ + wBA
)2
9β
+
(1− n) (α− 2w¯ + τ + wBA)2
9β
.
(A.8)
The quantities produced in the two regimes are
xAa = x
A
c =
n
(
α− wAA
)
3β
+
(1− n) (α− τ − wAA)
3β
(A.9)
and
xBa =
n
(
α + w¯ + τ − 2wBA
)
3β
+
(1− n) (α+ w¯ − 2τ − 2wBA)
3β
,
xBc =
n
(
α− 2w¯ − 2τ + wBA
)
3β
+
(1− n) (α− 2w¯ + τ + wBA)
3β
,
(A.10)
respectively. In stage 4, using these quantities in (11) and maximizing with respect to wA
in Regime B gives
wBA =
1
4
[α + 3w¯ + (3n− 2)τ ], ΩBA =
[α− w¯ + (3n− 2)τ ]2
24β
(A.11)
as the union’s wage and the wage surplus in Regime B. In stage 3, equating the multina-
tional’s gross profit differential in the two countries to (tA − tB), as in (14), solving this
term for wAA and substituting w
B
A from (A.11) gives
wAA = α− (1− n)τ−
1
4
√
25(α− w¯)2 − 10(9n− 2)τ(α− w¯) + (2− n)(47n+ 2)τ 2 + 144β(tA − tB) ,
(A.12)
which collapses to (15) for τ = 0. In stage 2, we use (4) and (A.9) to calculate the wage
surplus ΩAA. Equating this to Ω
B
A in (A.11) yields
(tA − tB)H = 1
72β
[−9(α− w¯)2 + 2(25n− 8)τ(α− w¯) + n(23n− 48)τ 2
+2
√
[3α− 3w¯ − (4− 5n)τ ](α− w¯ − nτ)(α− w¯ + nτ − τ)2
]
,
(A.13)
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which reduces to (18) for τ = 0.
In the first stage of the game, the governments maximize welfare in a way analogous to (22)
and (23). The firms’ profits are given in (A.7)-(A.8) and the wage surplus of country A’s
union is obtained by inserting (A.9) and (A.10) into (11) and (16). Consumer surplus in
the different regimes amounts to
CSAA =
2n
(
α− wAA
)2
9β
, CSAB =
2(1− n) (α− wAA − τ)2
9β
,
CSBA =
n
(
2α− w¯ − τ − wBA
)2
18β
, CSBB =
(1− n) (2α− w¯ − τ − wBA)2
18β
.
(A.14)
Substituting (A.11), (4) and (A.13) into the welfare terms and equalizing country B’s
welfare in the two regimes, we derive country B’s best offer tax rate as
toB = −σ +
1
288β
{−[7α− 7w¯ − (3n+ 2)τ ]2
+ 4
[√
7(α− w¯)2 + 2(5n− 6)τ(α− w¯)− (n2 + 4n− 4)τ 2 + 4γ(α− w¯ + nτ − τ)− 4nτ
]2}
(A.15)
where
γ ≡
√
3(α− w¯)2 − 2(2− n)τ(α− w¯) + (4− 5n)nτ 2 . (A.16)
It is straightforward to show that Lemma 1 also holds for n ≥ 0.4 when τ > 0. Intuitively
this is because the presence of trade costs makes it less attractive for country A to pursue
a beggar-thy-neighbor policy by means of high unionized wages (cf. footnote 24). Hence
we can add the tax differential (tA − tB)H from (A.13) to (A.15) to get the tax rate that
country A will optimally offer in a candidate Regime A equilibrium. Substituting this tax
rate to get maximized Regime A welfare, (UAA )
∗, and subtracting UBA determines under
which conditions country A wants to host the firm. This difference is
(UAA )
∗ − UBA =
1
288β
{−51(α− w¯)2 + 2(127n− 38)(α− w¯)τ
+ [n(197n− 324)− 12]τ 2 + 32γ[α− w¯ + (n− 1)τ ]} , (A.17)
where γ is defined in (A.16). Setting this welfare difference equal to zero yields the locus
of all (n, τ) combinations where country A is indifferent about attracting the firm or not.
This is the upward sloping curve labelled (UAA )
∗ = UBA in Figure 2.3. Below this line (A.17)
is positive and a Regime A equilibrium results, whereas above the line (A.17) is negative
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and the equilibrium is in Regime B.
To obtain the lowest prohibitive level of trade costs where firm a stops exporting to country
B, we substitute the equilibrium wages (A.11) and (4) into the profit terms (A.7) and (A.8)
and set these two zero. This yields a lowest prohibitive trade cost level of τ¯ = (α−w¯)/(3n+
2), which arises in Regime B. This upper limit on τ is represented by the downward sloping
curve in Figure 2.3.
Chapter 3
The winner gives it all: Unions, tax
competition and offshoring
3.1 Introduction
In January 2008, Nokia’s Executive Vice president Veli Sundba¨ck announced the closure
of its handset factory in Bochum in North Rhine-Westphalia (NRW) and the relocation
of Nokia’s manufacturing activity to Cluj (Romania) as a response to changes in market
conditions and an increased requirement for cost effectiveness. However, as Nokia had
received investment subsidies from the state of NRW for its production site in Bochum and
will be exempt from the real estate tax in Romania, the decision to relocate its production
facility to a low-labour-cost country reignited an old debate on the distribution of state
subsidies. As a matter of fact, the latest case of production delocation is just another
example of what has been common practice long before the enlargement of the European
Union: Governments exploiting firms’ responsiveness to subsidies and engaging in subsidy
races.1 Accordingly, Germany may have lost the latest race for a large manufacturer, but
has come off as the winner in the past at the cost of subsidy payments when bidding for
a BMW plant in 2001 against Kolin (Czech Republic) or averting Volkswagen’s threats to
relocate towards Hungary in 1996.
1As more than three quarters of subsidies to industry in the OECD are investment subsidies (see Fuest
and Huber, 2000, Table 1) there is hardly any doubt that local governments use subsidies as an instrument
to influence the location decision of capital. Van Biesenbroeck (2008) gives an overview of bidding wars
between the Canadian and the US government for the automotive industry. See also Greenstone and
Moretti (2004).
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Against this background, the present paper assesses the outcome and welfare implications
of a subsidy race between countries with different degrees of labor market distortions.
Our analysis builds on a model in which industrial activity is inefficiently locked-in in a
unionized core country. What we have in mind is that a certain region historically emerged
as an industrial center which sparked the emergence of trade unions, capturing some of
the location rents earned in such an agglomeration. Our most important result is that tax
competition among a leading unionized industry core and a challenging emerging country
is efficiency enhancing as it leads to relocation of industry towards the country with a
non-distorted labor market. A government of an industrial core whose objective it is to
maximize residents’ welfare will find it optimal to let its competitor attract mobile capital
so as to benefit from increased efficiency and the competing location’s tax regime.
Local labor markets are typically thought of as important determinants of subsidy poli-
cies, disregarding alternative employment opportunities of local workers and the fact that
consumers across the country as well as shareholders of locally owned companies may ben-
efit hugely from real capital moving to low-wage or low-tax regions. Our at first sight
somewhat surprising result suggests that what we observe in everyday political discussions
and decisions may, in some respects, be in contrast to what would be optimal policy once
general equilibrium effects are taken into account.
Moreover, disentangling the welfare effects of industry relocation to factor groups reveals
that capitalists are the clear winners of the subsidy race as they benefit from lower consumer
prices and the repatriation of subsidy income. Workers of the non-unionized competitive
industry in the winning country benefit from their government’s action only if union wages
have been way above the competitive wage rate such that the benefit from lower consumer
prices compensates the financing costs of attracting an industry cluster. The opposite
holds for non-unionized workers in the former industrial core country. Surprisingly, they
suffer, together with former unionized workers, from a delocation of industry and in par-
ticular when union wages were high. Since union wages depend on the same parameter as
consumers’ love for variety a loss of industry will be more severe if the valuation for the
industry good is high as this will have a strong impact on the country’s consumer price
index.
Our modelling approach has various advantages. Firstly, the monopolistic competition
framework allows us to be consistent with empirical findings by Stewart (1990), Abowd
and Lemieux (1993) and Nickell et al. (1994) who give evidence for unions’ wage setting
behaviour to depend on firms’ market power next to their own bargaining power. Secondly,
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the model which follows recent work by Borck et al. (2009) is able to reflect the stylized
fact that economic activity is not evenly distributed across space but tends to cluster
according to certain agglomeration mechanisms as outlined by Marshall (1890), creating
location rents for each individual firm. These location rents can to a certain extent be
extracted, e.g. by governments or unions without changing the spatial allocation of firms
instantaneously.
Our work draws on different strands of the literature. Recent years have seen an increasing
interest in the interaction of agglomeration economies and local government tax setting
behaviour (Kind et al. (2000), Ludema and Wooton (2000), Baldwin and Krugman (2004),
Borck and Pflu¨ger (2006)) with one major insight being that the presence of agglomeration
economies reduces the mobility of capital and creates taxable location rents. These models,
however, do not incorporate labor market frictions as an additional factor in the competi-
tion for mobile capital. Picard and Toulemonde (2006) examine the role of trade unions on
the allocation of firms across two regions. They describe how the existence of union wages
reinforce the home market effect supporting the concentration of firms in one location.
A parallel strand in the literature has focused on the deterring effects of unionization on
foreign direct investment (Leahy and Montagna (2000); Naylor and Santoni (2003); Lom-
merud et al. (2003) ).2 These papers, however, consider only trade unions and firms while
ignoring government tax policies. A notable exception is recent work by Haufler and Mit-
termaier (2008) who show that a unionized country with additional location disadvantages
(such as a smaller market) may end up attracting mobile foreign capital, whereby taxes
have a strategic effect on the union’s behavior. Our model however differs conceptually as
it explicitly accounts for agglomeration tendencies which are empirically well established3
and explain the co-existence of industrialized core and lagging regions as empirically out-
lined in Redding and Venables (2004). Moreover, our paper, by contrast, examines the
role unions plays for tax competition without their behavior being controllable (directly or
indirectly so) by governments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general setup of
the model. Section 3 illustrates the impact of tax competition on the allocation of industrial
firms. Section 4 demonstrates the welfare effects on each single factor group. Section 5
discusses the outcomes of the game for an alternative government objective. Section 6
2These contributions are part of a more general literature that analyzes the interaction between union-
ization, imperfect competition in goods markets, and economic integration. See e.g. Brander and Spencer
(1988), Huizinga (1993), Driffill and van der Ploeg (1995), and Naylor (1998).
3For an overview of the empirical literature on agglomeration economies see Rosenthal and Strange
(2004).
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concludes.
3.2 The basic model
The theoretical model follows the model proposed by Borck et al. (2009). We consider two
countries i ∈ {h, f} (h and f being mnemonic for ‘home’ and ‘foreign’) where one of the
two production factors, labor (L), is immobile, whereas the other, capital (K), is mobile
across countries such that it can be employed in one region while its owners (who do not
move) spend its return in the other region.
Countries are symmetric in technology, preferences and size, but are allowed to differ in
labor market rigidity as measured by a parameter of union power. There are two sectors, an
‘A’ sector with perfect competition, and an industrial ‘M ’ sector displaying differentiated
goods, increasing returns to scale and monopolistic competition. Trade in the competitive
good is costless, whereas the increasing returns sector faces per unit ‘iceberg’ transport
costs τ a` la Samuelson (1954) which means that for each unit to arrive at location j, 1 + τ
units have to be shipped from location i. The A sector produces a homogeneous traditional
good which we choose to be the nume´raire using labor only. Units are scaled such that one
unit of labor produces one unit of output, so that the competitive wage also equals one.
3.2.1 Preferences
There are two types of households in each country, inelastically supplying their factor en-
dowment, labor and capital, respectively. In country i, there is a total ofKi+Li households,
whose utility stems from consumption of the traditional as well as the differentiated, in-
dustrial varieties. Those preferences are reflected by a two-tier utility function, whereby
the upper tier is quasi-linear and the lower tier is of the C.E.S. type. The upper tier utility
function of a household is
Ui(Mi, Ai) = α lnMi + Ai − α[lnα− 1], (1)
where the last term is a constant that disappears when indirect utility is derived, Ai denotes
consumption of the traditional good and Mi stands for differentiated industrial varieties v
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according to the lower-tier function
Mi =
(∫ ni
0
mii(v)
σ−1
σ dv +
∫ N
ni
mji(v)
σ−1
σ dv
) σ
σ−1
, σ > 1, N = ni + nj. (2)
Here σ denotes the constant elasticity of substitution between any two varieties and ni the
mass of varieties produced in i. mii and mji denote the quantity consumed by a household
in country i of a variety produced in i and j, respectively. Assuming 0 < α < yis, (i = h, f ;
s = K,L) it is ensured that both goods will be consumed. Utility maximization yields the
following demand functions:
Mi =
α
Pi
, Ais = yis − α, s = K,L
mii = αpi(v)
−σP σ−1i , mji = α(τpj(v))
−σP σ−1i ,
(3)
where
Pi ≡
(
nip
1−σ
i + nj(τpj(v))
−σ) 11−σ (4)
denotes the perfect C.E.S. price index4 where we take into account that firms within one
country are identical and charge identical producer prices.5 Indirect utility is
Vis = yis − α lnPi, s = K,L (5)
where income is either labor (‘L’) income or capital (‘K’) income.
3.2.2 Industrial production
The perfectly competitive A sector has already been described above. Every firm in the
industrial sector produces one variety6 with a fixed input, namely one unit of capital, and
labor. Moreover, a higher concentration of industry in the country lowers the labor input re-
quirement, according to the following specification: For each unit of output, γi ≡ 1/(1+θni)
units of labor are needed as a variable input, where θ > 1 measures the local knowledge
spill-over occurring between workers of the M sector. This way of modelling spill-overs is
obviously a short-cut for considering the various channels through which industry concen-
tration may benefit each and every single firm. It can be rationalized in the present setting
4This is the expenditure needed to purchase a unit-level of welfare.
5However, producer prices across regions are no longer equal once we allow for labor market frictions.
6Note that this is not an assumption, but a result. For details, refer to Baldwin et al. (2003).
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by knowledge exchange or thick labor markets.7 Using this specification, the firms’ profit
function in i reads
pii = (pi − wiγi)qi − ri, (6)
where pi denotes the consumer price, wi is the wage rate, and ri is the capital reward rate.
Equilibrium in the goods market requires total (world) demand for a domestic industrial
good to equal supply of this variety. The market clearing condition reads
qi = mii(Li +Ki) + τmij(Lj +Kj) (7)
This latter term shows that part of demand is indirect due to iceberg trade costs which
are fully borne by consumers. Straightforward profit maximization gives us the firm’s mill
price
pi =
σ
σ − 1wiγi, (8)
whereby the same price, multiplied by τ , is charged to customers abroad. Now, since capital
supply is fixed, so is the number of firms which will bid for capital; hence, its compensation
adjusts so as to ensure zero profits in equilibrium. Using this zero-profit condition and (8),
we obtain the output level which allows a firm to break even
qi =
ri(σ − 1)
wiγi
. (9)
Labor demand of an industrial firm reads
lMi = γiqi. (10)
3.2.3 Mobile factor’s reward
In the short run the allocation of capital and hence the location of M firms is exogenous.
To derive capital’s reward note that, due to the fact that one unit of capital is needed
to run a firm, its reward is bid up to the point where it equals operating profit. To ease
notation, we will henceforth use the share notation where sn ≡ nh/N denotes region h’s
share of the world’s industry, λ ≡ Lh/L is region h’s share of world labor and κ ≡ Kh/K
denotes the share of world capital region h owns. With (8) and (9), it follows immediately
that the capital reward rate ri reflects operating profit, i.e. ri = (1/σ)piqi. Using this, the
7For a thorough analysis on the micro-foundations of agglomeration economies, see Duranton and Puga
(2004).
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demand functions (3) and market clearing (7) and normalizing N = L = K = 1, yields
rh =
α
σ
(
κ+ λ
sn + φχ (1− sn) +
((1− κ) + (1− λ))φ
φsn + χ (1− sn)
)
,
rf =
α
σ
(
φχ(κ+ λ)
sn + φχ (1− sn) +
((1− κ) + (1− λ))χ
φsn + χ (1− sn)
)
;
(11)
where 0 < φ ≡ τ 1−σ ≤ 1 stands for the level of trade freeness and χ ≡ (pf
ph
)1−σ = (wfγf
whγh
)1−σ.
In the long run capital is mobile and seeks for the highest nominal return. Local techno-
logical spillovers on the sectoral level support a locational equilibrium where all industrial
activity is clustered in one region since, all else equal an increase in the number of firms
in h increases operating profit in h and hence the capital reward gap (rh − rf ) which in-
duces a further capital inflow into h. On the other hand, firms in h will face intense local
competition as sn increases which deters other firms to enter the market. However, for
ongoing trade integration φ firms compete with other firms irrespective of their location
which entails that the opportunity cost of agglomerating in one country and serving the
foreign market from abroad become low. Consequently, for a sufficiently high level of trade
freeness firms will be agglomerated in one region as they benefit from the spatial proximity
to other firms through local industry spill-over effects. The critical level of trade freeness
at which the benefit of agglomeration begins to exceed the cost of serving from one loca-
tion is typically denoted as the break point level of trade freeness, φB and derived solving
∂rh−rf
∂sn
∣∣
sn=1/2
= 0 for φ.8
For the purpose of our later analysis which assesses the outcome of a tax competition
game between an industrialized country hosting an industry cluster (‘core’) and a lagging
region (‘periphery’), we describe a locational equilibrium where the level of trade freeness
is sufficiently high (φ > φB) such that all industry is agglomerated in one region, say
h.9 This could be due to historical reasons, just as the story goes in Krugman’s seminal
1991 paper. For instance, one could think of a highly industrialized country in Western
Europe versus an emerging market in Eastern Europe. As said in the introduction, we
think that historically determined agglomeration patterns then may have sparked labor’s
organization, giving rise to asymmetric unionization. Firms in the industrial core earn an
8A formal expression of the break point is available upon request. For a more detailed model exposition
see Borck et al. (2009).
9Tax competition within agglomeration models where trade costs are so high that no agglomeration
occurs yield results that are closer in nature to the ‘basic tax competition model’ (see Baldwin et al.
(2003)). For an analysis of such interior cases in a New Trade Theory model, refer to Egger and Seidel
(2007) who show that a country with a stronger labor market distortion will find it optimal to choose a
lower Nash tax rate in competition for mobile capital.
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agglomeration rent (Ω) which is defined as the loss a single firm would incur if it relocated
to the periphery, given that all other firms stay in the core. In other words, capital is tied
to the core and capital owners will have no incentive to relocate their capital unit as long
as they earn positive location rents which can be expressed as
Ω ≡ rh − rf
∣∣
sn=1
=
α
σ
(
2− 1
φ
(
wf (1 + θ)
wh
)1−σ
(1 + φ2)
)
. (12)
Obviously, the agglomeration rent is increasing in θ the intensity of local industry spill-
overs, the level of trade integration φ and foreign’s wage rate wf , whereas it is decreasing
in core’s wage, wh.
3.2.4 Union wage setting
As noted earlier the emergence of an industrial cluster may have sparked labor’s orga-
nization, giving rise to asymmetric unionization. We find it therefore natural to choose
the industrialized core to be the unionized country whereas periphery’s labor market is
perfectly competitive. Hence, whereas the immobile factor’s reward in the periphery is
equal to the competitive wage rate, we allow firm-specific unions (which are conceptually
identical to sector-specific unions in this model) in the core to set the nominal10 reward
for unionized workers using a decentralized wage setting approach for two reasons: Nation-
wide unions are hardly observed in reality and, more importantly, the feature of our model
that unions, much like competing firms, try each to get the highest rent possible without
internalizing consequences for the overall price level, tax policies and industry location,
is one that makes it plausible as a stylized description of many OECD countries’ union
behavior. Workers employed in unionized firms will enjoy higher nominal wages than those
working in the non-unionized sector of the economy. Consequently, as firms set their prices
according to a fixed mark-up rule (8), consumer prices will, of course, be higher under
unionization, which implies that A sector employees and capital owners will lose from it, as
will foreign country’s residents who buy imported differentiated goods from core’s industry.
The non-unionized traditional A industry serves as a ‘buffer’ sector for those who do not
find employment in the industrial M sector, so there will be no unemployment.
10Obviously, we do not use a monetary model here. We use the term ‘nominal’ as opposed to ‘real’ in
the sense that the latter means taking the price index into account.
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We employ a monopoly union approach,11 where the union maximizes the nominal wage
bill of its members over and above the competitive one, (wh − 1)lMi . The firm then exerts
its ‘right to manage’, i.e. it chooses optimal output given the wage rate. From here on, wh
denotes the union-sector wage in h (whereas the competitive wages in core and periphery
are equal to 1, see above). Using (7), (10) and the demand functions from (3), we rewrite
union’s objective function,
(wh − 1) γ qh = (wh − 1)γh
(
σ
σ − 1 γhwh
)−σ
αψ, (13)
where ψ ≡ [P σ−1h (κ+λ)+P σ−1f ((1−κ)+(1−λ)].12 The left hand side of (13) reveals how each
union equally weighs the factors ‘wage rate above competitive wage rate’ and ‘employment’
so as to maximize the excess wage bill. The iso-elasticity of both labor demand (that stems
from the iso-elasticity of product demand and constant per unit labor input requirement)
and the firm’s part of the Nash bargaining lead to the wage that maximizes (13)
wh = 1 +
1
σ − 1 (14)
which is simply a fixed mark-up on the competitive wage. Intuitively, the union wage rate
falls in the elasticity of substitution which measures a firm’s mark-up in the monopolistically
competitive industry.13
A natural question that arises within a core-periphery equilibrium and unions’ mark-up
wages in the core is whether, in the absence of government intervention, this allocation of
capital remains stable. This is a straightforward problem to tackle, which leads us to
Proposition 1 Agglomeration rents earned in the core can partially be reaped by trade
unions, up to a wage level of wb = (1+θ)
(
2φ
1+φ2
) 1
σ−1
. Beyond this point, the core-periphery
11This is a special case of Nash bargaining between the representative union and the firm where all the
bargaining power is with the union. We are aware that this is only one out of many ways to model industrial
relations; however, it seems to be the most widely used one due to its tractability. For an exhaustive
overview of collective bargaining and some empirical evidence, we refer to Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).
12Note that each union neglects the effects on the economy’s consumer price index.
13It is worth noting that we get an only quantitatively different result with the more general Nash
bargaining approach. The union’s outside option is zero, and the firm’s outside option is to produce
nothing, having already sunk the fixed cost which is the same whether an agreement is reached or not
and hence cancels from the Nash maximand (This point is parallel to Picard and Toulemonde (2006).
They emphasize that this assumption is implicitly made in many models where fixed costs are set to zero).
Adding weights of β and 1− β to the union’s and firm’s objectives in the Nash product, respectively, and
maximizing yields wh = 1 + β/(σ − 1). Since this does not provide us with additional insights, we do not
pursue this further.
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equilibrium becomes unstable as the rents in f are higher.
For the proof, we simply set rh equal to rf and solve the equation for wh, evaluating the
expression at sn = 1. This is the ‘break wage rate’ above which each and every unit of
capital is better off in country f than in the core h.
The first derivatives are straightforward: wb rises in local technological spill-over (θ) and
falls with market integration (φ). Figure 3.1 illustrates the stability of the core-periphery
equilibrium under asymmetric unionization.
Figure 3.1: Stability of core-periphery equilibria under asymmetric unionization
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Figure 3.1 reveals that as long as the union wage rate set in the core does not exceed the
break wage rate wb, capital will be tied to the region where it earns an agglomeration rent.
Of course, with the presence of unions in the agglomerated core part of the location rent
which, in the absence of labor market distortion fully accrued to capital owners are now
redirected to unionized workers.
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3.3 Tax competition
Governments maximize residents’ welfare and deploy lump-sum taxes on factor endowment,
using the revenues for a direct subsidy to capital employed within their borders.14 In
accordance with the models in this literature (see Baldwin and Krugman (2004), Borck
and Pflu¨ger (2006)), we assume that the core is a Stackelberg leader in that it gets to set
its tax rate first. In our framework, this assumption can be rationalized in the following way:
The country that disposes of the unionized industries knows that it may face competition
from a challenger and will essentially play an ‘entry-deterrence’ game.
Letting zi denote a subsidy to capital employed in i and ri + zi the return to capital
including subsidies, we end up with the government budget constraints
snzh = Th(κ+ λ); (1− sn)zf = Tf ((1− κ) + (1− λ)), (15)
with Ti denoting the tax rate. To best disentangle the effects of asymmetric unionization
on the location of capital we assume that countries are of equal size (κ = λ = 0.5).15
Governments are utilitarian and maximize the sum of residents’ indirect utility, where
welfare of unionized M and non-unionized A workers as well as capitalists, in h reads
V Mh = L
M
h (wh − α lnPh − Th), (16)
V Ah = (L− LMh )(1− α lnPh − Th), (17)
V Kh = Kh(yK − α lnPh − Th), (18)
where yK denotes capitalist’s income and L
M
h = l
M
h nh is the core’s industrial sector’s labor
demand. Observe that since the world is a lumpy place in this model, both parties will
effectively compare two situations: being the core (henceforth indicated by the superscript
‘c’) or the periphery (indicated by ‘p’). At this point, the simple structure of the model
helps us greatly when it comes to optimal policy analysis as we get a closed-form welfare
function. Taking the example of country h being the core,16 welfare is derived adding up
(16)-(18) evaluated at sn = 1
WF ch =
1
2
(
1− zh + 2α
σ
)
+ LMch (wh − 1)− α lnP ch, (19)
14Tax competition here is modelled in a very simple way: Given that the owners of both factors are
immobile, they are simply taxed on their endowment, i.e. residence-based taxes are employed.
15The interested reader is referred to Borck et al. (2009) who consider inefficiencies arising through
asymmetrically sized countries.
16Note that rh|sn=1 = rf |sn=0 = 2α/σ.
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where LMch ≡ 2ασ (σ−1)wh . Country f ’s welfare in this case is
WF pf =
1
2
(2α
σ
+ zh + 1
)− α lnP pf . (20)
If, by contrast, all industry locates in f , the welfare terms are
WF ph =
1
2
(2α
σ
+ zf + 1
)− α lnP ph (21)
WF cf =
1
2
(2α
σ
− zf + 1
)− α lnP cf (22)
The simplified price indices are obtained using (8) and (14) in (see (4))
P ch =
σ
σ−1whγ, P
p
h =
σ
σ−1φ
1/(1−σ)γ,
P cf =
σ
σ−1γ, P
p
f =
σ
σ−1φ
1/(1−σ)whγ.
(23)
where γ ≡ 1/(1 + θ). Note that part of core’s union wage rate is borne by consumers
abroad (‘wage cost exporting’).
Moreover, given our assumption that the labor market distortion occurs only in h, we can
show that global welfare WF glob = WFh +WFf could be enhanced if the industry core
shifted towards the non-unionized periphery:
Proposition 2 For high levels of trade freeness and wf < wh < wb the core-periphery
equilibrium sn = 1 is stable but globally inefficient,
WF glob|sn=1 < WF glob|sn=0.
Proof : See Appendix.
The obvious question then is whether core will defend its industry cluster and prevent the
shift of industry towards an efficient allocation, using a generous tax regime to compensate
capital for high union wages and at the same time ensuring higher nominal wages for its
industrial workers. Hosting the industry core is attractive since local production avoids
consumer-borne trade costs for one’s residents (‘cost-of-living effect’). Moreover, whereas
the benefit of higher nominal wages accrues to unionized workers in the core only, part of
the resulting higher consumer prices is borne by consumers abroad (‘wage cost exporting’).
However, the latter effect enhances welfare in the core only up to a certain union wage
level after which consumer prices become so high that less workers will be employed in the
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unionized sector as less of the industrial good is demanded. This is illustrated in Figure
3.2 which depicts core’s welfare as a function of union wages in the absence of subsidies
Figure 3.2: Core’s welfare function for different union wages
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σ = 4; α = 0.3; θ = 0.3; φ = 0.6.
3.3.1 Second Stage: Periphery’s government
Solving the game via backward induction, we start with the government of the periphery
at stage two of the tax game. As all firms are alike, this is a straightforward exercise: The
government of the periphery, government f , has a maximum subsidy/minimum tax it is
willing to offer. This can be found at the point where its overall welfare level is the same
no matter if it hosts the industry or not, WF cf = WF
p
f . Solving this for the subsidy, we
obtain ‘zmaxf ’:
zmaxf = −zh + 2α
(
lnwh − lnφ
σ − 1
)
(24)
The first term denotes the foregone repatriation of subsidy income from c for periphery’s
capitalists once p attracts the industry. The second term captures the benefits of industry
relocation towards the non-unionized country. Residents in the periphery benefit from lower
consumer prices since wages are competitive and transport costs are absent for them once
industry locates in the periphery. On the other hand, the government of the periphery
knows that it has to offer each firm at least what core’s government offers, in addition
to the agglomeration rent Ω. We call this subsidy level ‘zminf ’ which is obtained solving
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Ω + (zh − zf ) = 0 for zh using (12):
zminf = zh +
α
σ
(
2− 1
φ
(
1 + θ
wh
)1−σ
(1 + φ2)
)
. (25)
Now, as long as zmaxf is greater than z
min
f , periphery can profitably attract the capital
from the core. Note that these terms depend only on core’s tax policy (zh) and exogenous
parameters (as the monopoly unions’ wage, wh, only depends on the parameter σ). The
next step is to examine government h’s behavior.
3.3.2 First Stage: Core’s government
The core’s government is aware of the influence its policy exerts on the ability and will-
ingness of the periphery to attract capital. To determine core’s optimal behavior, we first
determine the policy at which periphery’s government will not be able to profitably attract
the mobile capital. In a next step we check whether core’s government will actually want
to hold on to the industrial core.
From inspection of (24) and (25), it can easily be seen how we can work out the ‘knife-edge’
level of subsidy, say zdh, at which the core can make it unprofitable for the periphery to
attract the industry which will be the case whenever zminf is at least as large as z
max
f . We
set (24) equal to (25) and solve for zh:
zdh =
α
2σ
(
1
φ
wσ−1h (1 + θ)
1−σ(1 + φ2) + 2σ lnwh − 2σ lnφ
σ − 1 − 2
)
. (26)
This means that core’s offer has to be at least zdh to make sure that the periphery’s gov-
ernment will not be a threat to the pre-existing allocation.17
It is however not immediately obvious what core’s government opts for: Production in
its part of the world leads to a lower price index for all of its consumers (‘cost-of-living
effect’). Moreover, industrial workers in the core earn higher wages than they otherwise
would - whereby part of this excess wage bill is paid, via higher prices, by foreigners (‘wage
cost exporting effect’). On the other hand, allowing the industry to delocate to f means
h’s capitalists would benefit from the repatriation of subsidy income and also that its
consumers would be able to buy goods produced in a low-wage region. So, in the case
17Obviously, every better offer will do the trick, but will never be optimal since the subsidies do not
alleviate any distortion. Rather, they amount to a transfer to the other country which will be kept as tiny
as possible.
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where core holds on to its industry, it will set zh = z
d
h. In the case where it does not, it will
set the subsidy level marginally smaller, zh = z
d
h − ², where ² is some small but positive
number. To see this latter point, note that this guarantees the highest possible subsidy
transfer from the periphery (remember, zminf = zh+Ω). Core’s optimal policy can therefore
be summarized by
z∗h =
{
zdh if WF
c
h(z
d
h) ≥ WF ph (zminf (zh)),
zdh − ² otherwise.
This gives us also f ’s optimal policy when it attracts all industry: As the second mover, it
takes the given z∗h. So we plug z
d
h for zh into (25), which is optimal by a similar argument
to the one above: It is the cheapest way to attract the industry. On the contrary, in case
of no industry delocation it is simple to conclude that the subsidy to capital and hence the
tax on L and K will be zero as being the periphery implies not hosting any industry.
Now that we derived each country’s optimal policies in the two cases, we proceed to the
equilibrium outcome of the game. The reduced-form equations can be obtained by plugging
the optimal policies for each case into the region’s respective welfare functions (19)-(22)
using (25) and (26). It is then a straightforward exercise to compare welfare levels. Core’s
government will simply compare the difference between WF ch(z
∗
h) and WF
p
h (z
∗
f ). If it is
positive, then the country as a whole is better off holding on to its industry; if it is negative,
the opposite holds true. Using (19) and (21) the welfare differential can be written as
WF ch −WF ph = LMch (wh − 1)−
z∗h
2
− z
∗
f
2
− α ln
(
P ch
P ph
)
. (27)
The excess wage bill in the first term reflects the benefits of keeping all industry whereas
the second and third term reflect the financing cost and the foregone subsidy payment of
doing so, respectively. The last term’s sign is ambiguous as both P ch and P
p
h will exceed one.
Hence, depending on the level of trade freeness and the union wage the last term will be
positive or negative. Note that both governments take into account all general equilibrium
effects. Specifically, all tax and wage effects as well as trade cost and price effects are taken
into account. We can now state
Proposition 3 A welfare-maximizing government in the unionized core will find it in its
best interest to let the industrial core move to the periphery i.e.,
WF ch(z
d
h)−WF ph (zminf ) < 0.
Proof: See Appendix.
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This result is striking at first sight. After all, the core acts as a Stackelberg leader and
maximizes welfare within its border. So one might have expected it to hold on to its
industry via a generous tax regime since the costs of higher union wages are partly borne
by consumers abroad while the benefits of higher wage income accrue solely to workers
within the country. Upon closer inspection, however, our result is quite intuitive: By
letting its capital relocate to f , while still owning it, country h gets rid of the labor market
distortion18 and, at the same time, makes sure capital owners get a favorable tax regime
abroad, leading to repatriated subsidies. This makes a nice case why governments may, in
bidding for mobile factors, make favorable offers: They may have in mind the preferential
regimes their countrymens’ businesses will get abroad. Furthermore, the presence of a
challenging emerging market, i.e. tax competition leads to increased global welfare via
restoring an efficient allocation of industry.
3.4 Winners and losers of the subsidy race
The above analysis showed that unionized core benefits from inducing a relocation of firms
towards the periphery country f . It chooses a subsidy level at which the periphery can
profitably attract all industry. Hence, both countries are clearly winners of the game and
benefit from delocating industry towards a country with a non-distorted labor market. This
section identifies the winners and the losers of the subsidy race within the different income
groups. We begin with country h’s and f ’s capital owners.
Proposition 4 Capitalists in both locations are the clear winners of the subsidy race. Cap-
italists in h win due to the repatriation of capital income whereas capitalists in f benefit
from a lower cost-of-living index.
Proof: See Appendix.
For core’s capital owners, the benefits from repatriating subsidies exceed the cost of in-
curring transport costs for imported varieties. Capitalists in f benefit from a lower cost-
of-living index while the financing cost for subsidies are shared between capitalists and
workers.
The impact on workers in the new core country is however ambiguous. To begin with
workers of the new core the indirect utility (Vf, w) differential of workers in f before and
18Trade costs will, at a certain point, counteract the ‘lower-wage’ effect on prices. However, high trade
costs undermine stability of the core-periphery equilibrium in the first place, which is why we concentrated
on lower levels of τ from the outset.
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after reads
V pf, w − V cf, w = Lf
(
α(lnP cf − lnP pf ) + zminf
)
. (28)
The difference in price indices is negative since P cf < P
p
f , indicating that workers are better
off with firms producing in their country. The last term, however, indicates that workers
might be better off in a periphery when financing costs are high. Figure 3.3 illustrates the
welfare differential in (28).
Figure 3.3: Foreign workers’ welfare differential
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Figure 3.3 reveals that workers in f will only benefit from an industry relocation for low
σ. Put differently, workers in f win only if they have severely suffered from wage cost
exporting, i.e. for high union wages (low σ) such that it becomes worthwhile to incur the
financing costs of attracting firms.
Intuitively, union members as a whole lose as industry shifts towards f . Their real income
unambiguously falls on two counts, the decline of the nominal wage and the increase of the
price index. The difference of before and after welfare of union workers denoted as V cu and
V pu , respectively is derived using (16) and (23) for the core and periphery case
V cu − V pu =
2α
σ
(
σ − 1
σ
)(
1 + α[(σ − 1) ln(σ − 1
σ
)− lnφ]
)
. (29)
Figure 3.4 depicts union workers’ welfare differential in (29) for different σ which confirms
that union workers particularly suffer from subsidy competition for low σ, i.e. high union
wages.
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Figure 3.4: Welfare of h’s union workers before and after industry relocation
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Turning to non-union workers in h, their welfare differential is obtained after inserting the
respective price indices into h’s non-union workers’ indirect utilities using (17) for both
cases
V cnon − V pnon = −α(λ− LMch )(lnwh −
1
1− σ lnφ) (30)
From inspection of (30) it is not ex ante clear whether non-union workers unambiguously
benefit from industry relocation towards a country with no labor market distortion. More
precisely, non-union workers benefit from industry delocation as they no longer bear high
consumer prices resulting from asymmetric unionization (this effect is captured in ‘lnwh’)
whereas they suffer from losing all industry as they have to bear transport costs for imported
varieties which is reflected through ‘lnφ’. To learn whether the overall effect is positive
or negative Figure 3.5 displays non-union workers’ before and after welfare differential at
different levels of σ evaluated at different degrees of trade freeness.
Surprisingly, non-union workers were better off for low σ, i.e. under (high) union wages
and experience higher welfare from industry relocation only for higher σ (low union wages).
This seems to be counterintuitive at first sight as we would expect non-union workers to
gain (like workers in f) especially for low σ, i.e. for high union wages. To understand
the result, first note that non-union workers face a trade off between higher consumer
prices due to union wages and higher consumer prices because of shipping costs. However,
recall that a low elasticity of substitution σ implies high union wages but at the same
time indicates a high love for variety. Consequently, consumers in h suffer from industry
delocation especially if their valuation for the industrial good is high as this leads to a strong
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Figure 3.5: Welfare of h’s non-union workers (before and after industry relocation
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increase in the cost-of-living index Ph which depresses households’ purchasing power in h.
Formally, this effect reads
∂P ph
∂σ
=
φ
1
1−σ (σ lnφ+ 1− σ)
(1 + θ)(σ − 1)3 < 0,
∂2P ph
∂σ∂φ
=
φ
σ
1−σ (σ2 − 1− σ lnφ)
(1 + θ)(σ − 1)4 > 0. (31)
which reflects that an increasing elasticity of substitution (a declining ‘love for variety’ and
lower union wages) attenuates the loss arising from a high peripheral cost-of-living index.
This effect is amplified by decreasing levels of trade freeness.
3.5 Discussion
Obviously, our strong main result arises out of two specific assumptions: Firstly, govern-
ments are true welfare-maximizers and weigh workers’ and capital owners’ utility equally.
Then, the most efficient solution prevails, which is offshoring production to a location
where the labor market is not distorted.19 A straightforward extension here is to assume
a government that only cares about workers, which could be due to its preferences or the
fact that capital ownership is concentrated in very few hands, whereas the by far biggest
share of households are labor households. In this case, the core will not find it optimal
19The tax game here has, as is true of many of the models in this literature, an auction-like character -
hence the globally efficient outcome.
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to get rid of its industry up to a certain union wage, but will rather accept the distortion
which is partially borne by periphery’s residents. We briefly illustrate the case of a gov-
ernment that does not care about capital owners: Such a government’s objective function
has as its arguments only A- and M -sector workers’ utility. Apart from that, we proceed
in perfect analogy to the analysis above, i.e., we compare price indices and welfare levels
with all industrial activity in h and f , respectively, and work out the critical tax/subsidy
levels zˆmaxh , zˆ
d
h under this alternative scenario. Finally, inserting the optimal policies under
the revised scenario into the government objective function and conducting government h’s
welfare comparison, like before leads to the welfare differential
˜WFh
c − ˜WFhp = LMch (wh − 1)−
zh
2
− α ln
(
P ch
P ph
)
. (32)
Inserting the new subsidy levels zˆdh and the corresponding price indices finally yields
˜WFh
c − ˜WFhp = 2α− 1
wh
2α(σ − 1)
σ
− α
σ
(
1 +
(1 + φ2)
2φ
(
1 + θ
wh
)1−σ)
− α lnwh. (33)
As one would expect, it is rising in the agglomeration force (θ) and in trade freeness
(φ). Since technological spillovers as well as the level of trade integration increase the
agglomeration rent, it also decreases the cost of financing a subsidy level necessary to
defend the core. These familiar effects notwithstanding, core’s optimal decision in this
alternative ‘leftist’ scenario is no longer as clear cut as it was in Section 3. To see this
Figure 3.6 illustrates the welfare difference as a function of the union wage rate wh.
For moderate union wages a ‘leftist’ government that represents workers’ interests will set a
subsidy level low enough to prevent a relocation of industry towards an efficient outcome.
This may not seem too surprising as unionized workers benefit from the distortion, but
remember that non-union workers and home capitalists equally enter the government’s
welfare calculus.
Even though the model is highly stylized, we think the model and its predictions have
intuitive appeal: Due to the quasi-linearity of the utility function, the M -sector can be
thought of as one specific industry producing differentiated goods, whereas the competitive
sector represents the (‘big’) rest of the economy. If such a sector suffers from a labor market
distortion, it may not be ex ante clear that a government will find it in its best interest
to compensate mobile factors for high wages. Rather, it may well be welfare-enhancing
to use tax instruments or other government action to get industries offshored to low-wage
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Figure 3.6: h’s welfare difference between being core and periphery for different union
wages
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countries, which benefits consumers with low consumer prices and shareholders with higher
dividends. Thinking of particular industries such as consumer electronics, it may well be
that industrialized countries’ governments have understood that it can be in their best
interest to allow production and assembling to be shifted to places with lower labor costs.
Then, downward pressure on taxes benefits them as national shareholders gain from them.
Thinking of the car industry, on the contrary, one typically has in mind that jurisdictions do
a lot to hold on to it, which may show the importance of local interest groups as decisions
on industry- or even firm-specific tax breaks or subsidies will not only, in general, be based
on national welfare-maximizing behavior, but also on the interests of local politicians.
3.6 Conclusion
In a simple model of tax competition between countries with asymmetric union power and
agglomeration tendencies, we have shown that the government of the agglomerated and
unionized country may not have an incentive to try to hold on to its industry. Instead of
realizing the benefits from higher wage income while exporting part of the wage burden
to foreign consumers via higher prices, it rather allows the competing country to attract
industry and benefit from the other country’s generous tax regime as well as low production
costs, leading to low consumer prices. Tax competition is welfare enhancing as it leads to
a relocation of industry towards a country with a non-distorted labor market. In contrast
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to the previous literature which focused on the agglomeration-holding country’s ability to
hold on to the core, we show why its willingness to do so may be curtailed. The finding has
intuitive appeal when one thinks of the fact that welfare is, after all, driven by consumption,
which in this case is increased by two facts: Lower prices because of the circumvented labor
market distortion, and higher income because of capitalists’ repatriated income.
We highlight the way in which winners and losers are generated in tax competition and
leave it for future work to look into this in more depth empirically. In terms of theory, it
seems promising to examine the role of special interest groups and their organization when
it comes to influencing governments in their choice of policy variables in the presence of
international tax competition.
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3.7 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
Global welfare is derived adding up the indirect utility functions of A sector workers,
unionized and non-unionized M workers as well as capital owners across countries. Taking
the difference of global welfare evaluated at sn = 1 and global welfare at sn = 0 gives, after
inserting wh =
σ
σ−1 ,
WF glob
∣∣
sn=0
−WF glob∣∣
sn=1
= −1− σ
2
σ − 1 ln
(
σ − 1
σ
)
. (A.1)
one can easily see that the expression above is non-negative for σ > 1. ¤
Proof of Proposition 3
Setting zh = z
d
h and zf = z
min
f (zh) in equation (27), as well as inserting the respective price
indices from (23) reduces to
WF ch(zh)−WF ph (zf ) =
2α(σ − 1)
whσ
(wh − 1)− 2α lnwh. (A.2)
Note that the first term is simply union’s objective which is the excess wage bill of its
members whereas the second term denotes the potential benefit of a relocation, namely
getting rid of the distortion. This equals, after substituting wh =
σ
σ−1 ,
WF ch(zh)−WF ph (zf ) =
2α(σ − 1)
σ2
− 2α ln
(
σ
σ − 1
)
. (A.3)
This term is smaller than zero for any α > 0, σ > 1, indicating that the government in h
will always be better off when the core is in f . The equilibrium subsidy levels are given by
z∗h = z
d
h − ² and z∗f = zminf (z∗h), for some small ². ¤
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Proof of Proposition 4
The indirect utility differential of capitalists in h reads
V ch, cap − V ph, cap = Kh
(
α(lnP ph − lnP ch)− zminf
)
(A.4)
Inserting the respective price indices, (23), and the union wage yields
V ch, cap−V ph, cap =
α
4σ2
(1 + θ)1−σ(σ − 1)1−σσσ(1 + φ2)
φ
+
α[2σ(ln(σ − 1)− lnσ)− 1]
2σ
. (A.5)
This expression will be infinitely negative for σ → 1 and approaches zero for σ → ∞.
Hence, capitalists in h gain from firms’ relocation towards the union-unionized country.
The welfare differential of capital owners in f reads simply
V cf, cap − V pf, cap = Kf
(
α(lnP pf − lnP cf )
)
. (A.6)
After inserting the respective price indices and wh simplifies to
V cf, cap − V pf, cap =
α
2
(
lnσ − ln(σ − 1)− 1
σ − 1 lnφ
)
, (A.7)
which is unambiguously positive for any α > 0, σ > 1 and 0 < φ < 1. ¤
Chapter 4
Do countries compensate firms for
international wage differentials?
4.1 Introduction
There has been a remarkable downward trend in corporate tax rates in Europe over the
last decades, bearing witness to the fact that in an ever more integrating Europe, there
is intensive competition for mobile capital. Figure 4.1 shows the average statutory tax
rate over time for three groups of European countries (for a definition of ‘border’ coun-
tries, refer to Footnote 12). It is remarkable that taxes were relatively stable until the late
1980s. The graph also shows that countries in the center (‘at the border’, along the former
iron curtain), like Germany and Austria, had higher rates on average than more periph-
eral ‘western’ locations (such as the United Kingdom or Portugal). ‘Eastern’ countries, for
which meaningful data only date back to the early 1990s (since they had communist regimes
before), lowered taxes significantly to their present very low levels.1 But the astounding
thing is that the border countries lowered their rates to almost the levels of western Euro-
pean countries - which cannot have been driven by a tax competition effect as the eastern
countries at that time had tax levels that even exceeded the ones in the western countries.
As Overesch and Rincke (2009) put it, ‘[...]the main part of the downward adjustment of
corporate tax levels in the border countries was achieved between 1990 and 1994’. So it
looks like the integration shock with close, but very starkly differing competitors drove tax
rates down, and we want to exploit precisely this quasi-natural experiment to show some
evidence for this hypothesis: It seems pretty natural to see the unexpected competition
1For more details on those countries and taxes, we refer you to Overesch and Rincke (2009).
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from those low-wage countries, hitting countries at the border harder than those further
away, as one of the driving forces behind the ensuing fall in tax rates. Determinants of
corporate tax rates have been analyzed in a host of different papers, such as Devereux et al.
(2008) (on strategic tax competition), Slemrod (2004) and Winner (2005) (on openness),
and(Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al.) (on infrastructure). The literature on foreign direct investment
(FDI) and corporate taxation so far, however, has largely ignored the role of labor cost
differentials. This is surprising since in a world with integrated capital markets, labor costs
are among the most important determinants of firms’ location decisions, and governments
competing for FDI should take this into account. We contribute to filling this gap by
introducing labor cost differentials into a model of competition for FDI as in Haufler and
Wooton (1999) and Bjorvatn and Eckel (2006). We show that if two governments compete
for a mobile firm, the high-wage country is willing to offer a more favorable tax regime.
Obviously, such a specified model designed precisely to illustrate a government’s incentive
Figure 4.1: Average statutory tax rates for different European regions over time
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to attract a single firm has to be interpreted with discretion, but we think this incentive
will be found in very different and much more complicated settings, and we are convinced it
bears empirical relevance. Our empirical test, then, exploits precisely the exogenous vari-
ation in labor cost differentials in Western Europe induced by the sudden integration with
Eastern Europe after 1989/90. The evidence in fact suggests that countries with relatively
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high labor costs set significantly lower corporate income tax rates. To come up with this
evidence, we recur to both pure labor compensation cost data and unit labor cost data,
whereby the latter take productivity differences into account and can hence be considered
a more accurate measure of a location’s competitiveness.
4.2 Bidding for FDI: The role of wage differentials
Consider a mobile foreign entrant firm, f , and two countries, A and B, whose markets are
separated by unit transport costs τ . The entrant produces a homogeneous good, x, in what
is to become a monopolistic market.2 There are n identical households in country A and
1−n households in country B. A nume´raire good, z, is produced by perfectly competitive
firms with labor being the only input. Free trade in z equalizes wages to w. One unit
of labor generates one unit of output, fixing the competitive wage at unity. Household
preferences are ui = αxi − (1/2)βx2i + zi, i ∈ {A,B}, and each household inelastically
supplies one unit of labor. Maximizing ui subject to w = pixi + zi (with pi denoting the
price of x in i), one obtains XA = n(α − pA)/β and XB = (α − pB)/β as A’s and B’s
aggregate demand for x. Wages are the only variable costs, but for plant set-up the firm
incurs a fixed cost sufficiently large to prevent production at both locations.
Let subscripts denote a country’s terms and superscripts f ’s location decision. If f goes to
A, profits are
piA =
n (α− wA)2
4β
+
(1− n) (α− τ − wA)2
4β
, (1)
with the first term representing market A and the second market B profits. Consumer
surplus is
CSAA =
n (α− wA)2
8β
;CSAB =
(1− n) (α− τ − wA)2
8β
. (2)
Analogous expressions for profits and surplus hold if f goes to B. Suppose now that,
for some exogenous reason like union power, only A has an x industry (‘manufacturing’)
wage wA above the competitive one (which prevails in its z industry), wA > wB = 1.
3
Apart from increasing consumer surplus because of lower prices, for A attracting f has
the advantage of a higher manufacturing wage income which is partially borne by foreign
consumers. Assuming that f ’s after-tax profits are fully repatriated and that tax receipts
2The model in this section is similar in structure to the one in Chapter 1.
3Alternatively, we could have used a higher labor input requirement in A (i.e., lower manufacturing
productivity) to model a unit labor cost differential.
Do countries compensate firms for international wage differentials? 83
are redistributed to residents, welfareWA is composed of consumer surplus, tax receipts and
the ‘extra wage’ earned in the x industry. 4 With f choosing the location where after-tax
profits are highest, welfare-maximizing governments will engage in a bidding race, offering
the lowest possible subsidy (or charging the highest possible ‘admission’ in the case of a
tax). A’s gross gain (before taxes/subsidies) of attracting f is
∆A = W
A
A −WBA = CSAA − CSBA + (wA − wB)
α− wA − (1− n)τ
2β
. (3)
Observe that a country’s gain is its willingness to pay for the investment: If W ii > W
j
i , the
country will be prepared to offer a subsidy. Comparing ∆A and ∆B at size symmetry yields
∆A−∆B = (2α−3wA− τ +1)(wA−1)/(8β), which is positive at 1 < wA < (2α− τ +1)/3.
This reveals that, as long as wA is ‘not too large’, A will have the stronger incentive
to attract f , translating into a lower minimum tax (higher maximum subsidy) it will be
prepared to offer.5 So the high-wage country is willing to offer a lower tax rate as long as
the resulting distortion is not too pronounced.
It is straightforward to determine the minimum winning bids. Each country anticipates the
maximum offer of the other country which it must outbid, i.e. it has to offer the rival’s gross
gain. On top of that, so as to (just) win the race, i has to offer f the whole profit differential
(what it would earn locating in j net of what it can earn in i). The minimum winning bid for
A is thus OA = pi
B−piA+WBB −WAB = (2α−τ−wA−1)((3−n)wA+n−(5n−3)τ−3)/(8β).
OA is increasing in wA, implying a higher subsidy if the wage differential gets larger. It also
has the intuitive property of falling in n. Note that only if ∆A > OA, country A actually
wants to attract the investment. Setting ∆A equal to OA and solving for τ , we get a critical
level of trade costs above which country A will win the investment,6
τ cr =
1
6
(6α− wA − 5) + wA − 1
6(2n− 1) −√
(3α− n(6α− 5)− (1− n)wA − 2)2 − 3(2n− 1) (wA − 1) (2α + wA − 3)
3(2n− 1) .
(4)
The analogous critical value in the absence of tax policy (obtained from solving piA = piB
4The latter could alternatively be interpreted as the employment gain in a country with unemployment
where the shadow price of labor is lower than the nominal wage.
5Haaparanta (1996) makes a similar point using a model without trade and governments maximizing
labor income.
6This suffices to show that B does not want to attract it: The difference in f ’s profits, pii − pij , equals
∆j −Oi = Oj −∆i.
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for τ) equals τ 0 = (wA − 1)/(2n − 1). Confirming the insight from Bjorvatn and Eckel
(2006), we find that due to its cost disadvantage, A cannot attract the investment if its
market is smaller, no matter if there is tax competition or not: for 0 < n ≤ 0.5, there is
no non-prohibitive τ > 0 permitting A to win f .7 Note how this differs from the outcome
in Chapter 2 (where precisely the case was examined that when the labor cost differential
is not exogenous from the viewpoint of governments, a smaller country may be able to
attract the firm). For 0.5 < n < 1, however, the critical level of trade costs is strictly
smaller than the one that would prevail without subsidies. Hence, a labor cost differential
gives a country both the opportunity and the incentive to attract investment via tax policy
where it otherwise would not. Figure 4.2 illustrates this effect in n− τ -space: The dashed
line displays the regime border between A (above) and B (below) winning, respectively,
with subsidies. The solid line is the regime border that would prevail if the use of policy
instruments was ruled out.
Figure 4.2: The effect of the presence of tax policy on the equilibrium allocation
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α = 2; β = 4; wB = 1; wA = wB + 110 (α− wB).
7This is different in another paper in this literature: Barros and Cabral (2000). In their work, however,
there is no difference in the cost to the firm, but merely in the shadow price of labor. Apart from that, in
that paper, production (rather than entry) is subsidized.
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4.3 Evidence
We test the model implication using an unbalanced panel of 16 Western European countries,
1982-2005.8 Even though the cross-section in Europe is necessarily small, this approach has
many advantages as tax competition is prevalent in Europe, labor costs differ widely across
regions that are geographically close, and the 1990 integration shock provides us with an
exogenous break in the number of competitors. Assuming a linear relation between taxes
and labor costs, our estimation equation reads
TAXit = α∆LCit +Xitβ + ci + γt + ²it, i = 1 . . . , N, t = 1982, . . . , 2005, (5)
where TAXit is the corporate income tax rate, Xit is a vector of controls
9, ci denotes
country-specific and γt period-specific effects. The key explanatory variable is the labor cost
differential, ∆LCit = LCit −
∑
j wijLCjt, with the weights of competitors wij being based
on geographical distance, dij, and population, popi, taking the form wij =
ln(popj+1)/d
2
ij∑
k 6=i ln(popk+1)/d
2
ik
if j 6= i and wij = 0 if j = i. The theoretical model predicts a negative α, indicating that
countries with less competitive labor costs choose lower tax rates.
Since labor market conditions depend on a country’s attractiveness for private investment
and, therefore, tax policies, we treat ∆LCit as an endogenous regressor and devise an
instrumental variable (IV) approach to estimate equation (5). Our IV exploits the break-
down of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe around 1989/90 as a source of exoge-
nous variation in competitors’ labor costs (and, hence, labor cost differentials). Specifi-
cally, we use as an IV the weighted average of a country’s competitors’ exposure to the
1989/90 integration shock. Based on the count of the number of countries one has to
drive through (or to fly over in case of no land connection) starting from j’s capital and
heading at the closest Eastern European capital, DIST EASTj,
10 we construct the IV as∑
j wij(5 − DIST EASTj) × (2006 − t) × D1990, where D1990 is a dummy for post-1989
years.11 Note that the IV captures variation in ∆LCit driven by differences between coun-
8The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK.
9We include the log of GDP to control for country or market size. Also, the age structure of the
population may influence tax policies: A large share of young and elderly people may drive up tax rates
because of a higher need public spending. Finally, it has been argued that high capital mobility itself causes
downward pressure on corporate tax rates. Hence, we also include the annual inflow of FDI (divided by
GDP) as one of the common measures for openness.
10Counting both i and the country of the closest Eastern European capital, this gives, for instance, a
value of one for Poland, two for Germany, three for France, and four for the UK.
11Using (5 − DIST EASTi) × (2006 − t) × D1990 as IV gives similar, but statistically less significant
results.
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tries in terms of their exposure to countries in Eastern Europe with initially low (and then
slowly increasing) relative labor costs.
To ensure the validity of our IV we need to account for the direct effect of the 1989/90
break on taxes. We do this by including as an ordinary regressor an indicator equal to (5−
DIST EASTi)× (1989− t)×D1990. Note that, in contrast to our IV, (5−DIST EASTi)×
(1989−t)×D1990 does not show a discrete jump in 1990, reflecting the fact that the economic
integration between East and West was a gradual process rather than an immediate result
of the 1989/90 revolution. As an alternative, we use the indicator BORDERi × (1989 −
t)×D1990, where BORDERi is a dummy for Western European countries with immediate
Eastern European neighbors.12 This is obviously a rather crude approach, but one, as we
think, that captures the effect in a practicable way. Note also that using the integration
shock to identify the impact of labor cost differentials implies that only Western European
countries can be used for estimation. However, data on Eastern Europe is used to compute
∆LCit.
To estimate Equation (5), we use the statutory corporate income tax rate13 together with a
compensation cost index (USA=100) provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, com-
prising hourly compensation costs in manufacturing. These are prepared by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics specifically in order to assess international differences in employer labor
costs. The measure includes hourly direct pay and employer social insurance expenditures
and other labor taxes. The exchange rates used are prevailing commercial market exchange
rates. In addition, we use unit labor costs in manufacturing, representing the current cost
of labor per ‘real quantity unit’ of output produced, taken from the ILO’s ‘Key Indicators
of the Labor Market’ database. This indicator represents a direct link between produc-
tivity and the cost of labor used in generating output, and is designed as an indicator of
cost competitiveness. Apart from country size (GDP) and openness (share of exports and
imports in GDP), we control for preferences for public expenditures (percentage of popu-
lation below 15 and above 65 years). For more details on statutory tax rates and controls
(including sources), see Overesch and Rincke (2009).
Table 4.1 presents descriptive statistics. Note that due to missing data for labor costs in
Eastern Europe prior to 1993, we do not make use of the cross-sections 1990-1992.
Table 4.2 displays results of two-stage least squares (2SLS) regressions accounting for the
12The group comprises Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, and Sweden.
13We would like to thank Michael Overesch (ZEW Mannheim) for generously sharing his tax data with
us.
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endogeneity of labor cost differentials.14 Columns (1) to (3) use compensation costs as the
key explanatory variable. Irrespective of whether and how we control for the direct effect of
the 1989/90 shock on tax policies, the estimates point to a statistically significant impact
of labor cost differentials on tax rates. But the estimated effects are also economically
significant: If the compensation cost differential increases by one percent of the current
compensation cost in the US, firms are, on average, compensated by a 0.19 percentage
point cut in the tax rate. A one-standard deviation increase in the compensation cost
differential thus triggers a 5.1 percentage point cut in taxes. If we take into account
differences in labor productivity we find similar effects. As shown in columns (4) to (6), a
one-standard deviation increase in the unit labor cost differential is estimated to decrease
the statutory tax rate by 7.3 to 7.5 percentage points.
4.4 Conclusion
We develop a simple model highlighting the behavior of governments in a bidding race
for FDI when countries exogenously differ in labor costs. It is shown that tax policy
opens up room for a country with a disadvantage in labor cost terms to optimally attract
mobile capital where it would not be able to become the location of choice in the absence
of government intervention. Using data on Western Europe, we estimate a substantial
effect of labor cost differentials on corporate tax rates, confirming the model prediction.
One policy conclusion is that if labor unions are successful in setting wages above the
competitive level, this may not only cause unemployment, but also force the government
to compensate multinational firms by reducing corporate income taxes.
14We report standard errors which are robust to clustering by country within four-year windows.
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Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Statutory tax rate 0.393 0.102 0.125 0.659
Compensation cost differential 5.79 27.1 -56.8 96.9
Unit labor cost differential 0.031 0.165 -0.527 0.541
Log(GDP) 12.2 1.34 8.22 14.5
Openness 0.870 0.510 0.366 2.89
% young 0.183 0.026 0.139 0.303
% old 0.149 0.018 0.105 0.197
(5-DISTEAST)×(1989− t)×D1990 -14.1 14.6 -48.0 0
BORDER×(1989− t)×D1990 -2.09 3.80 -13.0 0∑
j wij(5−DIST EASTj)× (2006− t)×D1990 11.4 11.4 0 46.1
Unbalanced panel (16 countries, years 1982-1989 and 1993-2005, 304 observations).
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Chapter 5
Should market integration be
enforced?
5.1 Introduction
With the completion of the single market in a unified Europe and a common currency,
we are closer than ever to a truly integrated market in the European Union. In terms of
policies that directly affect consumption, there is a striking contrast between the fields of
competition and trade policy, which are now in significant parts at the supranational level,
and tax policy where countries are still a lot more independent. I am interested in the
interplay of these two policy fields. A sector on which the media frequently report that
there are substantial price differences in Europe is the car industry. This is, at the same
time, a sector with great factual and perceived importance, as the evidence presented in
Chapter 2 at least anecdotically suggests. Car producers are among the biggest employers
and largest companies in terms of their balance sheet totals and profits. Also, it is a
sector where specific taxation is in place and differs substantially across countries. It is
the repeatedly expressed will of the European Commission to see car prices converge in
Europe as large differentials are clearly not in the spirit of the common market. It wants
tax harmonization within the Union and has suggested to at least reduce registration
taxes or to abolish them altogether (see European Commission (2002)). Progress has been
made compared to a situation a few years ago, when car manufacturers had exemptions
from usual cartel rules and could choose at their discretion which dealers to provide with
how many vehicles, and these dealers had fully exclusive territories. As of today, auto
dealers are also allowed to open up stores in other European Union countries. Car price
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reports by the European Commission (2007a, 2009), however, show that there are still very
significant price differences across Europe. Car prices are among the lowest in Denmark
where a registration tax above 100% applies. For instance, the price difference for the
compact-sized Renault Me´gane (expressed as percentage of the price in Euros before tax,
comparing the most expensive with the cheapest Euro zone market) was an astounding
51.6% on January 1, 2009 (European Commission (2009)). The Volkswagen Polo had a tax
inclusive (in brackets: tax exclusive) price of EUR 12050 (10126) in Germany, EUR 13226
(9128) in the Netherlands, EUR 12191 (9773) in Austria, EUR 14146 (9072) in Finland
and EUR 20746 (8750) in Denmark. Seeing those figures, it is hardly surprising that Lutz
(2004) identifies a significant effect of registration taxes on registration on tax-exclusive
auto prices. Those numbers raise an interesting research question and spark the idea to
examine a very direct approach to tackle the issue: If car prices in Europe differ before
and after taxes, a natural question to ask is if a mandatory equalized producer price across
markets would be beneficial, and for whom. Thus, in this article, I look into how market
integration and tax policies are interrelated. A supranational entity determines whether
markets will be segmented or integrated/tied, very much as in Anderson et al. (1995) who
view enforced market integration as a strict antidumping policy. Given this information,
national welfare-maximizing governments then non-cooperatively set commerce taxes.
Since the destination principle, i.e. the taxation of consumption, is more apt to the car
market example, and is commonplace in Europe anyway, I expose the basic model around
this case. The main result is that antidumping policy is welfare superior, and that this
needs to be qualified if firms are not domestically owned. I also examine whether my main
results change when countries differ in productivity or when there is instead taxation of
production (i.e., the origin principle in place).
Given the focus of my analysis, the paper builds on two strands of the literature. Firstly, it
is related to papers on competition/trade policy in the form of antidumping rules. There
is a huge literature on this topic; I mainly recur to Anderson et al. (1995) who show that
a move from segmented to integrated markets will benefit consumers and harm producers
while increasing overall welfare. Older contributions include Davidson et al. (1989) who
tailor their model to the EU (then EC) car market and show that antidumping may actu-
ally lower welfare. Venables (1990) models the process of market integration as a reduction
in a firm’s perceived ability to price differentially in different national markets and finds
that market integration in that sense is unambiguously welfare improving. Antidumping is
an active area of research in international economics, in particular since multilateral trade
negotiations have made the analysis of tariffs, quotas and the like obsolete in many cases.
Blonigen (2000), in an empirical study, demonstrates that European firms react with FDI
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to American antidumping measures. A theoretical contribution on antidumping and FDI
is Belderbos et al. (2004). They discuss antidumping measures against a producer from
outside the EU, however. Feuerstein (2007) shows, in a two-country model with a single
producer, that the optimal importing country’s tax rate depends positively on the car
manufacturers’ scope to price discriminate, reducing tax rates when arbitrage costs fall. I
will give a short overview over segmented and integrated markets, with some additional lit-
erature, in the next section. The link to antidumping policy will then become more obvious.
The second strand I draw upon is on commodity taxation under imperfect competition
such as Hashimzade et al. (2005) who find that with linear demand, the origin principle
dominates the destination principle. Similar in nature is the more general contribution of
Haufler et al. (2005) who show that the case for origin-based taxation becomes stronger
when barriers to trade fall. Keen and Lahiri (1998) show in an integrated market (in
the sense that there are no transport costs) that, for both coordinated and noncoor-
dinated taxation, the origin principle tends to be globally optimal. These papers put
into perspective an older series of articles that examined destination-vs. origin based
taxes under perfect competition (see, e.g., the seminal contribution of Mintz and Tulkens
(1986), or Kanbur and Keen (1993)). Lockwood (2001) gives a survey of this literature.
One of the general messages from the literature is that the result that destination taxes
tend to be preferable under perfect competition can easily be turned into a dominance
of origin taxation when product markets are imperfectly competitive. To the best of
my knowledge, the paper closest to the present one (at least in terms of modelling) is
Haufler and Pflu¨ger (2007) who examine the incentives for strategic commodity tax-setting
under various regimes (Cournot vs. Bertrand competition, segmented vs. integrated
markets, origin vs. destination taxation). They show, inter alia, that origin taxes lead
to downward competition of tax rates in all cases. However, the focus of my analysis is
different: I focus on the general efficiency of market integration under varying assumptions.
A short comment on the modelling side: The literature on commodity taxation under
imperfect competition has developed a two-country, two-firm workhorse model which I will
build to here. It is also employed by the antidumping model in Anderson et al. (1995), for
good reasons: It nicely displays all relevant strategic effects while being simple enough to
yield closed-form solutions. The taxes considered in this model are specific unit commodity
taxes.
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The paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the theoretical model. Sec-
tion 5.3, the main part of the analysis, introduces a role for competing governments via
tax/subsidy policies and determines which regime is preferable in the benchmark symmetric
case, and also looks at market integration with a different government objective function
due to absentee ownership of firms and with asymmetric countries. Section 5.4 illuminates
the role of government revenue needs and production taxation to check the robustness of
my main findings. Section 5.5 concludes.
5.2 Taxation and antidumping: A simple model
Before going into the details of the model, it makes sense to briefly illustrate the concepts
of segmented and integrated markets. With segmented or separated markets, used in
most trade models, there is the assumption that imperfectly competitive firms optimize
for their different markets separately. This is the reciprocal dumping model from Brander
and Krugman (1983), used in many following influential contributions such as Brander
and Spencer (1985). It is somewhat less clear what integrated/tied markets means: It
may simply mean the existence of independent arbitrageurs or cross-border shopping, so
firms may not charge a price differential in excess of the transport cost. This is generally
non-binding with ‘segmented markets’ due to what is called freight absorption, i.e. the
firms’ optimally bearing some of the transport cost.1 Alternatively, it means that there
is a single factory-gate price, so the firm must sell all output at one producer price no
matter where one particular unit is going. This is what is used by most papers, inter alia
by Anderson et al. (1995) and Haaland and Wooton (1998), and what I will be using
here. It means, in particular, that firms are not allowed (rather than not able) to earn
less on a unit sold abroad than on a unit sold in their home country, where they produce.
In that sense, there is a formal equivalence between price discrimination and dumping.
Haufler and Pflu¨ger (2007) use the term integrated markets to express that for any single
firm, there is no difference between producer prices across markets. In the Anderson et
al. (1995) article, this simply means that a firm will be bound to pass on the full cost
differential, i.e. it must, when producing in i, charge consumers in j the real trade cost
and must not ‘underinvoive’ strategically. With production/origin taxes, I have exactly
the same concept here. With consumption/destination taxes, matters are slightly more
1This definition is used by Wright (2003), who shows that policymakers may use tariffs to segment
markets. It is also the basis of an article by Ishikawa (2004) where it is argued that an antidumping rule
can be beneficial to consumers while hurting producers.
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intricate. Tied markets, i.e. equal producer prices, then mean that firms have to take tax
differentials into account when setting prices for the two markets. This is exactly what
happens in the Haufler and Pflu¨ger (2007) integrated markets case, and I will analyze this
case in what follows.2 So, in essence, the question I am trying to answer is if it is welfare
optimal to introduce a supranational law which binds firms to set a single producer price
(and then let non-cooperative governments and firms set consumption taxes and prices
non-cooperatively.)
The model is kept as simple as possible: There are two countries, 1 and 2, and three
consumption goods, denoted x, y and z, with x being produced by a firm in country 1 (say,
firm 1) and good y by a firm in 2 (firm 2). These goods are variants of a differentiated
product. The z good is produced under conditions of perfect competition with costless
trade. It is used as the nume´raire, and labor is the only input throughout the model such
that a unit input requirement renders the wage rate in both countries equal to one as well.
Following Hashimzade et al. (2005, 2006), without loss of generality, I set the marginal
cost in differentiated goods production to zero. Doing so is a mere normalization3, and a
convenient one since when modelling asymmetries across countries later on, the marginal
cost will be δ > 1 in one of the countries, sparing me one parameter. The constraint
that prices are positive remains slack throughout the analysis due to firms’ market power.
Transporting a unit of goods x or y involves a real trade cost of τ . A fixed quantity of
labor, L, which I normalize to 1, is inelastically supplied by each consumer. Tax revenue
raised from the taxation of the differentiated good is returned lump-sum to consumers by
each government.
The utility function is characterized by
u = (x+ y)− 1
2
(
x2 + 2yγx+ y2
)
+ z, (1)
which is adapted from Vives (1984). The mass of consumers in each country is normalized
2Note that producer prices, i.e. prices before trade costs and taxes having to be equalized is the only
meaningful definition: For instance, referring only to the trade cost in the cost pass-on rule would be an
empty concept since it is impossible to disentangle ‘which’ costs have or have not been passed on. It is
also this sense under which the ban on price discrimination is being understood in the European political
discussion.
3In a previous version, I had a positive marginal cost parameter, which did not affect any of my results.
The only thing that changes is one then has to make sure the labor endowment is large enough for both
countries to produce the diversified as well as the perfectly competitive good.
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to one. The per-capita budget constraint is
qxx+ qyy + z = 1 + Λ, (2)
where Λ denotes lump-sum income consisting of tax revenues and profits.4 Note that
due to the quasilinearity of the utility function, this has no bearing on the equilibrium
quantities of x, y. γ ² [ 0, 1 [5 measures products’ substitutability, with a larger γ implying
closer substitutes. Throughout this paper, q stands for consumer prices and p will denote
producer prices. By utility maximization, I get the inverse demand functions
qx = 1− x− γy, (3)
qy = 1− y − γx, (4)
illustrating γ’s role as substitutability parameter. Denoting country 2 parameters and
variables with an asterisk, I get inverse demand there as
qx∗ = 1− x∗ − γy∗, (5)
qy∗ = 1− y∗ − γx∗. (6)
Note that x∗ is the quantity sold by firm 1 in country 2 and y∗ is the quantity sold by firm
2 in its home market. Using the example of country 1, direct demand functions are:
x =
1
1 + γ
− 1
1− γ2 qx +
γ
1− γ2 qy, (7)
y =
1
1 + γ
− 1
1− γ2 qy +
γ
1− γ2 qx. (8)
Expressions for quantities in market 2, x∗ and y∗, are analogous. Firms compete in prices
with differentiated products. The motivating example of the car industry seems to be a case
where traditionally a lot of competition was done via capacity choice and one could thus
argue that Cournot competition might be more appropriate. However, the last years have
seen dramatic overcapacities and quite substantial rebate waves in car markets like Europe
4The latter may be unevenly distributed if firm ownership is not symmetric within countries, which
will be of relevance later.
5Demand functions in this model do not allow for γ = 1, see Singh and Vives (1984). There is
nothing conceptually wrong with perfect substitutes, of course, but the outcome cannot be determined
using calculus any more.
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and North America, rendering price competition more convincing.6 Governments deploy
unit taxes in the x and y industries, leaving the nume´raire untaxed. Specific taxes, such
as on cars, are the underlying policy motivation, although a link can be made to existing
literature, which focuses on taxes like the VAT and also leaves the nume´raire untaxed as
without selective taxation, there tends to be no difference between the destination and
origin principles (Lockwood et al. (1994)). The structure of the game is as follows: At the
beginning (say, stage zero), a supranational institution (e.g., the EU) determines whether
markets are segmented or integrated. What then follows is a two-stage game: At the first
stage, governments determine tax rates. At the second stage, firms set prices. With taxes
and prices given, production and consumption take place. The model is solved, of course,
by backward induction.
5.3 Destination Principle
With output being taxed where it is consumed, firms’ profit functions are:
pid = (qx − t)x+ (qx∗ − t∗ − τ)x∗,
pi∗ d = (qy∗ − t∗)y∗ + (qy − t− τ)y,
(9)
where t and t∗ stand for 1’s and 2’s taxes, respectively, and the first summands stand for
the respective firms’ home market profits. Note that producer prices are then px = qx − t,
px∗ = qx∗ − t∗ − τ , and analogously for firm 2.
5.3.1 Segmented markets
Maximizing (9) (using the demand functions from the previous section, namely (7), (8),
and their foreign counterparts) with respect to producer prices separately for each market,
6Since antidumping rules/integrated markets affect pricing behavior directly, I consider Bertrand com-
petition as a natural choice. My guess on Cournot competition would be that it would not make a
qualitative difference: It does tend to lead to higher profits in those models, but the basic strategic effects
governments’ subsidies have are qualitatively similar. Furthermore, Anderson et al. (1995) show that their
result goes through under Cournot competition as well, and the results in Haufler and Pflu¨ger (2007) are
pretty similar for price and quantity competition, whereas segmented vs. integrated markets makes a big
difference.
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and solving these equations, I get the Nash equilibrium in prices:
px =
2− γ2 + τγ − γ + t (γ2 + γ − 2)
4− γ2 ,
p∗x =
(1− t∗)(1− γ)(γ + 2)− τ (2− γ2)
4− γ2 ,
p∗y =
2− γ2 + τγ − γ + t∗ (γ2 + γ − 2)
4− γ2 ,
py =
(1− t)(1− γ)(γ + 2)− τ (2− γ2)
4− γ2 .
(10)
Accordingly, consumer prices will amount to:
qx =
2(1 + t)− (1− τ − t)γ − γ2
4− γ2 ,
q∗x =
2(1 + τ + t∗)− γ + t∗γ − γ2
4− γ2 ,
q∗y =
2(1 + t∗)− (1− τ − t∗)γ − γ2
4− γ2 ,
qy =
2(1 + τ + t)− γ + tγ + γ2
4− γ2 .
(11)
Note that these prices depend, of course, on taxes. Substituting them back into the demand
functions, I get quantities depending on only taxes and exogenous parameters. These can
then be used in welfare expressions. Welfare consists of consumer surplus, labor income,
tax revenues and profit income:
W = CS + 1 + t(x+ y) + pi; W ∗ = CS∗ + 1 + t∗(x∗ + y∗) + pi∗. (12)
Hence, welfare in country 1 is
W d,s = (x+ y)− 1
2
(
x2 + 2γyx+ y2
)− qxx− qyy + 1 + t(x+ y) + pid,s, (13)
with ‘d, s’ standing for the ‘destination, segmented’ regime and welfare in country 2 is
W ∗ d,s = (x∗ + y∗)− 1
2
(
x∗2 + 2γy∗x∗ + y∗2
)− qx∗x∗ − qy∗y∗ + 1+ t∗(x∗ + y∗) + pi∗ d,s. (14)
Maximizing (13) and (14) with respect to t and t∗ yields7
td, s = t∗ d, s = −τ(γ + 1)
2(γ + 2)
. (15)
7Second order conditions for maximization are checked and fulfilled throughout this chapter.
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These taxes are zero when trade is free. There are two basic motives, pulling the tax in
different directions. On the one hand, they will be used as a corrective subsidy due to
the under-consumption caused by market power. On the other hand, to the extent that
they hit imports, they can be used to shift rents away from the foreign firm. It turns
out that in the present specification with linear demand, these two effects exactly cancel
each other under free trade. This makes intuitive sense as without trade frictions, the
foreign industry is just as important to a country (and a subsidy to it just as effective)
as the home industry. The taxes turn into subsidies when trade is costly, so there are
never positive taxes in this basic version of the model without an exogenous revenue need
or foreign ownership. This stems from the effect that the best thing to do in a closed
economy would be granting the monopolist the optimal subsidy, which is counteracted by
a tax-the-foreigner effect under trade. Observe that an increase in τ makes markets more
and more separated, driving up the firms’ market power in their home markets and calling
more strongly for corrective subsidies. These results are well-known (see, e.g., Hashimzade
et al. (2005)). With those taxes substituted back into (13) and (14), I get the equilibrium
welfare levels under destination taxes and segmented markets. Taking country 1, this is
W d,s =
1
4 (4− γ2)2 (γ2 − 1)
{
τ 2
(−2γ4 + γ3 + 11γ2 − γ − 19)+
4
(
γ4 − 4γ3 + γ2 + 9γ − 7) (γ + 2)2 + 4τ (γ4 + 2γ3 − 6γ2 − 7γ + 10)} . (16)
For future reference, welfare without profit income (i.e. Wnoprofit = CS + 1 + t(x+ y)) is
W d,snoprofit =
1
4 (4− γ2)2 (γ2 − 1)
{
τ 2
(−3γ3 + 7γ2 + 3γ − 9)+
4τ
(
γ4 − 6γ2 − γ + 6)+ 4 (γ6 − 9γ4 + γ3 + 27γ2 − 20)} . (17)
These terms are somewhat messy. I restate them for γ = 1/2 as a natural benchmark
case of intermediate substitutability across goods, and will make use of this simplification
several times in what follows for purely expositional purposes (the role of different values
of γ will be become clearer below):
W d,s|γ= 1
2
=
1
675
(4τ(67τ − 85) + 1075), W d,snoprofit|γ= 12 =
1
675
(
98τ 2 − 260τ + 875) . (18)
The above expressions characterize the non-cooperative solution. As a benchmark for
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ensuing welfare analyses, I now turn to the taxes that would prevail under a cooperative
solution, i.e. the (common) consumption tax that would maximize the sum of the two
countries’ welfare levels:
tscoop. = −
1
2
(2− τ)(1− γ). (19)
This will be discussed further below. One thing to note right away is that td, s is generally
larger (less of a subsidy) than tscoop.. This reflects that when setting taxes non-cooperatively,
governments do not take into account the negative effects on the other country’s industry’s
profits (which are negatively affected by a tax increase) and thus end up setting taxes too
high (from a global point of view).
Before proceeding to the next section, it is worthwhile to spend a moment considering the
outcome of the game. Since with symmetric countries, taxes will be the same in 1 and 2, and
since firms absorb some of the freight cost (at least with the linear demand assumed here,
and which is suggested to be the case in the bulk of the corresponding empirical literature),
there is no way arbitrage alone can prevent firms from earning different producer prices
across markets. The next section will now examine how a rule precluding them from doing
exactly the latter will influence taxes, and, above all, whether such a rule is desirable.
5.3.2 Integrated markets and comparison
With integrated markets, or, expressed differently, with an antidumping law prohibiting
both firms to earn less on their respective foreign markets than their home markets, firms
can no longer freely set their prices across markets. In fact, producers effectively lose one
instrument since for given taxes and exogenous trade costs, they must not strategically
earn less in one market.8 This is the intuition why firms lose from tied markets, at least in
the absence of taxes.
Maximizing (9) (again using (7), (8), and their foreign counterparts) with respect to pro-
ducer prices under the conditions that px = px∗ and py = py∗ , and solving the first order
conditions, I get the following Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices:
8If the taxes considered are registration fees rather than ‘standard’ commodity taxes one has to pay in
the moment of acquisition, arbitrage ensures that consumer prices can differ at most by real trade costs,
leaving producers the scope to price discriminate. Then, an ‘equalize producer prices rule’ effectively forces
producers to pass on the trade cost to consumers.
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px = px∗ =
(1− γ) (2− t− t∗ − τ)
2(2− γ) ,
py = p
∗
y =
(1− γ) (2− t− t∗ − τ)
2(2− γ) .
(20)
Consumer prices will then be:9
qx =
2 + 3t− t∗ − τ − γ (2 + t− t∗ − τ)
2(2− γ) ,
q∗x =
2 + 3t∗ − t+ 3τ − γ (2− t+ τ + t∗)
2(2− γ) ,
q∗y =
2 + 3t∗ − t− τ − γ (2− t+ t∗ − τ)
2(2− γ) ,
qy =
2 + 3t− t∗ + 3τ − γ (2 + t+ τ − t∗)
2(2− γ) .
(21)
As above, substituting prices back into the demand functions, I get quantities depending
only on taxes and exogenous parameters. Welfare in country 1 is:
W d,i = (x+ y)− 1
2
(
x2 + 2γyx+ y2
)− qxx− qyy + 1 + t(x+ y) + pid,i, (22)
and welfare in country 2 is
W ∗ d,i = (x∗ + y∗)− 1
2
(
x∗2 + 2γy∗x∗ + y∗2
)− qx∗x∗ − qy∗y∗ + 1+ t∗(x∗ + y∗) + pi∗ d,i. (23)
Maximizing (22) and (23) with respect to t and t∗, and solving the corresponding system
of first-order conditions, yields
td, i = t∗ d, i = − (1− γ)(2− τ)
2(5− (4− γ)γ) . (24)
It is obvious that these tax rates are not equal to zero when trade is costless. In fact, they
even rise in τ : ∂td, i/∂τ = (1− γ)/(2(5− (4− γ)γ)) > 0 for γ ² [ 0, 1 [ . This illustrates how
tying markets feeds back on optimal tax policy depending on the level of trade costs.10 So,
the presumption is that the subsidies are higher than subsidies under segmented markets
9As a consistency check, setting taxes to zero and appropriately relabelling parameters and variables,
I get the term in equ. (9) from Anderson et al. (1995). To see this, observe that they merely expose
their model in different terms: Setting their a equal to 1/(1 + γ), b to 1/(1 − γ2) and c to γ/(1 − γ2),
and setting taxes to zero (as they are absent in their model), I get the same demand system and the same
firms’ optimal prices.
10More on this will follow below, in a discussion on the deviation of the non-cooperative from the
cooperative tax rate.
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at least for a range of parameter values. In fact, td, s − td, i equals:
1
2
(
(γ − 1)(τ − 2)
(γ − 4)γ + 5 −
(γ + 1)τ
γ + 2
)
. (25)
As this difference depends only on two parameters, it is easy to plot a line where it is zero
in γ−τ -space, see Figure 5.1. The dashed line displays loci where the tax under segmented
markets and the one under integrated markets are equal. Below, td, i is smaller than td, s11,
which leads to
Proposition 1 Under the destination principle, subsidies are higher under integrated mar-
kets than under segmented markets for a large range of trade costs.
Proof. For τ = 0, td, s−td, i from (25) equals γ+1
5−(4−γ)γ > 0. For a general τ, ∂(t
d, s − td, i)/∂τ
equals −γ
3+4γ2−7
2(γ3−2γ2−3γ+10) , which is negative for any γ ² [ 0, 1 [ . In the benchmark case of γ =
1
2
,
td, s − td, i = 0 at τ = 20
49
. ¤
Figure 5.1: Line of equality in consumption taxes under segmented vs. integrated markets
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To understand why taxes differ under integrated markets, note that they play a very
different role. A look at prices under segmented (10) and integrated (20) markets reveals
that in the latter case, firm i’s taxes have a direct effect on firm j’s producer prices. This
11To see this, note that the first derivative of (25) with respect to τ is negative for any γ in the admissible
parameter range.
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is because of the binding constraint that a firm must not earn less per unit on its foreign
market than on its home market (and, obviously, firms’ optimal reactions). With tied
markets, e.g., a tax on consumption in country 1 not only makes firm 1 lower its home
producer price, it also makes it lower its export market producer price (px∗). Since the
same rule applies to firm 2, the same happens there (see (20)). Via the effect on consumer
prices, this makes firms sell more in 2, driving up consumption there. So, in addition to
the obvious negative spill-over on the foreign firm’s profits that is present in both regimes,
there is now a positive spill-over as a country will see its consumption (and, uno acto, its
tax base) increase if the other raises its tax.
Looking a bit closer at those spill-overs, firstly those on profits, it turns out that both
rise in trade costs (i.e., become less negative) as markets get more apart. With segmented
markets, this is the well-known standard result from a falling market share; under integrated
markets, note that the cost pass-on rule also drives firms’ market shares on foreign markets
down. Algebraically, those externalities are:12
∂pid, s
t∗ s
=
(2− τ)γ2 + 2γ + 3τ − 4
(γ − 2)2(γ + 1)(γ + 2) ,
∂pid, i
t∗ i
=
(γ − 3)(γ − 1)(τ − 2)
(γ − 2)(γ + 1)((γ − 4)γ + 5) , (26)
where both are negative and rising (that is, becoming smaller in absolute terms) in τ .
Intuitively, all spill-overs become smaller as trade gets costlier simply because the volume
of trade goes down. Subtracting the latter from the former term in (26) shows that the
profit spill-over is more negative (i.e., more pronounced) under integrated markets. So,
the fact that td, i is generally lower must be driven by overcompensating spill-overs on
consumption (consumer surplus, to be precise) and tax base. There will then be a point
depending on τ where spill-overs as well as taxes are the same. Overall spill-over effects
are:
∂W d, s
t∗ s
=
(2− τ)γ2 + 2γ + 3τ − 4
(γ − 2)2(γ + 1)(γ + 2) ,
∂W d, i
t∗ i
= − (γ − 1)(τ − 2)
γ3 − 3γ2 + γ + 5 , (27)
where the former is identical to the one in (26) as there are no other effects under segmented
markets. Again, both are falling in absolute value in τ . As a consistency check, taxes should
be the same where spill-overs are the same. In fact, the locus of γ − τ -combinations where
the two terms in (27) are the same is identical to the one in Figure 5.1 where taxes are the
same. Another view on the whole matter is that a subsidy has a strategic effect on the other
country’s firm’s behavior with integrated markets, and turns out to be a more powerful
policy tool in competition that way, pushing it closer to the cooperative level than under
12All spill-over effects are evaluated at the non-cooperative equilibrium.
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segmented markets.13 In the figure (and the following ones), I also plot a solid line which
denotes the prohibitive level of trade costs under integrated markets (which is the lower
prohibitive level as compared to segmented markets as the forbidden price discrimination
makes each firm sell more on the home and less on the foreign market).14 So, it is only for
γ < 1/215 and almost prohibitively high trade costs that taxes are higher under integrated
markets. Since taxes are almost the same in this realm and all ensuing results are mainly
driven by standard wasteful-trade-saving effects if trade is very costly (as will be discussed
below), I will be concentrating on lower trade cost ranges. The intuition that prohibitive
trade costs fall in γ is that a rising γ makes the products closer substitutes, rendering
competition fiercer.
For the cooperative solution, one essentially chooses the optimal tax for a closed economy,
which is why one expects the same rate under segmented and integrated markets.16 In fact,
I obtain a cooperative tax rate of:
ticoop. = −
1
2
(2− τ)(1− γ), (28)
which is the same as the one in (19). Now, the cooperative tax, not surprisingly, turns out
to be a subsidy. Assume for a moment that goods are maximally differentiated and trade
is completely free (γ, τ = 0). Then, it is equal to −1, which is a standard result given
we normalized the marginal labor cost to zero here. Costly trade attenuates the optimal
subsidy (as the latter always partly goes to imports, driving up the trade volume). See also
that as γ approaches 1, the cooperative subsidy goes to zero, which reflects the ‘Bertrand
paradox’: Price competition already drives profits to 0, so there is no further need for a
corrective subsidy. Since without cooperation, there will be strategic considerations like
‘tax-the-foreigner’ effects, I expect subsidies to be lower then. Proposition 1 and the ensuing
discussion have already shown that for the most part, taxes are lower under tied markets.
13One further thing to note about the comparison is that with market separation, each country’s best
response function does not depend on the other country’s tax rate, whereas with market integration, the
Nash assumption in the tax-setting game is really needed in that the best responses depend on each
others’ policy choices (i.e., they can be represented by td, i(t∗ d, i, ·) and t∗ d, i(t d, i, ·), respectively, which
are upward-sloping, making taxes strategic complements where they were strategically independent under
market separation).
14Formally, this can be shown by plugging prices from (11) and taxes from (15) into the direct demand
functions to obtain the reduced form for x∗ under segmented markets, x∗ s, and by proceeding analogously
with prices from (21) and taxes from (24) to get x∗ under integrated markets, x∗ i. Then, it is a tedious
but straightforward exercise to show that the locus of γ − τ -combinations where x∗ i equals 0 is strictly
below the corresponding locus where x∗ s equals 0.
15At γ = 1/2, the prohibitive level of trade costs, solving x∗ ,i != 0, is equal to 20/49 ≈ 0.41. At this
point, this coincides with the locus where td, s = td, i. See Figure 5.1.
16See also Haufler and Pflu¨ger (2007), who show that this equivalence also extends to production vs.
consumption taxes.
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It turns out that the cooperative subsidy is lower than both td, s and td, i: td, s, td, i > tcoop..
17
Since all externalities become smaller in absolute value as τ grows, the gap between both
non-cooperative solutions and tcoop. narrows in τ . Since tcoop. also grows in τ , this is no
contradiction to the fact that td, i goes up (i.e., becomes less negative) as the real trade cost
grows: The cost pass-on rule forbidding firms to ‘underinvoice’ the real trade cost abroad
drives foreign consumer prices up, which simultaneously drives trade and thus the positive
externalities on consumer surplus and the tax base down.
With the taxes from (24) substituted back into (22) and (23), I get the equilibrium welfare
level under destination taxes and integrated markets, again sticking with the example of
country 1:
W d,i =
1
4 (4− γ2)2 (γ2 − 1) {(4τ(γ − 3)(γ − 1)(γ(2γ − 7) + 7)+
4
(
γ6 − 8γ5 + 23γ4 − 17γ3 − 42γ2 + 89γ − 46)−(
γ5 − 5γ4 + 3γ3 + 27γ2 − 64γ + 46) τ 2)} . (29)
Welfare without profit income is:
W d,inoprofit =
1
4
(
4− (γ − 3)(τ − 2)
2
((γ − 4)γ + 5)2 −
τ 2
γ − 1
)
(30)
Again, these terms are messy, so I restate them for γ = 1/2:
W d,i|γ= 1
2
=
τ(667τ − 640) + 1654
1014
, W d,inoprofit|γ= 12 =
1
338
(τ(189τ − 80) + 418). (31)
Now that one has seen that non-cooperative subsidies are not as high as the cooperative
solution would suggest, and that taxes under integrated markets are closer to that solution
than under segmented markets, one would expect integrated markets to be preferable over
segmented markets. It is in fact true that it is optimal to have an antidumping law:
Proposition 2 Integrated markets lead to higher aggregate welfare in the presence of non-
cooperatively set consumption taxes.
Proof. ∆W d ≡ W d, s−W d, i = 0 has no real solution. This can be easily shown numerically.
17It can be shown that, for any non-prohibitive level of τ (i.e., one that ensures x
∗ i =
((γ−3)γ(γ+1)+8)τ−2(γ−3)(γ−1)
2(γ−1)(γ+1)((γ−4)γ+5) > 0), there exists no γ − τ -combination that renders tcoop. larger than td, s or
td, i.
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The term is given in the appendix. Here, I merely illustrate it, using again the intermediate
case γ = 1/2:∆W d |γ=1/2= ((29080− 59491τ)τ − 8800)/228150 != 0, a quadratic equation
that has no real solutions. To complete the proof, put in any non-prohibitive level of trade
costs, which yields a ∆W d < 0. ¤
There are actually two pieces of intuition that drive this result. For high trade costs, I
already showed that the tax difference between the two regimes becomes less significant.18
For this realm of high levels of trade costs, reciprocal dumping is, as is well understood
from existing literature, grossly inefficient, rendering integrated markets the more efficient
solution. The more interesting and non-standard result materializes with lower trade costs.
Suppose we are in a situation with infinitesimal real trade costs only. Then, the welfare
cost of reciprocal dumping is marginal, but the tax regime is very different. In particular,
integrated markets give governments strategic incentives to set their taxes lower, viz. closer
to the cooperative solution. This also makes integrated markets preferable, albeit for a
different reason. From these two forces driving the result and the fact that their strength
increases when approaching extreme values for τ (namely, 0 and the prohibitive level,
respectively), I expect the overall welfare difference between integrated and segmented
markets to be hump-shaped. This in fact turns out to be the case; the appendix displays
∆W d graphically in Figure 5.6.19 One sees that integrated markets dominate separated
markets everywhere, but less so for intermediate values of τ .
The fact that market integration makes subsidies larger makes one wonder about the dis-
tributional consequences of a policy shift from laissez-faire to an antidumping law. After
all, it is consumers who have to pay the subsidies that go to firms. In fact, a comparison
of welfare levels shows
Proposition 3 Profits are higher under integrated markets for low trade costs. As a corol-
lary, consumer-taxpayers are worse off for low trade costs under market integration than
under segmented markets iff governments are welfare-maximizers but profits are not redis-
tributed to consumers (and hence accrue to a single, infinitesimal individual).
Proof. Substituting, for each regime, prices ((11), (21)) into quantities ((7), (8), and their
foreign counterparts) and both into profits (9), and forming the difference of the resulting
terms, pid, s − pid, i, one obtains a longish expression which is displayed in the appendix as
∆pid and which equals 8(19τ+40)(23τ−7)
22815
for γ = 1/2. This is 0 at τ = 7/23 ' 0.3. For any
18Remember, from equs. (15) and (24), subsidies under segmented markets fall in τ whereas under
integrated markets, they rise in τ , so the difference gets large for low trade costs.
19For the figure, I set γ to its benchmark value of 1/2. The graph looks qualitatively similar for other
values of the substitutability parameter.
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given γ, the first derivative of the general expression with respect to τ is positive for τ > 0.
For those levels of γ other than 1/2, refer to Figure 5.2.
Subtracting W d,inoprofit from W
d,s
noprofit, I get a term I label ∆W
d
noprofit, which is shown in the
appendix. For γ = 1/2, it equals 13600−7τ(13493τ+4840
228150
, which is 272
4563
> 0 at τ = 0; for general
τ , the first derivative equals −7(13493τ+2420)
114075
< 0.
That there is a parameter range for which market integration benefits consumers is also
easy to show: For γ = 1/2, ∆W dnoprofit becomes zero at τ ' 0.24, which is strictly lower
than the lowest prohibitive trade cost level of τ proh ' 0.4. For levels of γ other than 1/2,
refer to Figure 5.3. ¤
Figure 5.2: Profits: Regions of dominance under segmented vs. integrated markets
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The result with respect to profits is displayed in Figure 5.2. This result is clearly tax-
driven and is at odds with what Ishikawa (2004) and Anderson at al. (1995) find. For
high trade costs, the gains firms get from segmenting those markets are so high that the
standard result that they lose from integration materializes. For low trade costs, however,
the effect from the lower taxes under integrated markets dominates. The second part
of the proposition is also shown graphically, in Figure 5.3, where I again plot the trade-
prohibiting level of τ . All points below the bent dashed line are loci in γ − τ -space where
consumer-taxpayers are worse off under tied markets (assuming that the mass of them does
not benefit from profits). Note that the fact that profits may be unevenly distributed (in
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Figure 5.3: Consumer welfare: Regions of dominance under segmented vs. integrated
markets (if the mass of consumers does not own the firm’s shares)
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the polar case, used to get Proposition 3’s corollary in its pronounced form, they all go
to one (infinitesimal, mass zero) member of society) has no bearing on the differentiated
goods demands due to the quasilinearity of the utility function. That consumers are, at
some point, better off under integration comes from the fact that close to the prohibitive
level, a ban on reciprocal dumping, which is a waste of resources (but profit-maximizing
behavior), implies a large efficiency gain. The result is not surprising after the preceding
discussions. After all, it is well known that even in the simplest closed-economy case where
a monopolist is optimally subsidized, this efficiency-increasing policy benefits the producer
while harming consumers, who have to pay for the subsidy, as long as they do not own
shares of the firm. I do not want to stretch this point too far since even though it may
be unrealistic to assume profits are evenly distributed, it may be as unrealistic to assume
they all accrue to some infinitesimal individual. However, especially the first part of the
proposition is interesting in that it shows how a seemingly unrelated upper-level policy rule
may influence specific taxes and distribution, and in that Anderson et al. (1995) also found
market integration to be optimal, but with the exactly reversed distributional consequences
(consumers gain, producers lose). So the message is clear: Just as in the absence of taxes,
tying markets is optimal policy, but it may be easier to implement since less resistance
from producers is to be expected. However, if tying markets is motivated by benefitting
consumers (and national governments act as non-cooperative welfare-maximizers), that
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policy aim will only be reached if firm ownership is spread.20
5.3.3 Absentee firm ownership
It is easy to think of a scenario under which governments ignore profits: Either when firm
ownership is concentrated in few hands and they disregard it in their welfare terms, or,
clearly, when there is absentee ownership, i.e. the firms belong to (third-country) foreigners
and profits flow abroad. Even then, I will show in what follows that due to the wasteful
trade effect, for high trade costs, market integration is preferable to segmentation. However,
countries will be worse off under integrated markets for low trade costs:
Proposition 4 Suppose profits flow abroad. Then, for low trade costs, integrated markets
are worse than segmented markets in the presence of non-cooperatively set consumption
taxes.
The analysis is completely analogous to the one in section 5.3.2; I present an illustration,
Figure 5.4, which shows the locus (the dashed line) on which the (symmetric) countries are
indifferent between market segmentation and integration. The solid line again displays the
prohibitive level of trade costs.
The only difference to section 5.3.2 is that profits are not part of national welfare. The rest
of the analysis is completely parallel. Then, under segmented markets, optimal destination-
based taxes are
td, s (abs.) = t∗ d, s (abs.) =
(2− τ)(1− γ)
6− 4γ . (32)
and reduced - form country 1 welfare ‘W d, s (abs.)’ amounts to
4(γ − 1)(γ(2γ − 1)− 4)(γ + 2)2 + 4(γ − 1)τ(γ + 2)2 + (7− γ(γ(γ + 5)− 1))τ 2
4(γ − 1)(γ + 1)(γ + 2)2(2γ − 3) . (33)
Under integrated markets, taxes are
td, i (abs.) = t∗ d, i (abs.) =
(γ − 1)(τ − 2)
2((γ − 6)γ + 7) , (34)
20One note on the fact that market segmentation vs. integration is at the supranational level here:
Anderson et al. (1995) show that countries find themselves in a classical prisoners’ dilemma where both
would gain if they both moved from segmented to tied markets, but where every single country has no
incentive to unilaterally place a ban on foreign industry’s pricing its output lower in its respective foreign
market. Since I get very similar results in the presence of commodity taxation, both production- and
consumption-based, I do not replicate that analysis here.
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Figure 5.4: Welfare: Regions of dominance under absentee ownership
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and welfare, ‘W d, i (abs.)’, is
1
4 (γ2 − 1) (γ2 − 6γ + 7)2
{
4γ6 − (τ 2 + 48) γ5 + (11τ 2 + 196) γ4 − 64τ 2+
60τ − 256− (35τ 2 + 12τ + 276) γ3 + (17τ 2 + 68τ − 72) γ2+
4
(
16τ 2 − 29τ + 113) γ} . (35)
Note that here, even without a revenue motive, taxes are positive since lowered profits
do not bother the government – to the contrary, countries will have common interest to
tax third-country foreigners. However, this will make the distortion in the goods market
worse.21 Now, with foreign firm ownership, the cooperative solution is
td, (abs.)coop. =
(2− τ)(1− γ)
6− 4γ , (36)
which corresponds to the non-cooperative solution that prevails under market segmentation.
Hence, market segmentation leads to the at least weakly more efficient taxes when strategic
profit effects due to spill-overs on the respective foreign firm are absent. This does not come
as a surprise, however: Recall from the main part in Section 5.3.2 that the only way a tax
by country i created a spill-over on country j was an influence on j’s firm’s profits. This
21It is straightforward to show that firms will make positive profits in equilibrium, rendering a corre-
sponding constraint slack.
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is by construction cut out if the firm does not belong to j residents. From the positive
spill-overs identified in the last section, consumption taxes can then be expected to be
lower under integrated markets again: td, s (abs.)− td, i (abs.) = − (γ−2)2(γ−1)(τ−2)
2(2γ−3)((γ−6)γ+7) > 0 for every
γ ² [ 0, 1 [ , τ > 0. Forming the difference of W d, s (abs.) and W d, i (abs.), one obtains a messy
expression that boils down to 3
289
− 3τ
289
− 12063τ2
28900
for the polar case of γ = 1/2. This expression
is, for general γ, graphed in Figure 5.4. So at least for free trade, it follows immediately
that segmented markets are preferable: Tying markets does not make a difference from a
real trade cost effect (since they are zero), but it does make the non-cooperative goods taxes
lower than the cooperative ones (which, again, are the same under segmented and integrated
markets, and in the former case equal the non-cooperative solution). So if the differentiated
goods market considered is characterized by outside ownership, tying markets will make
countries worse off unless trade costs are high, which once again leads to great inefficiencies
from reciprocal dumping. For low trade costs, the strategic effects of integrated markets
are such that governments’ competition leads to a solution that is further away from the
cooperative one. So, interestingly, the strategic effects of a tax-including cost pass-on rule
are such that tying markets (typically thought to help consumers) may hurt consumers if
governments set destination-based taxes non-cooperatively.
5.3.4 Cost asymmetry
In this section, I consider cost differences across countries. I borrow from Hashimzade et
al. (2006) the way to model an efficiency/a cost asymmetry; namely, I assume that firm
1 has an extra constant marginal production cost δ > 0 over and above firm 2’s (which is
normalized to 0). Such efficiency differences are known to have an effect on optimal tax
policy, hence why I examine their impact on my result. It turns out that the less efficient
country may be worse off under market integration unless the asymmetries in marginal
costs is rather small. To facilitate the exposition, I set γ = 1/2 throughout this section (I
had, however, been working with a general version of substitutability, which did not change
anything qualitatively). The analysis is completely analogous to the one in the previous
sections, so I concentrate on the most important terms in this part. In particular, for the
first time here, since countries are asymmetric, now also taxes will be asymmetric. With
market segmentation, taxes will amount to:
td, s (asym.) =
3(δ − τ)
10
, t∗ d, s (asym.) = − 3
10
(δ + τ). (37)
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When trade is free and the asymmetry goes to zero, we have again the result from section
5.3.2 that taxes are zero as the effect that one wishes to increase the suboptimal consump-
tion and that one wants to shift away rents from the foreign firm offset each other. If firm
1 is in fact less efficient than firm 2, country 1 still uses subsidies with trade costs greater
than the marginal cost disadvantage. Under free trade, the zero subsidy from section 5.3.1
turns into a tax (the intuition comes from the tax-the-foreigner effect: the more efficient
foreigner will be taxed). With market integration, taxes will amount to:
td, i (asym.) =
1
65
(18δ − 5(2− τ)), t∗ d, i (asym.) = 1
65
(−8δ − 5(2− τ)). (38)
Since the more efficient country (2) will continue to unambiguously benefit from tying
markets, I will concentrate on country 1 here. Note first that the incentive to tax away
rents from the efficient competitor is also present here, expressed by the fact that δ drives
td, i (asym.) and t∗ d, i (asym.) apart. Again, integrated markets22 lead to lower taxes/higher
subsidies than segmented markets; the intuition is the same as the one in section 5.3.2.
Figure 5.5 shows a dashed line which stands for points on which country 1’s welfare is the
same under segmented and tied markets.
Figure 5.5: Welfare: Regions of dominance under cost asymmetries
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For zero δ, we already showed that both countries are strictly better off under tied markets.
By continuity, this still holds for small productivity differences. To the right of the bent
line, i.e. for high differences in productivity, country 1 is better off under segmented
22Observe also that in this section, taxes differ across countries. Since countries are not symmetric any
more, assuming a utilitarian welfare function (W+W ∗) to work out a cooperative solution would imply a
loss of generality here. Also, such a solution would have to be negotiated and would typically display the
more efficient firm getting a higher subsidy (as the payoff is greater).
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markets, whereas country 2 (the more efficient one) is, as already said, always better off
under market integration. I may thus state
Proposition 5 Market integration may harm relatively inefficient countries under con-
sumption taxation.
Proof. The proof can be found in the appendix. ¤
To understand why, it is instructive to once again recall the motive for country 1 to raise
a tax (if trade is free) under segmented markets. The larger is δ, the more inefficient is
the home firm, making government 1’s rent-shifting incentive to tax the (relatively ever
more efficient) firm 2 larger. Since the positive consumer surplus and tax base externality
(absent under market segmentation) curtail the non-cooperative taxes under integration,
the ability to tax at the cost of firm 2 is hurt. This intuition is confirmed by the fact that
country 1 is more likely (in the sense that the bent curve in Figure 5.5 is shifted leftwards)
to lose from market integration if there is an exogenous revenue need (to be introduced in
the next subsection), making the lower integrated markets taxes particularly harmful.23
So another message of this paper is that there is yet another qualification to the main
finding that integrated markets are desirable: This last result shows that there may be
winners and losers, at least if countries are sufficiently asymmetric. I conjecture that cost
asymmetries are only one source of such potential conflicts of interest across countries. For
instance, a size asymmetry (in terms of population) gives a smaller country with a firm
higher per capita profits, which has a bearing on how strongly it is hit by the different
externalities and which may also affect the comparison of separated vs. tied markets.
5.4 Robustness
This section checks the robustness of my results against some more changes in modelling.
23The algebraic demonstration is completely standard, but involves very messy terms, so I do not state
it here.
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5.4.1 Revenue needs
It is arguably undesirable to have negative equilibrium taxes in the analysis (with the
exception of the case with foreign ownership). This is clearly driven by the fact that
a revenue motive is absent in the main part of the paper, leaving governments with the
incentive to remedy the market distortion that arises from imperfect competition. However,
it is straightforward to introduce a weight ω > 1, representing an exogenous excess burden
of taxation. This is pre-multiplied to tax revenues in the government objective functions.
With the rest of the analysis carried out just as in section 5.3, it is then simple to elicit
conditions on ω which ensure positive cooperative and non-cooperative tax levels. I follow
Keen and Lahiri (1998) who argue that a value of 1.25 for ω could be considered normal, and
values above 1.5 uncommon. The result that welfare is higher under integrated markets,
via lower (and thus closer to cooperative) taxes, did not change in the large realm of ω
values ² [1, 3] that I examined, which is why I will not display the corresponding formulae
here. I conclude that my result does not depend on the negativity of tax rates.
5.4.2 Origin principle
When taxes are not raised where goods are consumed, but rather where they are produced,
the whole effect of tying markets is simpler as the cost pass-on rule does not involve taxes.
To see this, note that with production taxes, each unit will be taxed at the same rate
no matter where it will be consumed. Under integrated markets, then, the price of units
produced by a firm for a foreign market must exceed the price on the home market by
exactly the trade cost. This immediately yields the result that market integration does
not make a difference when trade costs are zero, no matter if there are taxes in place
or not, under origin taxation. I relegate the corresponding algebraic expressions to the
appendix and only briefly state the results here: As with consumption taxes, integrated
markets are more efficient. For low to intermediate trade costs, consumers are worse off
under integration to the extent that they do not own firms (and, again, to the extent that
governments do take profits into account) again.24
As trade costs get higher, this effect is eventually dominated (as with consumption taxes)
by the efficiency effect which calls for a ban on resource-consuming reciprocal dumping.
24However, with production taxes, this relationship is hump-shaped in trade costs: For free trade, the
regime does not make a difference whatsoever; as trade costs go up, markets become increasingly separate,
which gives each country an incentive to lower the tax which is now hitting its respective firm more directly.
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A graph similar in spirit to Figure 5.3, along with the most important algebraic terms, is
given in the appendix.
5.4.3 Origin principle vs. destination principle
As stated above, it is known from previous literature that the origin principle strictly
dominates the destination principle at least for linear demand and low levels of trade
cost. These results (Haufler et al. (2005), Hashimzade et al. (2005)) were derived under
the assumption of segmented markets, which leaves the tied markets case to be analyzed.
Forming the difference of welfare levels, W o, i −W d, i, one obtains
(γ − 2)2 (τγ3 + 4τγ2 − 14γ2 − 17τγ + 36γ + 16τ − 22) (τγ3 − 4γ3 + 6γ2 − τγ − 4τ − 2)
4(γ + 1) (γ2 − 4γ + 5)2 (γ2 + 3γ − 6)2 .
(39)
This term is equal to zero only for γ − τ -combinations that are beyond the prohibitive
trade cost level. At τ = 0, for any γ ² [ 0, 1 [ , the term is positive and rising in the trade
cost, showing that the origin principle continues to dominate the destination principle with
integrated markets.
5.5 Conclusion
It is the declared will of the European Commission’s Directorate General for Competition
that car prices in Europe converge. I have examined a strong, but easily implementable
policy rule: Namely a law that binds producers to equalize their producer prices across
markets. The abiding by such a rule would be rather easy to control given the observability
of taxes and transport costs. Given that (in contrast to existing suggestions) firms do not
lose in this framework, it may be relatively easy to gain international support as the industry
(which has in the past turned out to be very outspoken against regulation, well-organized
in terms of lobbying and creative in finding ways to indirectly separate markets) may be
less inclined to turn it down.
I have elicited in a simple model regimes under which, given non-cooperatively set com-
modity taxes are in place, strict antidumping rules are optimal. This is in fact true in
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the symmetric case. My model also suggests two scenarios under which countries may
actually lose: With relatively inefficient countries, and with countries which do not own
their respective industries. One may speculate that this will hit relatively small and
peripheral nations in Europe. This said, I am fully aware that all results developed in
such a highly stylized framework need to be interpreted with discretion – but still, Europe
with its existing different tax regimes, strongly differing pre-tax prices in car and other
durable goods markets and pretty asymmetric countries seems to be a good example where
I expect the effects identified to play a role.
The results also show that antidumping policy may have counterproductive effects within
the European Union if non-coordinated national policies are in place, namely if their
aim is to benefit consumers who do not own stock of the companies and when national
governments are welfare-maximizers. This is not an implausible scenario as national gov-
ernments are in fact likely to take profits into account, be it a national champion policy,
be it because of big companies’ or large shareholders’ influence on the political decision
process. The facts that there is a lot of market power in general consumer goods markets
and that my results also hold under revenue-needy governments may even give them
some relevance beyond specific taxation, towards a more general discussion on commodity
taxation. To this end, I also demonstrated that the main result holds under origin taxation.
It seems promising for future work to examine the interplay of tax policies and antidump-
ing policy vis-a`-vis outside the union trading partners. Also, it would be interesting to
learn more about the scenario of countries which do not have production sites themselves,
rendering commodity taxes akin to an import tariff.
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5.6 Appendix
Destination principle
∆pid ≡ pid, s − pid, i=
=
(γ − 3)2(γ − 1)(τ − 2)2
2(γ + 1)((γ − 4)γ + 5)2 −
4 (γ2 + γ − 2)2 + (γ(γ((γ − 2)γ − 2) + 2) + 5)τ 2 − 4 (γ3 − 3γ + 2) τ
2 (γ2 − 4)2 (γ2 − 1) . (A.1)
The locus along which ∆pid equals zero is the dashed line in Figure 5.2.
∆W d ≡ W d,s −W d,i=
=
1
4 (γ2 − 1) (20− 16γ − γ2 + 4γ3 − γ4)2
{−4(−1 + γ)3(2 + γ)2 (9− 8γ + 2γ2)−
4(1− γ)2 (86− 37γ − 62γ2 + 37γ3 + 6γ4 − 7γ5 + γ6) τ+(
261− 289γ − 115γ2 + 271γ3 − 65γ4 − 55γ5 + 18γ6 + 12γ7 − 7γ8 + γ9) τ 2} . (A.2)
∆W dnoprofit ≡ W d,snoprofit −W d,inoprofit=
=
1
4(2− γ)2(γ + 2)2(5− (4− γ)γ)2 (γ2 − 1)
{
4(γ + 2)2(2(γ − 5)γ + 13)(γ − 1)3+
4(γ + 2)(γ(γ(γ((γ − 9)γ + 26)− 13)− 48) + 51)τ(γ − 1)2+(
223 + 179γ − 675γ2 + 227γ3 + 321γ4 − 283γ5 + 70γ6 + 8γ7 − 7γ8 + γ9) τ 2} . (A.3)
The locus along which ∆Wnoprofit equals zero is the dashed line in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.6 shows the difference in welfare (∆W d ≡ W d, s −W d, i ) for levels of trade costs
from 0 to the prohibitive one.
Cost asymmetry
Proof of Proposition 5:
Having plugged the taxes from (37) and (38) into the respective price ((11), (21)) and
quantity ((7), (8), and the country 2 counterparts) expressions from sections 5.3.1 and
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Figure 5.6: Difference in welfare depending on the level of trade costs
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5.3.2, and the resulting expressions (and profits according to (9)) into country 1’s welfare
expressions for segmented (13) and integrated (22) markets, one can form the difference:
∆W d (asym.) ≡ W d, s (asym.) −W d, i (asym.) is equal to:
−17020δ2 − 4(5819τ − 9610)δ + (29080− 59491τ)τ − 8800
228150
, (A.4)
which is equal to 0 at
τ1, 2 =
2
(
7270− 5819δ ± 39√−51300 + 2(160125− 72082δ)δ)
59491
, (A.5)
It is then straightforward, but tedious to show that for small δ, these values are below the
prohibitive trade cost level (which solves x∗ d, i (asym.)). The relation is plotted in Figure 5.5.
To show that a higher δ makes ∆W d (asym.) larger, observe that the first derivative with
respect to δ is 2(−8510δ−5819τ+9610)
114075
. Then, this can be shown to be greater than zero for any
permissible δ − τ -combination, which completes the proof.
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Robustness: Origin principle
Under the origin principle, profits are
pio = (qx − t)x+ (qx∗ − t− τ)x∗,
pi∗ o = (qy∗ − t∗)y∗ + (qy − t∗ − τ)y.
(A.6)
Segmented markets
With market segmentation, again, producers maximize (A.6) for each market indepen-
dently. This leads (again using px = qx − t, px∗ = qx∗ − t∗ − τ , and the analogues for firm
2) to equilibrium consumer prices of
qx =
2(t+ 1)− γ2 + (τ + t∗ − 1) γ
4− γ2 ,
qx∗ =
2(t+ τ + 1)− γ2 + t∗γ − γ
4− γ2 ,
qy∗ =
2(t∗ + 1)− γ2 + (τ + t− 1) γ
4− γ2 ,
qy =
2(t∗ + τ + 1)− γ2 + tγ − γ
4− γ2 .
(A.7)
Welfare in 1 now differs in that tax revenue comes from the respective home production:
W o, s = (x+ y)− 1
2
(
x2 + 2γyx+ y2
)− qxx− qyy + 1 + t(x+ x∗) + pid,s; (A.8)
the expression for country 2 is analogous. Having substituted prices into demands ((7), (8),
and their foreign analogues), the latter into (A.8) (and its foreign analogue), and having
maximized these welfare terms with respect to taxes, one obtains a Nash equilibrium in
taxes of
to, s = t∗ o, s =
(−(2− τ)γ2 + γ + 2τ − 7) γ2 + 4
γ2(γ + 5)− 12 , (A.9)
leading to an equilibrium welfare level of
W o, s =
1
2 (γ2 − 1) (γ2(γ + 5)− 12)2
{
2τ
(
60− 12γ − 53γ2 + 4γ3 + 13γ4) ·
(1− γ)(2 + γ) + (γ2 (γ (γ (6γ2 − 2γ − 51)+ 6)+ 129)− 108) τ 2+
2(−1 + γ)(2 + γ)2(68 + γ(−24 + γ(−55 + γ(15 + γ(7 + γ)))))} . (A.10)
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Integrated markets
Proceeding analogously to the previous section, but with the restriction that px = px∗ , py =
py∗ , one obtains producer prices of
px = px∗ =
2(t− 1)γ2 + 2(t∗ − 1)γ − 4t+ (γ2 + γ − 2) τ + 4
8− 2γ2 ,
py = py∗ =
2(t∗ − 1)γ2 + 2(t− 1)γ − 4t+ (γ2 + γ − 2) τ + 4
8− 2γ2 .
(A.11)
and corresponding consumer prices:
qx =
4t− 2γ + (γ2 + γ − 2) τ + 2γ (t∗ − γ) + 4
8− 2γ2 ,
q∗x =
4t+ (−γ2 + γ + 6) τ − 2 (γ2 − t∗γ + γ − 2)
8− 2γ2 ,
q∗y =
4t∗ − 2γ + (γ2 + γ − 2) τ + 2γ (t− γ) + 4
8− 2γ2 ,
qy =
4t∗ + (−γ2 + γ + 6) τ − 2 (γ2 − tγ + γ − 2)
8− 2γ2 .
(A.12)
After substitution, maximizing (A.8) and 2’s corresponding term w. r. t. taxes, I get the
Nash equilibrium in taxes of
to, i = t∗ o, i =
2γ(γ(2γ − 3)− 1) + (2− γ3 + γ) τ + 4
2(γ(γ + 3)− 6) . (A.13)
This leads to an equilibrium welfare level of
W o, i =
1
2 (1− γ2) (γ(γ + 3)− 6)2
{
(28 + γ(1 + γ)(−20 + γ(7 + γ)))τ 2+
2(γ − 1)(γ(γ + 1)(γ(γ + 7)− 20) + 28)τ+
2(1− γ)(68 + γ(−24 + γ(−55 + γ(15 + γ(7 + γ)))))} . (A.14)
Comparison
Like under destination taxation, taxes are lower under integrated markets. Under a pro-
duction tax/subsidy, tying markets only involves the trade cost. The latter has to be
charged to foreign consumers, so for any τ > 0 the foreign market will be served relatively
less (as compared to reciprocal dumping), rendering the subsidy a better instrument. Ac-
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cordingly, market integration leads to higher welfare. This can be shown formally: Setting
W o, s −W o, i equal to zero has no real solution in γ − τ -space for any non-prohibitive level
of trade costs. The equation ∆W o ≡ W o, s −W o, i equals
(γ + 1)τ (2(γ − 2)2(γ + 2)(γ − 1)2 + ((γ − 1)γ(γ(7γ + 3)− 24) + 4)τ)
2(γ − 1) (γ2(γ + 5)− 12)2 , (A.15)
and setting it to zero yields only τ = 0 and a (non-permissible) negative value of τ as
solution for any γ² [ 0, 1 [ .
Figure 5.7: Consumer welfare: Regions of dominance under segmented vs. integrated
markets, origin principle (if the mass of consumers does not own the firm’s shares)
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Substituting prices and quantities into profits (A.6), I can again, as in the main part, elicit
1’s welfare levels without profits for segmented and integrated markets, respectively. I
merely present the result similar to that in Proposition 3 graphically in Figure 5.7 .
This figure displays the prohibitive level of trade costs (solid line). Again, for low trade
costs (below the dashed line), consumer-taxpayer welfare is lower under market integration
unless profits are redistributed. A contrast to Figure 5.3 is that for free trade, there is no
difference whatsoever, as discussed in the main part: There is no cross-country strategic
effect of taxes, and tied markets do not make a difference under free trade. The same is
true for profits: The difference pio, i-pio, s is hump-shaped in trade costs for any given γ.
Chapter 6
Fiscal competition over taxes and
public inputs: Theory and evidence
6.1 Introduction
It is widely believed that national as well as local governments have powerful tools to
affect the allocation of mobile capital, and that how these tools are used has significant
consequences for the welfare of citizens. However, compared to the vast overall number of
factors typically regarded as crucial for private investors when deciding where to invest,
governments have mainly two sets of instruments at their disposal that directly affect
investors’ choices: the taxation of businesses and the provision of public inputs. When
analyzing government behavior related to competition for capital, it thus seems natural
to assume that governments make use of both available instruments, and that the choices
affecting the taxation of firms and decisions on public input provision will typically be
interdependent. Accordingly, a thorough analysis of how governments compete for mobile
capital should be based on analytical tools treating the relevant business tax rates and
infrastructure investments as jointly determined policy instruments.
The theoretical literature has pointed to the role of taxes and infrastructure investments
as joint determinants of private investment early on. Extending the analysis of Zodrow
and Mieszkowski (1986), Keen and Marchand (1997) have shown that in the presence
of a productivity-enhancing public good the composition of public spending tends to be
systematically biased towards a relative overprovision of public inputs compared to public
goods which are consumed directly by residents. Focusing on the strategic choice of policy
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instruments, Bu¨ttner (1999) has suggested a model where governments optimize over tax
rates and shares of income that are spent on productive public goods. More recently,
Hindriks et al. (2008) have presented a framework in which the level of public inputs is
chosen in the first stage of a game while the tax rate is determined in the second. This
dynamic setting implies an incentive for governments to underinvest in public inputs in
order to alleviate second-stage tax competition.
In contrast to the aforementioned contributions, the bulk of theoretical work on fiscal
competition has treated the cases of pure tax competition and expenditure competition
separately. While Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Wilson (1986), and Wildasin (1988) have
discussed the issue of inefficiently low equilibrium tax rates and a corresponding under-
provision of consumptive public goods, Taylor (1992) and Bucovetsky (2005) have dealt
with the problem of overprovision of public infrastructure. The related empirical literature
has been dominated by applications testing for the strategic choice of business tax rates,
mostly ignoring the issue of public inputs.1
Building on much of the theoretical as well as empirical work mentioned above, we offer a
comprehensive treatment of tax and public input competition, with a focus on the strategic
behavior of governments in choosing both policy instruments. In our theoretical model, the
governments of two symmetric jurisdictions compete for mobile capital by simultaneously
setting both the business tax rate as well as the level of provision of a productive public
input. The public input makes private capital more productive and can thus be used by
governments to attract investment. On the other hand, providing public inputs is costly.
We characterize the reaction functions for both policy instruments and show that govern-
ments react to tax cuts in the other jurisdiction by cutting their own tax rate and providing
more public inputs. If the other jurisdiction improves its infrastructure, governments lower
the business tax rate and increase the provision of public inputs. We then proceed with
an empirical test of the nature of strategic behavior of governments with autonomy to set
a business tax rate and to provide a productive public input. Using a rich data set of lo-
cal jurisdictions in Germany, we estimate an empirical counterpart of the two-dimensional
1One of the few empirical studies acknowledging the joint impact of taxes and public infrastructure
on the allocation of private capital is Be´nassy-Que´re´ et al. (2007). They investigate FDI flows from the
U.S. to several European countries and find that both the corporate tax rate and the stock of public
capital are significant in explaining inward FDI. In contrast to their study, we take the responsiveness of
investment to inter-jurisdictional differences in tax rates and public infrastructure as given and explore
whether governments make use of taxation and public inputs as strategic instruments to attract private
capital. A further study providing some related evidence on OECD countries is Gomes and Pouget (2008).
Early contributions include Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), Bu¨ttner (2001), and Hayashi and Boadway
(2001).
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system of fiscal reaction functions. To the best of our knowledge, we provide the first
empirical analysis of tax and public input competition that allows for taxes and spending
on infrastructure to be jointly determined endogenous variables. Building on recent work
of Kelejian and Prucha (2004), we run a four-step systems estimation approach for spa-
tially interrelated equations. Our approach is very general. First of all, it allows for both
policy instruments to depend on tax rates and public inputs in neighboring jurisdictions.
Secondly, we treat the business tax rate as a function of a government’s own level of public
input provision, and vice versa. Thirdly, it accounts for potential cross-sectional correlation
in unobservables and potential cross-equation correlation of residuals.
The picture of local government behavior that emerges from our estimations is much more
complex than suggested by previous empirical work on fiscal competition. Across various
specifications, our findings suggest that governments set both the business tax rate and
the level of public input provision strategically, i.e. they set both instruments taking into
account the respective choices of competing governments. In particular, we find that local
governments tend to adjust their business tax rate towards levels chosen in neighboring
jurisdictions. Moreover, if neighbors increase their spending on the local infrastructure,
governments react by strongly increasing their own spending, too. Finally, our results
suggest that a government’s level of spending on public inputs is also affected by the tax
rates of neighboring jurisdictions, with the sign of the effect as predicted by the theoretical
model. Treating taxes and public inputs as alternative means to attract capital thus reveals
that local governments react to competition by other jurisdictions in a rather flexible way:
municipalities experiencing a boost in local infrastructure investment in neighboring com-
munities will, on average, raise the level of public input provision, too. If neighbors choose
to lower the tax burden on locally installed capital, municipalities will adjust both the tax
rate and the spending on infrastructure to restore competitiveness. All these empirical
findings are in line with the predictions of our theoretical model.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 6.2 we introduce our theoretical model of tax
and public input competition. Section 6.3 describes our estimation approach and presents
evidence based on data on local jurisdictions in Germany. Conclusions are drawn in Sec-
tion 6.4.
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6.2 The model
Our theoretical analysis of tax and public input competition builds on the literature on
strategic tax competition in the tradition of contributions such as Wilson (1991), Wildasin
(1991) and Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). In these models, governments compete for
capital which is in fixed supply, and countries are large enough to have an influence on
each other’s optimal behavior. We extend this model of pure tax competition by allowing
for public inputs as a second strategic policy instrument. We aim at characterizing the
model’s reaction functions, describing how governments react with both instruments to
the respective choices of a competing jurisdiction. Since we want to account for strategic
interaction across instruments, we let governments simultaneously set taxes and spending
on the public input. The governments in our model thus compete by choosing a mix of
instruments capable of attracting mobile capital. The simultaneity in the choice of fiscal
policies rules out commitment effects emerging in a setting with sequential moves.
We consider a federation of two symmetric jurisdictions, labeled i = 1, 2. In each jurisdic-
tion, production of a homogeneous consumption good takes place, using perfectly mobile
capital ki and a publicly provided input, gi. The public input is of the factor-augmenting
type and raises the marginal productivity of the primary input factor. To keep the model
tractable, we use a simple quadratic production function of the form
Fi(ki, gi) = (a+ gi)ki − bk
2
i
2
, (1)
where a and b are parameters. Governments levy per unit taxes ti on capital employed in
their respective jurisdictions. With capital perfectly mobile across regions, the arbitrage
condition requires its net return to be equalized such that
F ′i (ki, gi)− ti = F ′j(kj, gj)− tj, (2)
where F ′i denotes the marginal product of capital. With the world capital stock denoted
as k, we can solve (2) for the capital employed in i, to obtain
ki =
kb+ gi − gj − ti + tj
2b
. (3)
Equation (3) shows how a government’s own choice regarding t and g affects its tax base,
and that making use of the instruments involves fiscal externalities. Note that due to the
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symmetric setting and the specification of the production function, we have
∂ki
∂gi
= −∂ki
∂ti
= −∂ki
∂gj
=
∂ki
∂tj
=
1
2b
. (4)
The governments are assumed to maximize welfare in their own jurisdiction. Assuming
absentee ownership of capital,2 we define the objective function of the government in i to
be
Ui = Fi(ki, gi)− F ′i (ki, gi)ki + tiki −
(kigi)
2
2
, (5)
where the first term captures total output, the second capital income of foreign owners,
the third local tax revenue, and the fourth the cost of public input provision. Hence,
welfare consists of the return to the immobile factor and tax revenue minus the costs of
providing infrastructure. This specification is very close to the one used in Hindriks et
al. (2008), for two major reasons: First of all, this makes our results with simultaneous
choices comparable to theirs with a sequential setting. In addition, and more importantly,
this simple framework is able to capture all effects that are relevant to our question while
still being fully analytically solvable.3
While the first three terms are straightforward, the expression capturing the cost of provid-
ing the productive input requires some discussion. First of all, including the cost of public
input provision in the welfare function instead of imposing a budget constraint implies
(realistically) that governments do not rely exclusively on capital taxes as the source of
funding for public inputs. Secondly, the specification avoids the need for a further policy
instrument. Otherwise, with two instruments and the requirement to balance the govern-
ment’s budget, only one policy instrument could be set strategically.4 The convex cost of
supplying the public input captures a congestion externality in the use of the public input.
Accounting for such an externality is motivated by two facts: first of all, the presence of
congestion externalities seems to be a natural assumption with regard to common public
inputs like road networks, telecommunication infrastructure or land for business parks.5
2This simplifies the algebra, but all our main results hold if we allow for domestic ownership of capital.
3It is a common feature of models in this literature that analytical solutions and the signing of even
basic effects tend to come at the cost of functional form assumptions. See, e.g., Wildasin (1991) and
Devereux et al. (2008).
4As first discussed by Wildasin (1991), equilibria in fiscal competition games with two instruments
related via a budget constraint crucially depend on which instrument is set strategically. See Bayindir-
Upmann (1998) for an exploration with taxes and public inputs as policy instruments.
5Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) provide evidence suggesting that most local public goods are con-
gestible. Craig (1987) finds substantial congestion effects using the example of police services, and Fernald
(1999) shows that after 1973, with the U.S. Interstate Highway system being well-established, an increase
in total miles driven reduced road services to individual producers significantly.
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Secondly, the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a simultaneous-move game
with taxes and public inputs is only guaranteed in general if the latter is crowded to some
degree Petchey and Shapiro (2008). The intuition for our specification of the congestion
externality is that, for any given level of g, the welfare costs of providing it are higher
the more it is used, i.e. the ‘relative’ costs of providing public inputs are convex. Stated
differently, we assume that governments trying to ensure an adequate provision of g for any
unit of k will see the costs of g rising with k. This is a standard way of modelling crowding
externalities in the context of local public inputs Matsumoto (2000).6 In anticipation of
our empirical example involving jurisdictions providing a local road network, one might
think of an increase in the number of vehicles as leading to a more than proportionate
increase in the need for roads due to nonlinearities in congestion effects. Alternatively, one
could argue that the maintenance costs of public infrastructure increase as it is being used
more heavily. With respect to the specific functional form of the cost term, we build on
Hindriks et al. (2008) by using a simple quadratic form, again a standard way to keep the
model tractable. This form is obviously ad hoc, but it is the simplest conceivable way to
get convex costs, ensuring interior solutions, and to grasp the idea that the costs of public
infrastructure increase with capital to use it. 7
Using (3) and (5), we derive the welfare level as a function of ki as
Ui(ki) =
δi
8b2
[b2k + g2i (gj − gi + ti − tj) + b(gi − g2i k − gj + 3ti + tj)], (6)
where δi ≡ kb+ gi − gj − ti + tj. Our main interest lies in the slopes of the tax and public
input reaction functions, ti = ft(tj, gj) and gi = fg(tj, gj), around the equilibrium. In
most of the literature, policy instruments are referred to as ‘strategic substitutes’ if the
derivative ∂2Ui/(∂xi∂xj) is negative, and as ‘strategic complements’ if it is positive, where
x denotes an instrument at players’ disposal. With just one instrument, this translates
one to one into negatively and positively sloped reaction functions, respectively. This is, of
course, no longer true in our case as a government will generally find it optimal to respond
to a marginal policy change by its competitor using both instruments. Taking account of
this, to obtain the slopes of the tax and public input reaction functions, we proceed by
totally differentiating the governments’ first order conditions with respect to ti and gi. In
6An alternative would be to include the congestion externality in the production function (see Bu¨ttner
(1999)). While this does not change the intuition for the crowding effect, it makes the algebra significantly
more involved.
7It is instructive to take a look at the change in the marginal cost of public inputs caused by more
capital, ∂2(g2i k
2
i /2) / (∂gi∂ki) = 2giki: It rises in ki, reflecting the crowding, and gi, reflecting the larger
stock that has to be adapted - to stick with our example, expanding the road network is more expensive
at the margin if roads are heavily used and the network already is large.
Fiscal competition over taxes and public inputs: Theory and evidence 127
general form, the resulting system of equations reads

∂2Ui
∂ti∂ti
∂2Ui
∂ti∂gi
∂2Ui
∂gi∂ti
∂2Ui
∂gi∂gi

 dti
dgi
 = −

∂2Ui
∂ti∂tj
∂2Ui
∂ti∂gj
∂2Ui
∂gi∂tj
∂2Ui
∂gi∂gj

 dtj
dgj
 . (7)
Since we assume jurisdictions to be identical, we follow the common practice to focus on
the symmetric equilibrium characterized by ti = tj = t and gi = gj = g. Using the specific
values of all the derivatives (note that we have relegated most formal derivations to the
appendix), it is straightforward to derive from (7) the four effects of interest as
dgi
dgj
= −dgi
dtj
=
1
|H|
gk − 1
4b2
(8)
and
dti
dtj
= − dti
dgj
=
1
|H|
k(bk + g(4− 3gk))
16b2
, (9)
where |H| denotes the determinant of the Hessian (it is shown in the appendix that |H| is
positive). The symmetries in dti/dtj and dti/dgj as well as dgi/dgj and dgi/dtj are driven
by the fact that, as shown in (3), the absolute values of the marginal changes in the tax
base are equal across instruments.
To sign the slopes of the reaction functions, we make use of the values for g and t in the
symmetric Nash equilibrium, which turn out to be g∗ = 2/k and t∗ = (bk2 + 4)/(2k) (see
the appendix for derivations, and also a discussion of stability).8 If we evaluate (8) at the
symmetric Nash equilibrium, we find unambiguous signs for the reactions in public inputs,
dgi
dgj
=
4
3bk2
> 0;
dgi
dtj
= − 4
3bk2
< 0. (10)
The expressions in (10) show that if the opponent deviates from the symmetric equilib-
rium by increasing its supply of public inputs, a region will find it optimal to respond by
supplying more g, too. Moreover, a region will also react by providing more of the costly
input if the opponent competes for capital by cutting its tax rate.
8Note that with absentee ownership, capital has a participation constraint, namely that its net of tax
return has to be positive, F ′(ki, gi)− ti > 0. This condition reduces to a > bk. Note that this condition is
also sufficient to ensure a positive marginal product of capital.
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Evaluating (9) in equilibrium, we see that the signs of the reactions in taxes depend on b,
the parameter measuring the curvature of the production function:
dti
dtj
=
bk2 − 4
3bk2
;
dti
dgj
= −bk
2 − 4
3bk2
. (11)
Hence, the finding of Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) that the slope of the reaction function
in a model of pure tax competition cannot be signed unambiguously carries over to our
setting. As long as we are willing to assume that b is larger than 4/k2, however, we find
dti
dtj
> 0;
dti
dgj
< 0. (12)
Under the given restriction on b, the optimal reaction to a decrease in the opponent’s tax
rate is to decrease taxes and to increase public input provision. Similarly, if the opponent
provides more public inputs, it is optimal to increase provision, too, and to cut the tax rate.
Inspection of (10) and (11) reveals that the smaller is b, the stronger will be the reaction in
public inputs and the smaller will be the reaction in taxes. This is intuitive, as the following
example demonstrates: imagine region j becomes a tougher competitor for mobile capital
by raising gj. The government in i can respond to this with its two instruments, ti and
gi, and will typically use both. The reason for the crucial role of b is that it determines
the curvature of the production function, thereby driving the residual income the country
earns (after having paid the mobile factor its marginal product). This residual income is,
besides tax revenues, the reason why a country is interested in attracting capital in the first
place. If b is very small, the production function is almost linear, rendering the residual
income small and the motive to tax local capital comparatively more important. For i’s
government it will then be optimal to respond to the increase in gj by a relatively strong
increase in gi, thereby defending its tax base, and by an increase in its tax rate ti. With
a larger b, the residual income becomes more significant, strengthening the incentive to
attract capital for its direct contribution to the region’s welfare. If b is sufficiently large,
the optimal response to an increase in gj will therefore be to lower ti and still increase the
costly gi.
Formally, the rationale for requiring b > 4/k2 can be seen from the components of a region’s
welfare, which after substitution of the residual income is
Ui =
b
2
k2i + tiki −
(giki)
2
2
. (13)
Evaluating this expression at the symmetric Nash equilibrium shows that the condition
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b > 4/k2 is equivalent to the requirement that the residual income is larger than the cost
of providing g. If this condition is not met, the welfare effect of attracting additional units
of capital is negative once we net out the contribution of tax revenue. This makes the
motive to raise tax revenue so strong that governments will react to increased competition
by increasing their tax rate. Hence, imposing the condition b > 4/k2 essentially means
restricting attention to situations where fiscal policies are driven by a motive to attract
investment as an income-generating factor and, at the same time, to raise tax revenue.
Effectively, the condition ensures that governments react to policy changes in the competing
jurisdiction by adjusting both fiscal policy instruments such that the adjustment in each
instrument contributes to offsetting the resulting change in a region’s relative attractiveness
for private capital.
To get an intuition for the role of the congestion externality in shaping the strategic be-
havior of governments, consider the reason for the sign of dgi/dgj to be positive: with the
congestion externality in place, attracting additional units of capital drives up the cost for
the public input. For governments, this affects the optimal fiscal policy mix by making the
attraction of capital less and using the tax instrument to generate revenue more attractive.
Hence, the congestion externality alleviates tax competition. The consequently relatively
higher taxes make the tax base effect important, inducing governments to respond with an
increase (decrease) in public input provision to a corresponding increase (decrease) abroad.
In the following, we suggest an approach to estimate empirical counterparts of the tax and
public input reaction functions of local jurisdictions. Since the congestion externality in the
use of the public input is a distinctive feature of our model, we use an example where such
externalities arise quite naturally: the provision and maintenance of a local road network.
6.3 Empirical Analysis
6.3.1 Estimation Approach
To accommodate strategic government behavior as implied by our model, our estimation
approach must be flexible enough to allow for tax rates and public inputs to be determined
simultaneously. Moreover, the design of the empirical model needs to account for the inter-
dependence of all jurisdictions’ choices regarding taxes and inputs, i.e. each jurisdiction’s
tax rate as well as the level of inputs provided to attract mobile capital should be allowed
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to depend on both taxes and inputs of all other jurisdictions.
Our structural empirical model builds on ti = ft(tj, gj) and gi = fg(tj, gj) as the general
form reaction functions of the tax and public input competition model. To facilitate es-
timation, we make use of linearized versions of these functions and define the following
system of equations,
τi = θτsi + λττ−i + ϕτs−i + βτXτi + ui (14)
si = θsτi + λsτ−i + ϕss−i + βsXsi + vi, (15)
where τ denotes the tax rate and s a jurisdiction’s spending on the public input, τ−i =∑
j wijτj and s−i =
∑
j wijsj indicate the average tax rate and average inputs of other
jurisdictions, weighted by the predetermined weights wi1, . . . , wiN , and Xτi and Xsi denote
vectors of control variables (including a constant) in the tax and input equation, respec-
tively. The variables entering both Xτi and Xsi are subsets of a set of exogenous variables,
Xi = (x1i, . . . , xKi).
Note that in specifying our system of equations, we include si among the right-hand side
variables of the tax equation and τi as an explanatory variable in the input equation. In
doing so, we deviate from the usual approach to use counterparts of reduced-form reaction
functions when estimating models of fiscal competition with more than one choice variable
(see Devereux et al., 2008). The reason for allowing a government’s own policy instruments
to appear as explanatory variables is that we want the empirical model to allow for the
fact that governments are not always free to adjust both instruments to optimal levels. For
instance, governments might face political costs when frequently changing the business tax
rate, and prefer to keep the tax rate constant if the difference between the optimal rate and
the rate actually implemented is sufficiently small. Taking into account the effect on the
government’s budget, the optimal choice of public inputs should then be modeled as being
conditional on a given business tax rate. A similar argument can be made with respect to
public inputs, where investments often require considerable planning effort. As a result, it
may take some time until a government can adjust its stock of public capital to the desired
level. Again, this may affect the government’s budget and, thereby, the tax rate.
Apart from modeling tax rates and inputs to be interrelated both within and across juris-
dictions, we also allow for cross-sectional dependence in the disturbances u and v,
ui = ρuu−i + ²i and vi = ρvv−i + εi, (16)
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where u−i =
∑
j wijuj and v−i =
∑
j wijvj. The innovation vectors ² and ε are assumed to
be identically and independently distributed with zero mean. Hence, we require that the in-
novations are free of spatial correlation. Note, however, that we allow for contemporaneous
cross-equation correlation among innovations of the same cross-sectional unit.
Following most of the literature on tax competition among local jurisdictions, we choose
a spatial metric which accounts for the physical distance between jurisdictions. Moreover,
we also want the weights to reflect differences in the jurisdictions’ size. We therefore use
the metric
wij =
nij popj∑
k 6=i
nik popk
,
where nij is an indicator for neighbors of i (with nii = 0) and popj is j’s population. To de-
termine which jurisdictions are ‘neighbors’ of a given community, we either use a maximum
great circle distance between the centroids of jurisdictions, or we apply an mth-nearest-
neighbors criterion, defining as neighbors the m nearest jurisdictions in terms of physical
distance. Note that the spatial metric defines an environment for each municipality that is
assumed to be the relevant local market for mobile investment. Although all municipalities
in our sample are part of an integrated capital market, it nevertheless seems reasonable
to assume such a local environment. One reason is that the population of firms in al-
most all municipalities is dominated by small and mid-size firms with limited management
capacity. Imposing a spatial metric based on geographical proximity essentially means
that these small and mid-size firms are assumed to consider only a ‘local environment’ of
municipalities as alternative locations.
While our specification of the empirical reaction functions is more general than the com-
monly employed reduced-form version, it also makes the estimation of the parameters of
interest more involved. In fact, allowing the choice variables to appear as explanatory vari-
ables means that we have to deal with a total of four endogenous explanatory variables:
si, τ−i, and s−i in the tax equation, and τi, τ−i, and s−i in the public input equation. To
account for all endogeneity problems and to achieve efficient estimation, we use the spatial
system estimator proposed by Kelejian and Prucha (2004). In the following, we briefly
outline the four step estimation procedure.
As the initial step, we run a two-stage least squares (2SLS) procedure separately on the
tax and the input equation, treating τi, si, τ−i and s−i as endogenous regressors. We
use the same set of instruments in both estimations, containing x1i, . . . , xKi as well as the
corresponding first and second order spatial lags. In matrix notation, they can be written as
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WX1, . . . ,WXK ,WWX1, . . . ,WWXK , whereW denotes theN -dimensional square matrix
of weights. Using the residuals of the first stage, in the second step of the procedure the
spatial auto-regressive parameters ρu and ρv are estimated by the generalized moments
method originally suggested by Kelejian and Prucha (1999). The estimates of the spatial
auto-regressive parameters are then used in the third step to perform a Cochrane-Orcutt-
type transformation of the structural equations to remove the spatial error correlation
and to re-run 2SLS on the transformed system. While the third-step estimation takes
into account potential spatial correlation, it does not take into account the cross equation
correlation in the innovation vectors. To utilize the full system information, in the fourth
step we apply a systems instrumental variable estimator, which is efficient relative to the
first and third stage single-equations estimators.
For several reasons, the systems estimation approach outlined above seems to be the ideal
choice for estimating our tax and public input competition model. First of all, the procedure
takes account of the fact that both taxes and public inputs are determined simultaneously.
Secondly, it allows for contemporaneous interaction between jurisdictions in a very general
way. In addition, it is easy to implement even in large samples, a distinctive advantage
over maximum likelihood procedures.
The evidence reported in this study is derived from cross-sectional estimations. While
we would like to run panel estimations accounting for fixed municipality effects, there
is, unfortunately, no straightforward way to do so. The systems estimator of Kelejian
and Prucha (2004) is not designed for panel data, and we are unaware of an alternative
estimation procedure that combines the features of a systems estimator with general cross-
sectional interdependence with ways to account for unobserved heterogeneity. Applying
the systems estimation routine of Kelejian and Prucha (2004) to panel data and including
a series of jurisdiction-specific constants as ordinary regressors is not a feasible option
because the estimation of standard errors which are robust to serial correlation is an open
question. However, as a robustness check regarding potential period-specific effects, we
report the results of systems estimations using the municipality-level data after a between-
transformation, i.e. we run cross-sectional regressions using variables after taking averages
over time.
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6.3.2 Data
The data used to estimate our empirical model of tax and public input competition come
from a sample of 1100 German municipalities in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, cov-
ering the period 1998-2004. Note that we exclude independent cities from the sample (10
cross-sectional units), which face different incentives within the municipal system of fiscal
equalization. As we will see, the treatment within this redistributive grant system exerts
a strong impact on local tax and spending decisions. In the following, we briefly comment
on the data which are summarized in Table 6.1.
As already pointed out, German municipalities have taxing autonomy with respect to the
business tax (Gewerbesteuer), essentially a tax on local business earnings. In the time
period under consideration, the statutory tax rate in the state of Baden-Wuerttemberg av-
eraged 0.167 and varied between 0.145 and 0.21. Besides revenues from the local business
tax, grants and federal tax revenue sharing play an important role in municipal financing.
In our context of tax and public input competition, fiscal equalization grants deserve spe-
cial attention, as redistributive grant systems affect the incentive of local governments with
respect to tax and expenditure policies. The theoretical literature on the internalizing ef-
fects of fiscal capacity based equalization suggests that the implementation of redistributive
grant systems tends to weaken tax and public input competition (e.g., see Ko¨thenbu¨rger
(2002) and Bucovetsky and Smart (2006)). Recent empirical evidence for Germany (Buet-
tner (2006); Egger et al. (2007)) supports the view that tax rates tend to rise when the
degree of equalization increases. Following Bu¨ttner (2006), we therefore include two control
variables in our regressions to account for substitution and income effects of equalization
grants. The marginal contribution rate describes to which extent an increase in the tax
base reduces the equalization transfers received. For the period between 1998 and 2004 the
average rate was 13.2% with a maximum value of 14.5% and a minimum of 8.8%. Relating
the marginal contribution rate to the tax rate reveals an average equalization rate of around
80%. As a means to control for pure income effects we include unconditional transfers cap-
turing the amount of transfers a municipality would receive if its tax base were actually
zero. This includes equalization transfers and the municipal share of statewide income and
value added taxes.
Furthermore, since differences in taxing capacity may affect local tax and expenditure
policies, we account for a municipality’s relative fiscal capacity. This variable is calculated
by relating a municipality’s fiscal capacity (comprising the local business tax base as well as
other revenue sources, in particular the share of statewide income and value added taxes)
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to its fiscal need, calculated by multiplying a predefined per capita spending need with
the municipality’s population size. Hence, controling for a municipality’s relative fiscal
capacity essentially captures the local budget constraint. The relative fiscal capacity shows
values between 28% and 635% with an average value of 71.4%, indicating that the average
municipality in the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg is not able to cover its spending needs
though own resources and depends on intergovernmental transfers.9
In our analysis, public input provision is defined as spending on the municipal road network.
This choice is straightforward since it seems reasonable to assume that the quality of the
local road infrastructure is of substantial importance for all types of firms. Moreover, the
construction and maintenance of local roads is one of the most important autonomous
municipal responsibilities in Germany. More than 60% of the road network falls under
the municipal domain.10 Between 1998 and 2004, municipalities have spent, on average,
130 Euros per capita (in prices of 2000) on the construction and maintenance of local
roads. A standard deviation of 93 Euros per capita indicates substantial variation in
this expenditure category. As municipalities receive grants in order to fulfill their self-
administrated spending responsibilities, we explicitly control for specific transfers in the
spending category ‘local roads’. This includes grants within the so called ‘traffic and
transport burden sharing’ (Verkehrslastenausgleich), which depend on the length of the
road network and the size of the municipal area. In addition, we include other specific
grants independent of the tax base in order to control for the corresponding income effects.
Other conditioning variables capturing local characteristics include debt service, population
size and population density as well as the population share of the young (less than 16 years)
and the elderly (above 65 years). Furthermore, we also include the unemployment rate as a
proxy for the general demand for spending on social services. Finally, drawing on Bu¨ttner
(2001), we include the share of the population that is affiliated with one of the three major
Christian churches (Catholic, Protestant State, and Protestant Free Church) as well as two
variables that interact this proportion with the rate of unemployment and the share of
elderly people, respectively.11 The inclusion of these variables is warranted as the religious
9See Bu¨ttner (2006) for further details on the municipal system of fiscal equalization in the state of
Baden-Wuerttemberg.
10Due to strong interlinkages of municipal and state responsibilities, other spending categories poten-
tially capturing inputs to production, most notably educational expenditure, can not be considered as
independently provided at the local level. Our empirical analysis therefore focuses on the local road net-
work and captures other expenditures as a residual category.
11Data on religious affiliation is available only for 1987. The slight imprecision in the count of church
members relative to overall population (10 municipalities with a reported share of church members higher
than one) is known from other studies using the same data. Excluding municipalities with implausible
figures does nothing to our estimation results.
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orientation of the population may indicate preferences regarding the provision of local
public goods and, in particular, social services and welfare. The interactions account for
the possibility that, depending on the strength of religious orientation, an increase in the
number of potential welfare recipients may have different effects on the socially preferred
level of social services.
The fact that both the tax rate and public inputs appear as explanatory variables in our
system of equations requires to use some of the exogenous characteristics as instruments
for these variables. Technically, this is achieved by imposing exclusion restrictions with
respect to a subset of the exogenous variables on both equations. An exclusion restriction
for the tax equation is suggested by the system of specific grants. As specific grants for the
construction and maintenance of local roads amount, on average, to only 1.2% of overall
expenditures, the business tax rate should be independent of the level of these grants. To
the contrary, we expect grants for local roads to significantly affect actual spending on the
local road network. Consequently, we include specific grants in the public input equation,
but exclude it from the tax equation. Note that other specific grants amount to 57.4 Euros
per capita, twice as much as specific grants for local roads. We therefore include other
specific grants in both equations to account for potential income effects.
Regarding the exclusion restrictions for the public input equation, note first that local roads
are not only used as public inputs by firms, but are also consumed by private households.
A change in infrastructure spending will therefore have direct as well as indirect effects on
the utility of residents. In contrast, a change in the business tax rate will affect households
only indirectly. This suggests to exclude the variables describing the religious orientation of
the local population and related preferences regarding spending on social services from the
input equation. We thus assume that a stronger preference for spending on social services
and welfare may affect the preferred level of local taxation, but that the level of municipal
spending on physical infrastructure is independent of residents’ religious orientation.
Of course, the quality of the instruments obtained from imposing our exclusion restrictions
is also an empirical question. In particular, to identify public inputs in the tax equation, we
need the specific grants for local roads to be sufficiently strongly partially correlated with
spending on local roads. Furthermore, the identification of the local business tax rate in
the input equation rests on the partial correlations between the tax rate and the proportion
of church members as well as the related interaction terms. We will discuss the quality of
the instruments when turning to the estimation outcomes.
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6.3.3 Results
Table 6.2 and 6.3 present detailed estimation results for a first set of system estimations on
tax and public input competition. The spatial metric is W 15kmpop adj, defining as neighbors of a
given community all municipalities with a physical distance of up to 15 km. As discussed
above, the metric also gives higher weight to larger municipalities in terms of population
size. As mentioned above, we report results from cross-sectional estimations. To check for
the robustness across years, the tables depict regressions for different years.
After excluding the 10 independent cities from the sample, we are left with 1100 cross-
sectional observations. Note that the sample restriction is applied after taking spatial lags.
Hence, while all municipalities are included in the computation of τ−i and s−i, the IV
estimations at the first, third and fourth step of the system estimation approach are based
on the restricted sample.
Table 6.2 reports two columns for each year, where the left one shows estimated coefficients
and corresponding standard errors for the tax equation and the right one depicts the results
for the public input equation. The coefficients of our variables of interest are shown in the
first rows. First of all, we note that the coefficient of neighbors’ taxes is positive and
highly significant in the tax equation in all reported cross-sections, ranging from 0.20 to
0.31. These results suggest that the municipalities in our sample react to tax policies
of their neighbors by adjusting their own business tax rate towards the level chosen in
nearby jurisdictions.12 Note that this finding is well in line with the evidence presented in
Bu¨ttner (2001). However, our results also reveal that there are several other effects at work,
suggesting that the behavior of local governments is much more complex than described
in the earlier empirical tax competition literature. In particular, we find a positive and
statistically significant effect of neighbors’ spending on infrastructure on a community’s own
spending level in three out of four cross-sections. The coefficients indicate that a one-Euro
increase in neighbors’ average spending per capita triggers an increase in a municipality’s
own per-capita spending on infrastructure between 18 and 51 Cents. Hence, our findings
suggest that the municipalities engage in simultaneous tax and public input competition
12In the following, we sometimes interpret the estimates of the strategic effects in terms of reactions of
governments to changes in other municipalities’ policy instruments. Such interpretations always refer to
the partial effects in our static empirical model, and not to any sort of dynamic adjustment.
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for mobile capital.13 A second effect that has not been considered in previous work is that
of neighbors’ taxes on a municipality’s own level of spending on public inputs. In two out
of four cross-sections, we find a negative and statistically significant effect, pointing to local
governments increasing their per-capita spending on infrastructure by about 7 to 11 Euros
per capita in reaction to a one percentage point decrease of their neighbors’ average tax
rate. Note that the sign of all these effects are in line with the predictions of the model
discussed in Section 6.2.
Interestingly, our results also point to direct interaction between fiscal variables within a
community: a one percentage point increase in the statutory tax rate triggers an increase
in spending per capita of 32 Euros in 1998 and of 24 Euros in 2000, while in the 2002 cross-
section we find a negative effect of about 22 Euros. Moreover, for 1998 and 2000 there is a
positive partial effect of public inputs on taxation, indicating that an increase of spending
by 100 Euros per capita would result in a tax rate increase of 0.1 to 0.2 percentage points.
All these findings support the notion that it is important to account for the fact that not
all policy instruments might be adjustable to optimal levels at all points in time.
Besides the evidence on tax and public input competition, there are additional findings
that are worth mentioning. Confirming our expectations, the marginal contribution rate
positively affects the tax rate, while unconditional transfers exert a negative impact on
local taxes. Both findings are in line with Bu¨ttner (2006) and support the view that a
higher degree of redistribution within a system of fiscal equalization alleviates business
tax competition. In addition, there is evidence for a negative impact of the marginal
contribution rate on public input provision in two out of four cross-sections. This suggests
that fiscal equalization counteracts both tax and public input competition. Furthermore,
unconditional transfers are found to positively affect public inputs. An increase of these
transfers by one Euro per capita brings about an increase in infrastructure spending per
capita of 0.18 to 0.24 Euros. Regarding relative fiscal capacity, our expectations are also
confirmed: municipalities with higher capacity set lower tax rates and spend more on
public inputs. With respect to the characteristics which are used as instruments in either
the tax or the public input equation, we note that spending on local roads strongly reacts
to the amount of specific grants received for that purpose. In addition, we find at least
two highly significant variables capturing the religious orientation of the population in
13The positive impact of neighbors’ spending on a municipality’s own spending is unlikely to be driven
by technological externalities since the construction and maintenance of major interconnecting roads and
highways falls into the responsibility the federal government or the states. Our measure of local public input
provision thus includes only spending on roads with a very limited potential impact on the productivity of
capital invested in other municipalities.
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all cross-sections.14 Finally, we note a positive impact of debt service on local taxes and a
negative impact on public input provision, and a negative (positive) effect of unemployment
(population) on the tax rate.
Regarding the quality of the instruments, we first note that τ−i and s−i are identified by a
strong partial correlation with first and second-order spatial lags of exogenous community
characteristics, resulting in F -statistics of the excluded instruments in the corresponding
first-stage regressions larger than 50 in general.15 Hence, we are confident that our identifi-
cation approach with respect to the spatial effects does not suffer from a weak instruments
problem. With respect to a community’s own tax rate and public input as endogenous ex-
planatory variables, we first checked the performance of the instruments in the first stage
regression in terms of statistical significance. The specific-grants variable is always highly
significant in the first-stage regression of public inputs on the set of instruments, with t-
statistics around 10. In the first-stage regression of the tax rate, both the proportion of
church members and the interaction with the rate of unemployment are generally signifi-
cant at the 1% level. However, since the F -statistics for a community’s own tax rate and
public input are relatively small, we also checked the critical values for the Stock-Yogo
weak identification test. We were able to reject the null that the bias of our IV estimation
exceeds 20% of the bias in the corresponding OLS estimation in all cases, lending further
support to our identification strategy.
The spatial metric used in the estimations reported in Table 6.2 assigns 23 neighbors on
average to each municipality. In addition, there is substantial variation in the number of
neighbors, ranging from one to 54. As a first robustness check of our findings with respect
to the definition of neighborliness among municipalities, Table 6.3 reports results of the
same estimations as before, with the metric W 10 nearestpop adj based on the definition of the 10
nearest communities (in terms of physical distance) as neighbors, weighted by population.
A first point to mention is that all main effects from Table 6.2 are robust to the change
in the metric. The effect of neighbors’ taxes on a municipality’s own tax rate is estimated
to be significantly positive but somewhat smaller than before, ranging from 0.16 to 0.21.
The impact of neighbors’ spending on infrastructure on the local provision of public inputs
is of similar size as before, with estimated coefficients ranging from 0.22 to 0.39. The
results also confirm the finding that the municipalities take into account the level of taxes
among neighbors when choosing their level of spending on the local road network. Even
14Note, however, that this finding is not sufficient to rule out a potential problem of weak identification.
We comment on this below.
15We refer to the 2SLS estimation that is performed as the third step of the estimation procedure.
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with respect to the strength of the interaction, we do not find any significant difference
compared to the results reported in Table 6.2. A brief inspection of the evidence regarding
the control variables reveals that the effects mentioned above are highly robust to the
change in the metric, too.
To some extent, the evidence on tax and public input competition depends on which cross-
sections are used for estimation, and it might therefore be useful to have a look on average
effects. Table 6.4 reports the results of a system estimation after applying a between-
transformation, i.e. after taking averages of all variables over time. Using t = 1, . . . , T as
the index of time periods, the transformed system reads
τ¯i = θτ s¯i + λτ τ¯−i + ϕτ s¯−i + βτX¯τi + u¯i (17)
s¯i = θsτ¯i + λsτ¯−i + ϕss¯−i + βsX¯si + v¯i, (18)
where τ¯i = T
−1∑
t τit, X¯i = T
−1∑
tXit, τ¯−i =
∑
j wij τ¯j, etc. The between-estimations
confirm the presence of direct strategic interaction in the choice of taxes and public inputs.
UsingW 15kmpop adj as the spatial metric, we find an average direct tax competition effect of 0.263
and a direct public input competition effect of 0.211. With W 10 nearestpop adj , the corresponding
point estimates are 0.328 and 0.215, respectively.
The result regarding the impact of neighbors’ taxes on own spending on infrastructure is
mixed: the null of no interaction cannot be rejected under the metric W 15kmpop adj, but it is
rejected under W 10 nearestpop adj at the 10% level of significance. However, the magnitude of the
estimated effect is rather small.
6.3.4 Robustness
The results discussed so far have been derived under specific assumptions with respect to
spatial metrics. In related applications it has been shown that the choice of the metric may
be of critical importance Baicker (2005), and it therefore seems to be warranted to discuss
the issue in more detail.
While choosing a metric based on some geographical definition of neighborliness seems to
be accepted as a general rule in applications involving local jurisdictions (Bu¨ttner (2001),
Bu¨ttner (2003)), no consensus has evolved how to exactly specify the weights. However, as
argued by Conley (1999), in many cases the application itself suggests a certain strategy.
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In our case, for instance, the significant differences in the jurisdictions’ size together with
the fact that the key issue driving local governments into strategic interaction is a fiscal
externality warrant to include some measure of size. Moreover, there are also technical
aspects that need to be considered. As shown in the descriptive statistics (Table 6.1), the
cross-sectional variation of the tax rate is rather limited. Taking averages over neighboring
jurisdictions’ tax rates will, of course, give a variable with even smaller variation. This
problem can be expected to become the more severe the more municipalities are, on average,
defined as neighbors for a given community. In fact, with sufficiently many communities
included in the calculation of neighbors’ taxes, τ−i will quickly converge towards the regional
(or even the statewide) average of taxes. Defining many municipalities as neighbors for
a given community will thus result in τ−i becoming a poor measure for the tax effort of
nearby municipalities.
To exemplify the last point, we have assembled in Table 6.5 some descriptive statistics
for neighbors’ average tax rates (τ−i) and neighbors’ expenditures on infrastructure (s−i)
according to different spatial metrics (based on data for the year 2000).
The first four rows depict statistics for spatial metrics that take either the municipalities
within a distance of up to 15km or the 10 geographically closest municipalities to be
neighbors of a given municipality. Irrespective of whether we take the weights of neighbors
to be uniform or to be defined based on the inverse of the great circle distance, the variable
capturing the average tax rate of neighbors shows very limited variation. With uniform
weights assigned to municipalities within a distance up to 15km, for instance, the variation
in neighbors’ average tax rate is actually modest, with a minimum of 0.16 and a maximum
of 0.177. However, if we account for asymmetries in population size (last two rows), the
variation in the resulting series is significantly higher. Note that, due to higher variation
in local expenditures per capita, the computation of neighbors’ spending on infrastructure
does not seem to be affected by the problem of quick convergence towards regional or
statewide averages.
Based on the preceding discussion, we expect the estimates regarding the impact of τ−i to
critically depend on the choice of the spatial metric. In contrast, the estimates regarding the
coefficient of s−i should be more robust to the definition of neighbors. To check to what
degree this presumption is supported by our data, we estimated our system of reaction
functions using the different spatial metrics. Table 6.6 gives an overview on the estimated
coefficients of interest for a number of cross-sections.
We note that using W 15kmuniform, W
15km
inverse, W
10 nearest
uniform and W
10 nearest
inverse results in very large estimates
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of λτ compared to W
15km
pop adj and W
10 nearest
pop adj . This is well in line with our expectations, as
the variation in τ−i tends to be low (recall that, with the weight matrix approaching a
matrix of uniform weights for all other municipalities, τ−i becomes a constant measuring
the average tax rate among all communities). Note that for our system of equations to be
stable, λτ is required to be smaller than one in absolute value. There are two estimations
based on the 2004 cross-section where this requirement is barely met, adding further doubt
about the appropriateness of spatial metrics that define ‘large’ sets of neighbors and that
do not account for the municipalities’ relative population size. It is also worth mentioning
that the estimate for the interaction effect in public input provision, ϕs, is much more
robust to changes regarding the spatial metric. Noting that the variation in spending on
infrastructure is much higher than the variation in tax rates, and that defining a composite
neighbor from a large set of communities should therefore be less of a technical problem, it is
reassuring that the conclusions regarding public input competition are not critically affected
by the choice of a spatial metric that defines either smaller or larger sets of neighbors.
6.4 Conclusions
Although it seems natural to think of governments’ choices regarding taxes and public
inputs as alternative means to attract mobile capital, most of the literature on fiscal com-
petition has focused either on taxes or on expenditures. This study offers a comprehensive
treatment of tax and public input competition, with a focus on the strategic interaction
between governments in simultaneously choosing both policy instruments. We use a sim-
ple theoretical model to characterize the two-dimensional system of tax and public input
reaction functions. We then test the predictions of the model with respect to the strategic
behavior of governments. Using a systems estimator for spatially interrelated equations,
we show that the fiscal policies of local jurisdictions in Germany are well in line with the
model’s predictions.
Our findings suggest that the behavior of local jurisdictions is much more complex than
described by the earlier empirical literature on fiscal competition. In particular, the es-
timation results of our system of interrelated equations show a positive and significant
direct interaction effect in the local business tax rate. Municipalities facing competition
by low-tax jurisdictions thus set lower taxes than municipalities with high-tax neighbors.
Secondly, the local governments also adjust their level of spending on infrastructure to-
wards the average level among neighboring jurisdictions. For our preferred specifications,
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the direct interaction effect in public input provision is statistically different from zero in 10
out of 14 cross-sections, and it tends to be larger than the direct interaction effect in taxes.
Moreover, treating taxes and public inputs as alternative means to attract capital reveals
that the municipalities react to competition in a rather flexible way: if neighbors lower
their taxes, a municipality not only adjusts its own tax rate, but also increases its level of
public input provision. Finally, we demonstrate that our results depend on the choice of
the spatial spatial metric in a predictable way, and that all main results are robust across
various cross-sections.
Several lines of further research seem to be promising. First of all, it would be interesting
to compare our results to evidence regarding tax and expenditure competition from other
countries. Depending on the institutional environment, taking into account different policy
instruments could yield further insights into the rather complex process of fiscal policy
decision making at the local level. For instance, with respect to the US, our findings
suggest to treat local property taxes and local expenditures for public schools as well as
public safety as jointly determined endogenous variables. Moreover, we think that some of
the recently proposed improvements regarding spatial estimation techniques can fruitfully
be applied in cases that are of interest both from an academic and from a policy perspective.
Further advances towards estimation techniques for systems of interrelated equations and
panel data would therefore be highly welcome.
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6.5 Appendix
The system (7) under symmetry
Plugging in the various derivatives into (7) gives −g2+3b4b2 g2+2bkg+b4b2
g2+2bkg+b
4b2
−g2+b2k2+b(4gk−1)
4b2
 dti
dgi
 =
 −g2+b4b2 g2+b4b2
g2+2bkg−b
4b2
−g2−2bkg+b
4b2
 dtj
dgj
 .
(A.1)
The symmetric equilibrium
In order to derive the symmetric Nash equilibrium, we form the first order conditions of
(6) with respect to the tax rate,
ti =
(g2i + b) (bk + gi − gj + tj)
g2i + 3b
. (A.2)
Having done that for each country, we invoke symmetry in g, giving us a symmetric tax
rate of
to =
1
2
(b+ g2)k. (A.3)
In the next step, we proceed analogously for public inputs, i.e. we form the first order
conditions of (6) with respect to public inputs, then impose symmetry in t, giving us
go =
√
b2k4 + 4bk2 + 8tk − bk2
2k
. (A.4)
Combining (A.3) and (A.4) provides us with the Nash equilibrium values of
g∗ = 2/k, t∗ = (bk2 + 4)/(2k). (A.5)
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Sufficient conditions
We have to check that the second derivatives of the welfare function with respect to own
instruments are negative at the symmetric equilibrium. To see this, note that
∂2Ui
∂ti∂ti
∣∣∣∣
g=g∗
= −3b+
4
k2
4b2
< 0 (A.6)
and
∂2Ui
∂gi∂gi
∣∣∣∣
g=g∗
= −b (bk
2 + 7) + 4
k2
4b2
< 0. (A.7)
Note furthermore that the Hessian determinant evaluated at the Nash equilibrium is
|H| |g=g∗ = 3k
2
16b
. (A.8)
Since this expression is positive, all sufficient conditions for a maximum are met.
Stability
To address the issue of stability of the symmetric equilibrium, we take a look at the slopes
of the reaction functions, given in (10) and (11). There, we see that (bk2 − 4)/3bk2,
−(bk2−4)/3bk2, −4/3bk2 and 4/3bk2 are all less than one in absolute value for any b > 4/k2,
the condition imposed in the main text. Note furthermore that due to the symmetric
marginal reaction of capital to both instruments from (4), it is possible to determine the
slope of a ‘net policy response function’ by adding the absolute values of the slopes of
both of i’s reactions to a marginal change in one of j’s instruments. They add to 1/3,
demonstrating stability in the policy response around the symmetric Nash equilibrium.
To give an example, a marginally higher public input in j triggers a reaction in i’s tax
instrument with slope −(bk2−4)/3bk2 and a reaction in the public input with slope 4/3bk2.
From (3), we know that the tax response affects capital in just the opposite direction than
the public input response, so adding both terms in absolute values gives us the combined
‘policy response’ slope of 1/3.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Statutory tax rate, τ 0.167 0.006 0.145 0.210
Spending for local roads per capita, s 130 92.8 0.815 1739
Marginal contribution rate 0.132 0.011 0.088 0.145
Unconditional transfers per capita 300 50.3 96.5 447
Fiscal capacity 0.714 0.272 0.276 6.35
Specific grants for local roads per capita 27.3 53.7 -76.5 1730
Other specific grants per capita 57.4 33.0 -3.92 282
Debt service per capita 10.6 35.2 -858 280
Population (1,000s) 7.81 10.7 0.101 112
Population densitya 0.300 0.302 0.017 2.50
Unemployment 0.062 0.013 0.025 0.127
% population< 16 years 0.181 0.022 0.101 0.300
% population> 65 years 0.155 0.027 0.071 0.347
% church members 0.891 0.053 0.706 1.04
a (total population)/1000 per square kilometer; Nob=7700 (1100 municipalities from 1998 to 2004, independent cities ex-
cluded); Fiscal variables in Euros (prices of 2000). Source: Statistical Office of Baden-Wuerttemberg and own calculations.
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Table 6.2: Tax and public input competition, system estimation using W 15kmpop adj
Cross section 1998 2000 2002 2004
Dependent variable τ s τ s τ s τ s
Neighbors’ tax rate 0.196 ??? -731 ?? 0.207 ??? -1055 ?? 0.278 ??? 68.4 0.314 ??? 60.0
(0.049) (350) (0.049) (427) (0.055) (559) (0.058) (480)
Neighbors’ public input -0.000 0.178 ? -0.000 0.507 ??? 0.000 0.237 ?? 0.000 0.148
(0.000) (0.095) (0.000) (0.096) (0.000) (0.124) (0.000) (0.108)
Own tax rate - 3190 ??? - 2396 ??? - -2176 ?? - -171
(801) (924) (1057) (772)
Own public input 0.00002 ??? - 0.00001 ??? - 0.000 - -0.000 -
(4D-06) (4D-06) (0.000) (0.000)
Marg. contr. rate 0.098 ??? -810 ??? 0.091 ??? -523 0.065 ?? 342 0.088 ??? -469 ?
(0.029) (302) (0.026) (318) (0.030) (426) (0.030) (276)
Uncond. transfers -0.00002 ??? 0.241 ??? -0.00002 ??? 0.175 ?? -0.00002 ??? 0.199 ?? -0.00004 ??? 0.215 ???
(7D-06) (0.070) (6D-06) (0.075) (7D-06) (0.097) (8D-06) (0.075)
Fiscal capacity -0.001 46.0 ??? -0.002 ? 87.7 ??? -0.002 ? 95.7 ??? -0.004 ??? 52.8 ???
(0.001) (13.5) (0.001) (14.4) (0.001) (15.7) (0.001) (10.5)
Specific grants - 0.995 ??? - 1.05 ??? - 1.30 ??? - 1.12 ???
for local roads (0.044) (0.051) (0.047) (0.037)
Other specific 0.00001 ? -0.005 0.000 0.025 0.000 0.010 0.00002 ?? 0.004
grants (7D-06) (0.071) (0.000) (0.073) (0.000) (0.078) (7D-06) (0.060)
Debt service 0.00005 ??? -0.112 0.00004 ??? -0.153 ?? 0.00004 ??? -0.100 0.00002 ??? -0.116 ??
(6D-06) (0.072) (6D-06) (0.074) (5D-06) (0.078) (5D-06) (0.049)
Unemployment -1.01 ??? 194 -1.27 ??? 265 -1.50 ??? -70.3 -1.23 ??? 166
(0.266) (147) (0.316) (200) (0.344) (280) (0.337) (186)
Population 0.0002 ??? 0.119 0.0002 ??? 0.309 0.0002 ??? 1.02 ?? 0.0002 ??? 0.625 ??
(1,000s) (0.00002) (0.272) (0.00002) (0.308) (0.00002) (0.418) (0.00002) (0.274)
Pop. density 0.000 -22.1 ?? 0.001 -18.1 ? 0.000 -6.59 0.000 -7.80
(0.000) (9.25) (0.001) (10.1) (0.000) (11.6) (0.000) (8.17)
% pop.< 16 years -0.005 -42.8 -0.004 25.6 -0.005 40.6 -0.015 212 ?
(0.012) (120) (0.012) (138) (0.012) (165) (0.014) (127)
% pop.> 65 years -0.272 ?? -37.8 -0.187 ? -112 -0.075 50.4 -0.089 140
(0.111) (98.3) (0.111) (109) (0.111) (124) (0.118) (88.2)
% church members -0.132 ??? - -0.114 ??? - -0.115 ??? - -0.109 ??? -
(0.028) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032)
% church members× 1.07 ??? - 1.32 ??? - 1.57 ??? - 1.28 ??? -
unemployment (0.295) (0.352) (0.383) (0.374)
% church members× 0.308 ?? - 0.219 ? - 0.108 - 0.107 -
% pop.> 65 years (0.123) (0.123) (0.123) (0.130)
R2 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.37 0.20 0.43 0.17 0.49
F -tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 110.3 215.7 105.4 199.6 73.6 133.9 94.1 115.0
s−i 77.7 91.2 95.6 104.1 68.0 65.4 49.8 54.7
Own tax rate - 5.0 - 5.8 - 6.9 - 5.4
Own public input 7.3 - 8.7 - 7.7 - 16.6 -
Sample includes all municipalities up to independent cities, Nob=1100. Spatial metric for constructing τ−i and s−i isW 15kmpop adj
(see notes in Table 6.5 for details). Standard errors in parentheses. R2 is from the third step of the estimation procedure
(2SLS after taking account of spatial error correlation). F -tests of excluded IVs are from first-stage regressions of the 2SLS
estimation in the third step of the estimation procedure. Significance levels: ? 10%; ?? 5%; ??? 1%.
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Table 6.3: Tax and public input competition, system estimation using W 10 nearestpop adj
Cross section 1998 2000 2002 2004
Dependent variable τ s τ s τ s τ s
Neighbors’ tax rate 0.158 ??? -678 ? 0.177 ??? -796 ? 0.212 ??? -604 0.213 ??? -1412 ???
(0.041) (398) (0.040) (481) (0.040) (503) (0.044) (373)
Neighbors’ public input -0.000 0.086 0.000 0.389 ??? 0.00001 ? 0.134 -0.000 0.217 ???
(0.000) (0.072) (0.000) (0.075) (7D-06) (0.086) (0.000) (0.080)
Own tax rate - 3039 ??? - 1276 - -560 - 3283 ???
(821) (923) (1066) (800)
Own public input 0.00002 ??? - 0.00001 ? - 0.000 - 0.000 -
(4D-06) (4D-06) (0.000) (0.000)
Marg. contr. rate 0.089 ??? -774 ?? 0.080 ??? -470 0.089 ??? 120 0.098 ??? -763 ???
(0.028) (303) (0.025) (323) (0.029) (433) (0.029) (289)
Uncond. transfers -0.00002 ??? 0.225 ??? -0.00002 ??? 0.170 ?? -0.00002 ??? 0.265 ??? -0.00004 ??? 0.304 ???
(7D-06) (0.071) (6D-06) (0.073) (7D-06) (0.09) (8D-06) (0.080)
Fiscal capacity -0.001 45.7 ??? -0.003 ?? 85.2 ??? -0.003 ?? 100 ??? -0.004 ??? 62.4 ???
(0.001) (13.4) (0.001) (14.2) (0.001) (15.5) (0.001) (10.6)
Specific grants - 0.999 ??? - 1.05 ??? - 1.30 ??? - 1.10 ???
for local roads (0.045) (0.051) (0.047) (0.038)
Other specific 0.00001 ? -0.004 0.00001 ? 0.064 0.00001 ? 0.003 0.00001 ? -0.060
grants (7D-06) (0.071) (6D-06) (0.073) (6D-06) (0.078) (7D-06) (0.062)
Debt service 0.00004 ??? -0.096 0.00004 ??? -0.089 0.00003 ??? -0.153 ?? 0.00002 ??? -0.194 ???
(6D-06) (0.072) (6D-06) (0.074) (5D-06) (0.077) (5D-06) (0.048)
Unemployment -0.961 ??? 189 -1.10 ??? 187 -1.18 ??? 93.7 -0.913 ??? 425 ???
(0.264) (140) (0.312) (183) (0.334) (248) (0.316) (157)
Population 0.0002 ??? 0.169 0.0002 ??? 0.315 0.0002 ??? 0.585 0.0002 ??? 0.027
(1,000s) (0.00002) (0.267) (0.00002) (0.275) (0.00002) (0.3759) (0.00002) (0.272)
Pop. density 0.000 -26.8 ??? 0.000 -22.8 ?? -0.000 -12.7 -0.000 -12.3
(0.000) (8.45) (0.000) (9.29) (0.000) (10.5) (0.000) (7.56)
% pop.< 16 years -0.003 -9.84 -0.000 51.8 -0.001 80.9 -0.007 241 ?
(0.012) (118) (0.011) (136) (0.012) (163) (0.014) (128)
% pop.> 65 years -0.248 ?? -7.39 -0.198 ? -52.5 -0.094 77.1 -0.025 115
(0.110) (97.0) (0.110) (107) (0.109) (120) (0.112) (87.8)
% church members -0.124 ??? - -0.106 ??? - -0.100 ??? - -0.077 ?? -
(0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.030)
% church members× 1.02 ??? - 1.16 ??? - 1.25 ??? - 0.965 ??? -
unemployment (0.294) (0.349) (0.372) (0.351)
% church members× 0.280 ?? - 0.229 ? - 0.126 - 0.037 -
% pop.> 65 years (0.122) (0.122) (0.121) (0.124)
R2 0.21 0.38 0.22 0.39 0.22 0.45 0.21 0.48
F -tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 77.0 76.1 76.3 63.2 69.0 63.4 88.6 93.7
s−i 72.6 78.7 67.1 63.9 38.9 33.7 37.5 36.8
Own tax rate - 4.9 - 5.8 - 5.7 - 4.1
Own public input 6.9 - 9.5 - 7.1 - 14.7 -
Sample includes all municipalities up to independent cities, Nob=1100. Spatial metric for constructing τ−i and s−i is
W 10 nearestpop adj (see notes in Table 6.5 for details). Standard errors in parentheses. R
2 is from the third step of the estimation
procedure (2SLS after taking account of spatial error correlation). F -tests of excluded IVs are from first-stage regressions of
the 2SLS estimation in the third step of the estimation procedure. Significance levels: ? 10%; ?? 5%; ??? 1%.
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Table 6.4: Tax and public input competition, system estimation after between-
transformation
Spatial metric W 15kmpop adj W
10 nearest
pop adj
Dependent variable τ s τ s
Neighbors’ tax rate 0.263 ??? -387 0.211 ??? -505 ?
(0.050) (352) (0.039) (263)
Neighbors’ public input -0.000 0.328 ??? -0.000 0.215 ???
(0.000) (0.081) (0.000) (0.060)
Own tax rate - 1658 ??? - 1591 ??
(568) (632)
Own public input 0.00002 ??? - 0.00001 ??? -
(5D-06) (5D-06)
Marginal contribution rate 0.098 ??? -372 0.093 ?? -438
(0.037) (278) (0.036) (282)
Unconditional transfers -0.00003 ??? 0.261 ??? -0.00003 ??? 0.259 ???
(7D-06) (0.054) (7D-06) (0.057)
Fiscal capacity -0.002 87.7 ??? -0.003 ?? 84.7 ???
(0.002) (11.7) (0.001) (11.8)
Specific grants for local roads - 1.17 ??? - 1.17 ???
(0.044) (0.044)
Other specific grants 0.00001 ? 0.016 0.00001 ? 0.019
(7D-06) (0.047) (6D-06) (0.048)
Debt service 0.00004 ??? -0.166 ??? 0.00004 ??? -0.153 ???
(6D-06) (0.050) (6D-06) (0.050)
Unemployment -1.41 ??? 179 -1.15 ??? 232 ?
(0.314) (147) (0.306) (134)
Population (1,000s) 0.0002 ??? 0.133 0.0002 ??? 0.198
(0.00002) (0.203) (0.00002) (0.228)
Pop. density 0.000 -8.43 0.000 -15.8 ??
(0.000) (6.38) (0.000) (6.19)
% pop.< 16 years -0.010 90.6 -0.004 109
(0.013) (94.7) (0.013) (94.6)
% pop.> 65 years -0.141 -4.47 -0.135 25.8
(0.108) (70.3) (0.107) (69.6)
% church members -0.127 ??? - -0.109 ??? -
(0.028) (0.027)
% church members×unemployment 1.47 ??? - 1.21 ??? -
(0.349) (0.340)
% church members×% pop.> 65 years 0.165 - 0.158 -
(0.120) (0.118)
R2 0.22 0.48 0.22 0.39
F -tests of excluded IVs:
τ−i 108.2 149.1 81.2 91.1
s−i 124.0 123.8 83.5 79.9
Own tax rate - 6.3 - 6.0
Own public input 15.9 - 16.5 -
Sample includes observations for all municipalities up to independent cities after between-transformation using years 1998,
2000, 2002, and 2004, Nob=1100. Standard errors in parentheses. R2 is from the third step of the estimation procedure
(2SLS after taking account of spatial error correlation). F -tests of excluded IVs are from first-stage regressions of the 2SLS
estimation in the third step of the estimation procedure. Significance levels: ? 10%; ?? 5%; ??? 1%.
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Table 6.5: Neighbors’ tax rates and infrastructure spending for different spatial metrics,
year 2000
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Spatial metric τ−i s−i τ−i s−i τ−i s−i τ−i s−i
W 15kmuniform 0.167 140 0.0030 31.3 0.160 76.3 0.177 253
W 15kminverse 0.167 139 0.0032 33.6 0.159 68.8 0.182 329
W 10 nearestuniform 0.167 139 0.0034 37.4 0.157 66.0 0.181 332
W 10 nearestinverse 0.167 139 0.0036 40.6 0.156 66.9 0.182 465
W 15kmpop adj 0.171 147 0.0068 28.9 0.160 83.7 0.198 281
W 10 nearestpop adj 0.169 146 0.0066 35.4 0.156 72.0 0.204 326
W 15kmuniform: Municipalities with distance < 15km defined as neighbors, weights uniform. W
15km
inverse: Municipalities with distance
< 15km defined as neighbors, weights based on inverse distance. W 10 nearestuniform : 10 geographically closest municipalities defined
as neighbors, weights uniform. W 10 nearestinverse : 10 geographically closest municipalities defined as neighbors, weights based on
inverse distance. W 15kmpop adj: Municipalities with distance < 15km defined as neighbors, weights based on relative population
size. W 10 nearestpop adj : 10 geographically closest municipalities defined as neighbors, weights based on relative population size. All
weight matrices are row-standardized.
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Conclusion
So, what do I make of all this? In a wide sense, my work on this dissertation has taught me
just how many ways and channels there are, even in simple settings, through which taxes
that are set in policy competition affect economic actors and their behavior, and how am-
ple the realm of immediate and oblique impacts (and hence the scope of their purpose) is.
International taxation is a fascinating field of study precisely because it features two traits:
On the one hand, competition from a different country has a bearing on the feasibility of
optimal policy, as illustrated, e.g., by Chapter 5. This is the standard, well-examined com-
petition effect with all the ensuing externalities that arise when non-cooperative solutions
are reached. But on the other hand, things like, for instance, the subsidy-induced out-
sourcing to circumvent a labor market distortion from Chapter 3, are possible via taxes,
and roles can be played by them, that are not even conceivable in closed economies. I
have built on a large literature that is centered around the question how governments are
constrained in their tax policy-choosing behavior in a world where integration is becoming
ever deeper in goods and factor markets (above all the capital market); and I have put
emphasis on the question how this is related to labor market distortions, on which a huge,
different body of work exists.
Obviously, the questions asked and the tools and methods used to analyze the topics in
question in this dissertation vary rather widely, and this is definitely not a place where
I want to repeat all the findings. This whole project has shown roles for taxes that go
far beyond what typically comes to one’s mind firstly when thinking about subsidies and
business or commodity taxes. In the different chapters, taxes first rather conventionally
serve as a way to attract a new competitor to a concentrated market - duly taking into
account how this affects existing industry. They are then used as a strategic device to
give a labor market institution an incentive to behave in a way that is desirable from
the viewpoint of the governments, in a setting where the latter are using a subsidy to
compete for mobile capital. In this interpretation, Chapter 2’s taxes are like a deal offer
to a trade union. Chapter 3 then shows how a unionized country’s tax can be interpreted
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as an offer to the other country – so, taxes play their efficiency-enhancing role in another
way: This time the union is not tamed, but outplayed in that production moves to a
non-unionized location, whose tax rate is strategically pushed down to the benefit of the
unionized one. The story then goes on in that the next part, Chapter 4, shows yet another
role for taxes: They are theoretically predicted and empirically shown to compensate firms
for wage differentials. In that way, they present an offer to firms. In a somewhat bold
reduction, one could say that a labor market distortion, typically very difficult to tackle
directly, may be addressed with tax and subsidy policies by taming a union, outplaying it
or by compensating firms. To the extent to which tax competition is a partial remedy to
a labor market distortion, it is clearly advantageous, especially in view of experiences that
direct approaches, otherwise preferable, are often hard to implement. So an insight that
may be helpful for policymakers is that lowered business taxes may well have reasons and
purposes that go beyond the simple ‘competing for capital’ story.
With those little bits and pieces pulled together, it becomes clear what an eminent role
labor market distortions play in tax competition. Imperfect goods markets have been
analyzed for a while in this context, but I think there is a lot of work to be done, of both
theoretical and then definitely also empirical nature, on how tax competition in various
fields influences and is fed back on by labor market institutions and distortions. Chapter 3
has already given a first glance at my expectance that a lot will depend on how important
efficiency aspects will be relative to distributional issues. This arguably not only differs
across countries, but also across sectors. In light of the importance that is given to labor
market distortions and especially their consequences like unemployment by politicians and
the general public, it is astounding that there is not more work on this. After all, a badly
working labor market has the spiny property of at the same time making the marginal
value of an inflow of capital larger (in a ‘real’ and a ‘political economy’ sense) and the
government budget leeway smaller. Europe today, with its integrated capital market and
countries which differ in size, labor costs, labor market institutions and, at least for the
time being, business and commodity tax regimes, seems a fascinating playing field for policy
analysis, with many policy-relevant practical questions to be addressed, modelled and later
estimated. It would be especially promising when one could empirically disentangle to
which extent lowered business taxes increase the scope for high-wage policies, and to which
extent unions increasingly view themselves as competitors for mobile capital, aligning their
interests to governments’ at least in this respect.
Another point this dissertation has made is just how important and influential ownership
structures can be in competition for mobile capital, as well as in goods taxation. To the
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extent that globalization leads to more and more firms (or greater percentages of their
stock) being owned by foreigners, the likelihood that any two competing governments
will disregard them goes up. In Chapter 1, I have shown that not owning ‘its’ industry
may make a government more likely to attract FDI, even without any lobbying by home
industry involved; Chapter 5 shows how foreign ownership of firms can render otherwise
optimal regulation relatively inefficient. Again, Europe will be an interesting place to watch
as with the free movement of capital in an integrated market, more and more capital can
be expected to be by in non-residents’ hands. This thesis has shown this will not only be
relevant in capital, but also in commodity taxation.
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